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ALL WORLD WARS
INTERROGATION OF GENERAL FIELD MARSHAL WILHELM KEITEL,
Mondorf Resort, Luxembourg, June 17, 1945
Interrogation of Keitel Wilhelm, Field Marshal, 62, Chief of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces
Mondorf Resort, Luxembourg
June 17, 1945
Question: Since what time did you occupy the post of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces?
Answer: I was the Chief of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces since 1935, and, fulfilling these duties, I was in charge of the development, organization, and conduct of operations of the country's armed forces — the Wehrmacht, the Air Force, and the Navy.
Question: Were you a member of the national socialist party?
Answer: According to the rule in the German Army, military personnel cannot be members of any party, and I was no exception. In 1939, I was awarded the Golden NSDAP honorary badge by Hitler's decree, but this award was not related to the party's membership. In 1939, military orders had not been restored in Germany yet, and therefore Hitler, willing to reward me after the seizure of Czechoslovakia, gave me this badge.
Question: Did you agree with the policy of the national socialist party?
Answer: This question is difficult for me to answer. I cannot say that I agreed with all the party's activities. However, I supported its strengthening and restoring Germany's armed forces. I have to declare that now, after a long time, it is difficult for me to remember all those events, and therefore, I find it hard to answer.
Question: Since Germany started preparing for the war against the Soviet Union, what part in this preparation did you play?
Answer: The question of the possibility of war with the Soviet Union was put first with some certainty by the end of 1940. In the fall of 1940 - winter of 1940-1941, this question was raised only in connection with the possibility of active operations of the German armed forces in the East to prevent Russia's attack on Germany. During the winter of 1941 - spring of 1941, the war in the East was considered almost inevitable, and the General Staff began preparatory measures and the development of war plans. During this period, General Staff took no specific measures.
I cannot say what political plans Hitler had, but I assessed the war preparation in the East from a strictly military point of view. The General Staff had the information that from the early spring of 1941, the Soviet Union began a massive concentration of its forces in the border areas, which was evidence of the preparation of the USSR, if not to the opening of hostilities, then at least to exert open military pressure on the German foreign policy.
Initially, I was very skeptical about the possibility of a war in the East. My memorandum to the Foreign Minister of September 1940, in which I considered a conflict with the Soviet Union unlikely, can be used as proof of my position. However, in the course of the winter of 1940-1941, this opinion underwent significant changes, primarily under the influence of intelligence information on the concentration of the Russian troops.
It was clear that the Soviet Union was conducting a similar preparation using diplomacy. I believe that the decisive event in this regard was Molotov's visit to Berlin and his talks with the leaders of the German government. After these negotiations, I learned that the Soviet Union had utterly unacceptable conditions concerning Romania, Finland, and the Baltic States. Since that time, we could assume that the issues of war with the USSR became resolved. It should be understood that the threat of an attack by the Red Army had become clear to Germany.
This danger became especially evident after the steps taken by the USSR in Balkan politics. In particular, in the relations of the Soviet Union with Yugoslavia, we saw that Stalin unequivocally promised military support to Yugoslavia and expected to use it as a convenient political springboard for deploying diplomatic pressure and, if necessary, direct military actions. Our conclusions immediately suggested the need to neutralize these measures of the Soviet Union, which was done by a blitzkrieg strike on Yugoslavia.
I affirm that all preparatory activities that we carried out before the spring of 1941 were defensive preparations in case of a possible attack by the Red Army. Of course, in preparing these actions, we decided to choose a more efficient way, namely, to prevent an attack by Soviet Russia and to defeat its armed forces with an unexpected blow. Thus, to a certain extent, the entire war in the East can be called preventive.
By the spring of 1941, I was of the definite opinion that the Russian troops' intense concentration and subsequent attack on Germany could put us strategically and economically in an exceptionally critical position. Two flank bases of operations in East Prussia and Upper Silesia were particularly threatened. The Russian attack would put Germany in a highly unfavorable situation in the first weeks. Our offensive was a direct consequence of this threat.
From a political point of view, it was clear that Stalin put his hopes on a prolonged war in the West. He decided to wait until the war depleted Germany as much as possible. The delay will provide an opportunity for the USSR to take the initiative in world politics into its own hands.
At present, as a person involved in assessing the situation and planning events of 1941, it is difficult for me to fully develop an objective opinion about the correctness of our plans. However, in 1941, when General Staff was preparing military plans, it was guided by the fundamental provisions I indicated above.
Question: Tell us in general about the strategical and operational plans of the German High Command in the war against the Soviet Union?
Answer: In developing the strategic and operational plans of war in the East, I proceeded from the following prerequisites:
a) The exceptional size of the Russian territory makes it impossible to conquer it completely.
b) To achieve victory in the war against the USSR, it is enough to reach the most critical operational and strategic line, namely, the Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad-Caucasus line, which would exclude the practical possibility for Russia to offer military resistance since the Red Army will be cut off from its most important bases, and firstly, from the oil.
c) A quick defeat of the Red Army was necessary to complete this task, which must be carried out in time to prevent the possibility of a war on two fronts.
