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ALL WORLD WARS

"DROPSHOT" - AMERICAN P:AN FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1957

After Nazi's defeat in 1945, Soviet Union emerged as a new superpower with its own aggressive agenda to promote Communism and eventually, dominate in the world. American Joint Chiefs of Stuff had to contemplate probable Soviet's actions and by 1949 came up with a plane of effective military response. "Dropshot" is a result of these contingency planning, a frightening but realistic scenario of the Third World War, started between NATO and USSR in Europe and all over the world on January 1, 1957.

VOLUME 1. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, DISASTER, AND DEFENSE.

1. MISSION

1. To impose the national war objectives of the United States on the USSR and her allies.

2. BASIC ASSUMPTION

2. On or about 1 January 1957, war against the USSR has been forced upon the United States by an act of aggression of the USSR and/or her satellites.

3. NATIONAL WAR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

3. The conclusions of NSC 20/4 approved by the President, state the aims and objectives of the United States with respect to the USSR. November 23, 1948

REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON US OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO THE USSR TO COUNTER SOVIET THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY

THE POBLEM

1. To assess and appraise existing and foreseeable threats to our national security currently posed by the USSR; and to formulate our objectives and aims as a guide in determining measures required to counter such threats.

ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THREATS

2. The will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies which threaten the security of the United States constitute the greatest single danger to the United States within the foreseeable future.

3. Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate that the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world. Soviet leaders hold that the Soviet Communist party is the militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise to political power and that the USSR, base of the world Communist movement, will not be safe until the non-Communist nations have been so reduced in strength and numbers that Communist influence is dominant throughout the world. The immediate goal of top priority since the recent war has been the political conquest of Western Europe. The resistance of the United States is recognized by the USSR as a major obstacle to the attainment of these goals.

4. The Soviet leaders appear to be pursuing these aims by:

a. Endeavoring to insert Soviet-controlled groups into positions of power and influence everywhere, seizing every opportunity presented by weakness and instability in other states, and exploiting to the utmost the techniques of infiltration and propaganda, as well as the coercive power of preponderant Soviet military strength.

b. Waging political, economic, and psychological warfare against all elements resistant to Communist purposes and in particular attempting to prevent or retard