I have to emphasize that our calculations did not include the complete conquest of Russia. Actions against Russia after the defeat of the Red Army were planned only in the form of creating a military administration (the so-called Reich Commissariat). I am not aware of what was expected to do later; political leadership probably did this planning. At least, I know that in developing plans for war in the West, the German command and political leadership never asked for certain political forms to be imposed on the states after its occupation.
Question: How did the German High Command calculate to crush the Red Army fast, and at what time?
Answer: Of course, we hoped for success. No military leader will start a war if he is unsure that he will win, and that soldier who does not believe in victory is horrible. Another thing is that I could not be unaware of the considerable difficulties associated with waging war on the Eastern Front. It was clear that only a military defeat of the Red Army could win the war. It is difficult to indicate the exact dates we plan to finish this campaign. However, I can say that we expected to end operations in the East approximately before the onset of the winter of 1941. Until that time, the German armed forces were to destroy the land army of the Soviet Union (which we estimated at two hundred or two hundred and fifty divisions), its air force, and Navy, reaching the specified strategic line.
Question: What military-diplomatic measures were put in effect for the war's preparation?
Answer: From all Germany's supposed allies in the war against the Soviet Union, we notified only Romania and Finland in advance about our preparatory military activities. We advised Romania because of the need to ensure the passage of German troops through the country. Also, we have to strengthen the German training garrisons.
Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, General Heinrichs, also received a word about the planned war against the Soviet Union, but in extremely cautious form. General Heinrichs replied that he had a favorable opinion about Germany's intentions and would report to Marshal Mannerheim about these intentions and his assessment.
I do not exclude the possibility of notifying Italy by diplomatic means during the talks between Ribbentrop and Mussolini. I should point out that the military-political negotiations between Germany and Italy did not contain any requirements. There were no military negotiations with Italy before the start of the war. On the contrary, in 1941 and 1942, Mussolini offered his troops to send to the Eastern Front (first the Mountain Rifle corps, then the 8th Army).
We didn't conduct any military negotiations with Japan. We, however, regularly received information from the Japanese General Staff about the State of the Russian Far Eastern Army.
Question: When it becomes clear to you that Germany lost the war as the Chief of the General Staff?
Answer: Evaluating the situation most roughly, I can say that this fact became clear to me by the summer of 1944. However, the understanding of this fact came not at once, but through phases, along with the development of the situation on the fronts. Also, in my personal opinion, this understanding was expressed in the formula that "Germany cannot win the war by military means." You understand that the chief of the General Staff of a country that continues to wage war cannot hold the opinion that the war will be lost. He may only assume that we cannot win the war. Since the summer of 1944, I realized that the military had already said their word, and could not have a decisive influence, so the matter remained with politics.
Bear in mind that even in 1944-1945, the military-economic situation of Germany and the situation with human resources were not catastrophic. Arms production remained sufficient, which allowed maintaining the Army in reasonable condition. Aerial bombardment took individual factories out of operation; however, they could recover quickly.
I can say that the military-economic situation in Germany became hopeless only by the end of 1944 and the condition of human resources by the end of January 1945. Concerning the foreign policy position of Germany, I can hardly say anything, as I have not recently participated in any diplomatic negotiations.
Since the summer of 1944, Germany waged war only to win time in anticipation of the supposed events but had not occurred. We pinned high hopes on the offensive in the Ardennes, which was supposed to return the Siegfried Line to Germany and stabilize the Western Front.
Question: What are the actual military and political factors that Germany counted on, waging war for winning time?
Answer: It is challenging to answer this question, and indeed, almost impossible. In a war in which many states took part on both sides, various armies, various fleets, and various generals due to the combination of these multiple forces, a completely unexpected change in the situation could arise at any time. These unexpected events cannot be predicted, but they can have a decisive influence on the military situation at large.
I cannot say anything about the political calculations of the Fuhrer because, for the last time, he separated everything military from political very intensely.
Question: What was the meaning of the resistance that Germany continued to exert?
Answer: As I said, it was a drag in anticipation of political events and partly in expectation of improving the military situation. If the Allies had once proposed other conditions than the demand for unconditional surrender, I am sure that Germany would have stopped resistance much earlier. However, no other proposals were received, and we, as honorable soldiers, could only fight to the last opportunity. I do not think that the situation in which Germany now found itself is worse than if she had capitulated earlier. I asked the Führer if there were opportunities for conducting diplomatic negotiations with the Allies and whether any political ties were made. In response, Hitler either would give a sharply negative answer or would not answer such questions at all.
Question: Can I assume that you agreed with Hitler's military-political line from the beginning to the end and supported it until the capitulation?
Answer: I did not always and not on all issues agreed with the Führer, but he seldom took my opinion into account when making decisions on significant matters.
Internally, I also often disagreed with him, but I am a soldier, and my job is to implement what was ordered. We had the right to express our opinion, but we never influenced any decisions.
I must point out that when von Brauchitsch was removed from his post as commander-in-chief of the land army and transferred this post to Hitler, the Führer made me understand that I should not stand between him the military. From that time on, I was almost totally excluded from the sphere of issues of the Eastern Front. Instead, I was involved in the rest of the theaters of military operations and the coordination of the Army, the air force, and the Navy. The chief of the Wehrmacht became the principal advisor to the Führer on the Eastern Front issues. Since that time, the separation of functions between the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) and the General Staff of the Land Army (OKH) began to arise. The first was engaged with the Western Front, Italy, Norway; the second was only with the Eastern Front. Therefore, it was difficult for me to influence decisions made on the Soviet-German front. Since 1941, I also did not take part in the leadership of the military industry because, for this purpose, a special ministry of armament and military industry was created.
Regarding foreign policy, the more difficult and threatening became the military situation, the more reserved the Fuhrer became in his statements. On the question of foreign policy, he conferred only with Ribbentrop.
Question: How do you explain that Hitler gradually removed you from the leadership of the most critical areas of government?
Answer: I explain this with the following reasons:
a) that the Führer personally took over the direct command of the Wehrmacht. He didn't tolerate contradictions at all, and he couldn't bear that I contradict him with my authority. I was officially advised that I can express my disagreement with the Fuhrer only face to face, but in no case in the presence of other persons.
b) I got the impression that the Führer did not trust me and my views. I cannot explain this rationally; I felt it intuitively. Recently, he became very close to the Headquarters of the High Command under Colonel-General Jodl, excluding me from the circle of his closest advisers. Perhaps I did not live up to his hopes as a strategist and commander. This is understandable because you cannot become a military leader; you must be born as such. I do not consider myself a commander since I did not have to conduct a single battle, and even not a single operation on my own. I remained the chief of staff, fulfilling the will of the commander.
Question: How do you assess Hitler's military abilities?
Answer: He could find the right solutions to operational and strategic issues. He intuitively guided himself in the most confusing situation, finding the right way out of it. Despite this, he lacked practical knowledge in the direct implementation of military operations. The immediate consequence was that he, as a rule, made all the decisions all too late since he could never correctly estimate the time that separated the decision-making from its implementation.
Question: Do you consider yourself responsible for the situation in which Germany found herself after losing the war?
Answer: I cannot deny that Germany and the German people found themselves in a catastrophic situation. If its results judge any policy, we can say that Hitler's military policy turned out wrong. However, I do not consider myself responsible for the catastrophe of Germany because I did not in any way take any decisions, neither military nor political. I only carried out the orders of the Fuhrer, who consciously assumed not only the state but also military responsibility before the people.
Question: Until what time were you with Hitler?
Answer: On April 23, 1945, at night, I left Berlin for the front, to the headquarters of General Wenk's 12th Army, coordinating actions of the 12th and 9th armies. On April 24, I tried to return to the city but could not land there, and I had to stay outside Berlin.
On April 22, the Führer decided to remain in Berlin. He told us that he would not leave the city for any price, and he would await the outcome of his fate, directly leading the troops. On this day, the Führer made a very depressing impression on me. Until then, I have never doubted his mental capacities. Despite the grave consequences - the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944 - he always remained in control of the situation. However, on April 22, it seemed that the moral forces left the Führer, and his spiritual resistance was broken. He ordered me to go at once to Berchtesgaden, and the conversation was very harsh and ended with the Fuhrer only driving me out of the room. Coming out, I said to Jodl: "This is the end."
Being outside of Berlin until April 29, I kept in touch with the Headquarters using the decimeter wave-length radio station (directional device). I did not talk directly with the Führer; however, I received through General Krebs vague orders and requests from Hitler, demanding to speed up the actions of the 12th and 9th armies, as much as possible, to start an immediate counteroffensive, etc. After this radio station got broken, I could not receive any information from the HQ.
Question: What measures were taken to bring Hitler and other government leaders and the party out from Berlin?
Answer: As I indicated above, Hitler most decisively refused to leave Berlin. The only thing I can say is that on April 28, while I was in Reinfeld, I received a radiogram from Berlin demanding to allocate 40-50 Fieseler Storch aircraft or other training airplanes that were supposed to land in Berlin. Ritter von Greim arrived by plane to see me and manage this operation from Berlin. The aircraft was allocated, some of them had to land at Pfaueninsel on the Havel. The operation results are unknown to me because I had left the command center.
I do not think Hitler could fly out of Berlin in the last days. A segment of the Charlottenburger Chaussee near the Brandenburg Gate remained the only landing site. I requested permission from Berlin to report to the Führer with a landing on the said site, which was refused because the place was entirely swept by Russian artillery. I don't know anything about the fate of other people who were with Hitler in Berlin.
Question: What do you know about the measures taken by the national-socialist party to preserve their cadres under German occupation and the creation of illegal organizations?
Answer: On the question of illegal organizations, I only know about creating the "Werewolf" organization, which I learned on the radio in mid-April. (I do not remember the exact day). Before the announcement on the radio, nobody had said anything to me regarding the creation of this organization. When I tried to ask the Fuhrer what kind of organization it was, he rudely answered me: "This is not of your business." I believe that the initiative to create "Werewolf" belongs to the party or the SS. At least I can vouch that the armed forces General Staff did not take any measures to create or supply this organization.
Regarding the tasks of "Werewolf," I assume that they were similar to the guerrilla units' functions in force in Russia or the Balkans. It was supposed to supply them with weapons from the air. In France, we had a striking example of how troops emerged in a disarmed country that had all kinds of weapons - thousands of rifles, machine guns, grenades. However, these are my assumptions; I cannot speak with certainty. No measures for creating "Werewolf" organizations have been implemented.
I believe that at the time of the announcement about Werwolf's creation, none existed, and the appeal pursued propaganda goals: to foster resistance without having any control center. The experience of organizing a Volkssturm clearly shows the failure of attempts to create a mass people organization, especially when the party does this without interaction with the armed forces.
One of the mass events that have been undertaken in the last period can be considered the creation of groups and detachments of tank destroyers, for which the Hitler youth were mainly used, but this was legal since the anti-tank squads acted together with the regular troops.
I have no other data on creating any illegal organizations; however, I cannot exclude the possibility that the party or the SS created them.
Question: Tell us about the development of the operational-strategic situation on the Eastern Front. What was your assessment of the military prospects of Germany at various stages of the war?
Answer: The concentration of the German Army in the areas bordering the region of the state interests of the USSR began directly after the end of the French campaign since, by that time, we had only five-seven divisions in the eastern regions. This concentration intensified as the Russian troops were pulled up to the border areas. The main areas of the troops' concentration were East Prussia and Upper Silesia.
It is impossible to say that it was precisely by the summer of 1941 that the German Army was entirely ready for war. For example, Germany would only be prepared to conduct a full-fledged underwater war by 1945.
In short, the campaign plan of 1941 was as follows: three army groups, reinforced by powerful tank formations, were to deliver a simultaneous attack on the Red Army, gradually concentrating their efforts on the flanks, with the primary goals: Leningrad in the North, Donbass and the gate to the Caucasus to the South. We assumed that the forces of the Central Army Group would be used for the subsequent escalation of the flank attacks.
After the battle at the border and the breakthrough of the entire line of defense of the Red Army, the German troops were to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Red Army in Belarus and Ukraine, preventing their retreat to Moscow. As I said before, the campaign of 1941 was supposed to end by the beginning of the winter of 1941 because we had a perfect idea of all the difficulties associated with the fall rains and winter frosts in Russia. Evaluating the forces of the three army groups that were at our disposal at the beginning of the war, I can say that they were not too large. However, according to our estimates, we had a solid opportunity to achieve decisive success. I cannot tell you exactly how many divisions we had.
Initially, I shared the common opinion that the primary battle, which could decide the military-economic fate of Russia, should take place on the fields of Donbass. However, later this opinion was changed, first of all, under the influence of the successful completion of the battles of Bryansk and Vyazma.
According to the report of our intelligence, as well as a general assessment of all the commanders and leaders of the General Staff, the position of the Red Army by October 1941 was as follows:
a) In the battles on the borders of the Soviet Union, the main forces of the Red Army were defeated.
b) In the fall battles in Belarus and Ukraine, German troops defeated and destroyed the principal reserves of the Red Army.
c) The Red Army no longer has operational and strategic reserves that could offer serious resistance to the further advance of all three army groups.
The position of our troops was as follows: The Army Group South was significantly depleted after the fighting and did not have enough power to capture the entire Donbass. The desire to transfer the most powerful blows to the center increasingly intensified after the forcing of the Dnieper.
Regarding the further offensive of the Central Army Group on Moscow, the following differences became more pronounced:
a) The command of the Central Army Group and the leadership of the General Staff of the land army (Brauchitsch, Halder) demanded to concentrate the most potent forces in the center to continue the attack on Moscow, bypassing it mainly from the North and thereby decide the outcome of the war.
b) I, and at first the Führer believed that it was necessary to stabilize the central sector in the most advantageous positions, and at its expense, strengthen the flanks to solve basic military tasks and achieve a broader and deeper circumvention of the Central Group of the Red Army.
Considering the brilliant success of the encirclements near Bryansk and Vyazma, the leadership of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht convinced the Fuhrer that the operation near Moscow had a one hundred percent prospect of success. The Fuhrer succumbed to their arguments and agreed to an offensive against Moscow.
Further developments have shown the fallacy of this decision. The consequence of the failure of Moscow and the withdrawal of the German troops was the removal of Brauchitsch from the post of the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht. As far as I can now remember, the removal of Brauchitsch was explained as follows:
a) The Fuhrer resolutely protested against the fact that, after the counterattack of the Red Army, Brauchitsch undertook a systematic retreat, having planned it by stages. Fearing to lose the connection between Army Group Сenter and the Army Group North, he began to withdraw the 9th Army too hastily. The Fuhrer believed that Brauchitsch had violated the principle requirement - not to leave the conquered territory since he knew what it meant to give it back to the enemy. Hitler sharply rejected the illusions of the "rear lines" that were created during the planning of the withdrawal.
b) The Fuhrer, as well as I, believed that Brauchitsch had underestimated the strength of the German troops. The 4th Army and the 3rd Tank Group were not defeated at all, and the 2nd Tank Group sufficiently retained its power in total. The hasty withdrawal was not necessary.
c) Hitler, moreover, considered Brauchitsch's illness and his age.
Political reasons did not play any role in his resignation. There are also unfounded opinions that Brauchitsch allegedly was against the offensive against Moscow and the further advancement into the depth of Russia.
As a result of the 1941 campaign, it became clear that there was a moment of an almost precise balance of power between the German and Soviet troops. The Russian counterattack, which was entirely unexpected for the High Command, showed that we had grossly miscalculated the Red Army's reserves estimate. Moreover, it was clear that the Red Army would take advantage of the winter stabilization of the front for the further strengthening and preparation of the new reserves. We could not win the war with lightning speed; however, this did not in any way deprive us of hope to achieve a military victory by a new offensive.
In drawing up the plan for the 1942 campaign, we were guided by the following:
a) The troops of the Eastern Front are no longer able to attack along the whole front line, as it was in 1941.
b) The offensive must be limited to one front sector, namely, the South.
c) The purpose of the attack: to completely shut down the Donbass from the military-economic balance of Russia, cut off the supply of oil along the Volga River, and seize the main oil supply bases, which, as we estimated, were in Maykop and Grozny.
We did not plan to reach Volga River in a vast stretch; it was supposed to get to Volga River in one of the places to seize the strategically important center - Stalingrad. In the future, once the South was completely isolated, it was intended to make a turn by large forces to the North (provided that our allies would take the front line along the Don River). I find it difficult to name any deadlines for this operation. The operation in the southern sector was supposed to end with the large encirclement of the entire Southwestern and Southern groups of the Red Army, which were to be encircled by our Army Groups "A" and "B."
It must be pointed out that at the very last moment before the attack on Voronezh, it became known that Mr. Reichel, one of the officers of the General Staff, who was carrying operational directives to the front, went missing, and most likely was captured by the Russians. Also, in a note in one of the British newspapers, the plans of the German command were revealed. The letter mentioned the exact wording of the operational directive of the General Staff. We expected countermeasures from the Russians and were subsequently very surprised that the offensive against Voronezh was rather quickly crowned with success.
After breaking through the defense line of the Red Army, Army Group "B," which had not had the task of capturing Voronezh, had to turn sharply to the South and race along the Don to Stalingrad. This operation was successful, and after the breakthrough, it seemed that there was almost no enemy left before us. My conclusion was that the main forces of the Red Army were going for the Southeast.
For example, some of the military leaders, the commander of Army Group "B," Field Marshal von Weichs, suggested immediately to cross the Don quickly and turn to the North before reaching Stalingrad. The Fuhrer did not approve this plan because it distracted us from resolving the main goal - cutting Moscow off from the Caucasus and it required forces that we did not have.
Following this development, the battle for Stalingrad began. The main strategic calculations of both forces were based on this battle. The importance of this matter explains that we have tied up too many forces in the city, and it must be admitted that the Red Army managed to resolve this critical task in its favor.
Here again, I must admit that we underestimated the strength of the Red Army near Stalingrad; otherwise, we would not have dragged one division after another, weakening the front along the Don. In addition to all the difficulties, Antonescu demanded the allocation of an independent sector for the Romanian Army. This decision later led to disaster.
Now we can say that the German command had calculated neither the forces, nor the time, nor the strike abilities of the troops correctly. However, at that time, Stalingrad was such a tempting target that it seemed impossible to abandon it. We thought that if we used another division, another artillery regiment, another engineer battalion, another mortar or artillery battery, then the city would be in our hands very soon. In conjunction with underestimating and ignorance regarding the enemy, all this line of thought led to the Stalingrad encirclement.
If the decision on the fate of the 6th Army was in my hands, then I would have left Stalingrad. However, I must say that it is now complicated to assess my actions, for I can only now see how our plans had ended. The Fuhrer most strongly rejected all suggestions to leave Stalingrad. Initially, high hopes were pinned on Manstein's counterattack and Luftwaffe assistance. But after Manstein's failure, everyone was unanimous in the opinion that it was necessary to withdraw the troops from the Caucasus as quickly as possible, which was accomplished.
From the campaign of 1942 and the battle of Stalingrad, I made the following conclusions:
a) The loss of the 6th Army will have a substantial impact on the entire Eastern Front.
b) However, we cannot say that the war on the Eastern Front was lost, even if it had not been crowned with a military victory.
c) You cannot pin any hopes on the allied states (Romania, Hungary, Italy, etc.). True, we experienced a severe lack of experienced military personnel. Nevertheless, by the time of the start of planning operations on the Eastern Front for the summer of 1943, the troops of the Eastern Front were able to replenish and ensure their supply fully.
Plan for 1943 provided for:
a) The destruction of the Kursk bulge and the straightening of the front in this area.
b) In the case of success, it was possible to move to the Northeast to cut the railways leading from Moscow to the South (I must make a reservation that this assumption was expressed most uncertainly).
c) In the future, undertake a similar offensive operation of a limited nature near Leningrad.
The command of the Army Group Center (Field Marshal Kluge) and the leadership of the General Staff of the Land Army (General Zeitzler) insisted on conducting the Kursk operation without showing any doubt in its success.
Regarding myself, I must point out that at that time, I did not take part in the development of plans and direct leadership of the Eastern Front. Therefore my knowledge of the issues of the Soviet-German front in the period 1943-1945 is insufficient.
The Fuhrer was unsure about the operation's need and its success. However, he succumbed to the assurances of the Army General Staff.
It was clear that for the Red Army, our intention to liquidate the Kursk Salient was not a secret and that it was preparing for our strike. Therefore, the Fuhrer offered, in addition to strikes from the North and the South, to deliver an additional blow in a strictly east direction to Kursk. Zeitler strongly protested, believing it was impossible to dissipate forces in different directions in this way, and he again managed to convince the Fuhrer.
The hesitations and uncertainty of Hitler himself later affected the operation, in which Manstein and Jodl did not have the strength or determination to succeed.
Besides, we did not in any way expect that the Red Army was not only ready to repel our strike but also had enough reserves to go into a powerful counterattack. The consequence of this was a retreat in the entire central sector of the Eastern Front.
Summing up the battles of 1943, I have to say that they were the severe second warning to the German Army. I estimated them as follows: the war for Germany is not lost by any means. However, we can no longer conduct large-scale offensive operations in the East and must go on the defensive. It is necessary to gain time to make up for the losses suffered by the Army.
I cannot give precise information about the plans of the 1944 campaign on the Eastern Front because I did not take part in its development. There was no doubt that if we did not have to keep 12 tank and 16 infantry divisions in the West, then the development of events on the Eastern Front would be different. The very course of the fighting was marked for me by three certain events: defeat in Central Belarus, defeat in Romania, and Allied invasion in the West, which led me to conclude that Germany would not be able to achieve victory in this war by military means.
Also, I concluded that the troops on the Eastern Front could provide defense and even halt the Russian offensive.
The Allied invasion in Normandy made us face the fact of war on two fronts (I did not consider the Italian campaign of the Anglo-American forces as a second front). We were expecting an invasion of Brittany or the Cherbourg region since they were the most suitable bases for landing. However, in my opinion, Allied success was accomplished solely due to their superiority in the air, which jeopardized our supply routes ultimately. Under other conditions, German troops would have been able to push Anglo-American units into the Channel. The result of 1944 for me was that only diplomacy could win the war. Military victory cannot be achieved.
During the operation of 1945, I can point out several attempts by the High Command to achieve a turning point in the battles:
a) The most strenuous effort - the winter offensive in the Ardennes, which was intended to cross the river Maas between Lutthich and Namur and, if successful, further advance to Antwerp. We expected success most seriously because we knew that the allies in France had 80-85 divisions, and only three American divisions were in the area of the attempted breakthrough. The defeat in this attack was associated with the depletion of our human resources.
b) In February — March 1945, it was planned to carry out a counterattack against the troops advancing on Berlin, using the Pomeranian bridgehead. It was intended that after breaking through in the Graudenz area, the forces of the army group "Vistula" would cut through the Russian front, enter the valleys of the river Netze and Warta, and come from the rear to Kustrin. At the same time, an additional blow was to be undertaken from the Stettin area. This plan remained unfulfilled because there were not enough troops in this area, and a transfer from elsewhere would require a long time. The fact that the Vistula group of armies was then commanded by Himmler, who had no idea how to control the troops, was also important.
c) The next attempt is the counterattack of the 6th Panzer Army near Budapest. I should point out that the Fuhrer himself suggested this idea. He believed that 70 thousand tons of oil in Nagykanizsa and the supply of Vienna and Austria were of decisive importance in the present conditions. He pointed out that it is possible to surrender Berlin rather than lose the Hungarian oil and Austria. Taking these considerations into account, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer Army to be transferred from the Western Front to the area of Budapest. This transfer took between seven to eight weeks because it was hampered by the destruction of the transport network in Germany. After the failure, after all these attempts, the defeat of Germany became clear. Only the soldier's duty of obedience to the person to whom the oath was made, made me and all of us continue to fight to the last.
Question: Why did the German command continue to keep troops in Courland and Italy without transferring them to the active sectors of the Eastern Front?
Answer: The issues of Courland and Italy were the subject of repeated considerations and considerable disagreement. On the effect of the Courland Group, the Führer believed that they were attracting from 50 to 60 Soviet divisions. If we would withdraw the troops, then every German division would face three to four Russian divisions, which would be very undesirable.
Colonel-General Guderian thought it was necessary to regularly withdraw troops from Courland, one division after another. The commander of the Courland Army Group, Colonel-General Rendulich, offered a fantastic plan - to break into East Prussia.
You should consider that we have experienced significant difficulties with sea transport. The transportation of all divisions from Libau to Germany would take at least 12 days and three weeks for a complete turnaround of the participating ships. Therefore, the Fuhrer decided to continue transporting the equipment, materiel, horse, and a small contingent of troops, leaving the main forces to keep binding the Russians.
Regarding Italy, we considered it necessary to leave the troops in its northern part for the following reasons:
a) Northern Italy - a rich agricultural and industrial area (artillery, automobile factories, etc.). To use the local labor force, we did not have to take it to Germany and spend money on its accommodation and food.
b) While our troops were in Northern Italy, the Allies were based on airfields in the area of Rome. The withdrawal from Italy would entail a fast approach of the Allied bases and increased air raids on Germany.
c) If we had left, and the mountainous borders with France, Italy, and the old Austrian border, this would not have freed many troops, and 16 divisions would be needed.
The crucial consideration in preserving Northern Italy was the presence of our troops in Yugoslavia. As long as the German forces remained in Yugoslavia or were on the move from Yugoslavia to North-West, we could not leave Italy because, by doing so, we would condemn them to death.
Defense positions in the Alps where our troops could retreat had been ready. The troops in Yugoslavia were ordered to withdraw as fast as possible. Still, the development of events in the Balkans slowed this movement and made it impossible to leave Italy. In principle, the question of abandoning Italy was raised by the fall of 1943.
Question: Tell us about your mission to Finland in 1944 and your talks with the leaders of the Finnish government?
Answer: By June 1944, we were faced with a threat of a possible exit of Finland from the war, which would completely expose our northern flank. To prevent this, Ribbentrop left for Finland, and he reached an agreement during negotiations with Ryti that Finland would not leave the war without prior contact with Germany. We promised Finland one division and two battalions of assault guns as reinforcement, which were transferred through Revel.
My visit to Finland was aimed at negotiations with the Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army and, simultaneously, with Mannerheim. During the meeting on military issues, I told Heinrichs that all measures would be taken to keep the frontline on river Narva. I suggested to Mannerheim that an official delegation of the Finnish General Staff visit the headquarters of the Northern Army Group and assure him that all measures would be taken to keep the frontline on Narva. I also promised that Germany would continue to send reinforcements to the Finnish front as required.
During personal negotiations, Mannerheim declared that the mood in Finland had fallen; the people wanted peace and were eager, perhaps, to end the war quickly. He made me understand that Parliament did not ratify the agreement with Ryti. As the President, he is responsible to the people and, therefore, is not bound by the obligations Ryti took. Further, Mannerheime stated that his fate relates to the future of his people and, at the decisive moment, will depend on him.
I emphasized that Finland can be confident in our support, for we have in Finland interests not only related to Finland but mainly our interests. Mannerheim made no promises to me.
When I returned to Germany, I immediately reported to the Führer about Mannerheim's statement, to which he replied: "I was expecting this. When soldiers begin to make politics, nothing good will come of it. Mannerheim is an excellent soldier but a poor politician."
For my part, I said that I believe that the Finns will, at the slightest opportunity, resume the negotiations with the Soviet Union. Hitler agreed with my opinion.
As a direct consequence of this visit, we were forced to give the German commander in Finland, Colonel-General Rendulich, to begin planning for leaving the country immediately, which was subsequently implemented with complete success, despite active opposition from active opposition the Finnish troops. We managed to withdraw 90% of German units from Finland.
Question: What intelligence information did you have about the Soviet Union before the war and during it? From what sources did you receive information?
Answer: Before the war, we had very scant information about the Soviet Union, and the Red Army received from our military attaché. During the war, the information received from our agents concerned only the tactical zone. We have never received data that would have a strong impact on the development of our military operations. For example, we did not manage to calculate how much the loss of Donbass influenced the overall balance of the military economy of the USSR. Admiral Canaris carried out the leadership of military intelligence in general. He sent materials received from agents to reconnaissance of the Wehrmacht, air force, and Navy.
I have the most superficial information about the intricacies of the intelligence service. I was not interested in the details of the work, relying entirely on Canaris. I can say that in peacetime, we had a minimal intelligence service. During the war, we had intelligence centers in neutral countries (in Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and South America).
I never interfered in his affairs. I thought all states were somehow involved in this matter, so I let Canaris work like the rest. I know that Canaris traveled abroad often (he reported this to me before leaving). However, I don't know any details about these issues.
Question: What do you know about the so-called "Vlasov's Army," and how did the German command intend to use it?
Answer: As far as I know, General Vlasov was captured by the 18th Army. An Army's propaganda company began to distribute leaflets signed by him, whence the whole story with the Vlasov troops was born.
I do not remember exactly, but it seems that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially noticed Vlasov, then he was transferred to Rosenberg, who, in turn, passed him to Himmler.
Initially, in the spring of 1943, Army HQ paid serious attention to Vlasov, and it proposed the formation and arming of Russian units under his command. The Secretary of the Reich Chancellery, Minister Lammers, drew Fuhrer's attention to this attempt in a particular letter. Hitler banned all activities for the formation of Russian parts most decisively and gave me an order to monitor the implementation of this directive. After that, I took Vlasov under house arrest and kept him in the Berlin area. Himmler also opposed the formation of Russian units under the auspices of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht.
In October — November 1944, Himmler changed his attitude towards Vlasov. He visited me to find out where Vlasov was and to have the opportunity to talk with him. Then, together with the general inspector of the volunteer units of the land army, General Köstring, he asked me to report to the Führer about the necessity to form Russian units under auspices of the General Staff and make extensive use of General Vlasov. I resolutely refused this.
Later, Himmler was able to obtain permission from the Führer to create a Russian division, which, as far as I know, was thrown into battle in April 1945 in the area south of Frankfurt-on-Oder. The Supreme High Command never entertained any serious calculations for using Vlasov's troops. The Fuhrer also strongly rejected the idea of forming the Vlasov's Army and resolutely refused to see him. Only Himmler and SS provided patronage of Vlasov.
Question: What is your opinion about the countless casualties concerning the civilian population inflicted by the German troops on the territory of the Soviet Union?
Answer: Even when the war was fought in Poland, unprecedented atrocities were committed against German officers; the same thing happened in France. I cannot deny that German soldiers committed crimes against civilians and prisoners of war in some places. However, I affirm that the High Command not only has not given such orders but, on the contrary, severely punished all the perpetrators. You can verify this by reviewing cases at the Military Tribunals.
Question. Who were you most closely associated with the leading military, party, and government leaders?
Answer: I had no friends in political circles and the party. My personal friends were General von Briesen and von Wolff, who died during the war. The statesmen closest to service were the imperial Minister Lammers, then the Minister of Finance Schwerin von Krosigk. Among the military, I was close to Colonel-General Jodl and Colonel-General von Fritsch, Field Marshal von Reichenau, and, at one time, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.
Question: Did anyone from your associates participate in the conspiracy on July 20, and how did you feel about the plot?
Answer: None of my associates took part in the conspiracy on July 20, except for one officer who served in the General Staff for a short time during my leadership. I never had any personal relationship with him. I consider the plot of July 20 to be the gravest crime a soldier can commit, namely, a crime against a man whom he swore.
Question: Do you know those who held a prominent position in the Hitler government and are currently in hiding?
Answer: Currently, I do not know who is being held captive and who is hiding. For example, I do not know the whereabouts of the Minister of Food Backe, Minister of Justice Thierack, Minister of Posts Ohnesorge. I am not aware where is Colonel-General Rendulich or Field Marshal Schörner. However, I do not think the generals would hide from the Allied military authorities.
Question: What role did you play during the seizure of power by Hitler?
Answer: At that time, I was the head of the Organizational Department of the Reichswehr Headquarters, and from the beginning of November 1932 to January 1935, I was sick. At that time, I did not take any part in political life. All events occurred during my illness. I am in debt to the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Blomberg, who treated me very well.
Question: What do you know about the fate of Goebbels?
Answer: As far as I know, Goebbels was in Berlin until recently, and I repeatedly saw him in Hitler's bunker. He did not live in the Reichs Chancellery but in his house near the Brandenburg Gate, under which there was a well-equipped bomb shelter. I have no exact information about the fate of Goebbels.
Question: What do you know about the fate of Himmler?
Answer: I met Himmler in April 1945, when I was forced to retreat from the Russian troops in the northwestern direction and looked for a suitable place for my command post. Around April 29, I arrived at the Dobbin estate, in the district of Waren, since my head of communications picked up this place equipped with a wire and radio link. In Dobbin, I met Himmler, who would travel to the Lubeck area. Himmler told me that he would surrender to the Allies if he was cornered. Subsequently, from the press and stories, I learned that Himmler was detained by the British and poisoned himself; after that, he was buried on the northern outskirts of Luneburg.
Question: Do you know about the relationship between Hitler and Eve Brown?
Answer: I only know that there was always one woman in the Führer's house; perhaps it was Eva Braun. I have met her briefly five or six times in recent years — she was a delicate, elegant woman. The last time I saw her in Hitler's bunker was in April 1945.
Question: Where are Germany's state and military archives located at present?
Answer: I do not know the location of the state archives. The military archive was located earlier in the city of Potsdam. In February — March 1945, I ordered the removal of the files to Thuringia, in the region of Ohrdruf. I don't know if they were taken somewhere further.
Interrogated by: Colonel of State Security Potashov, Colonel Smyslov.
Colonel FRUMKIN attended the interrogation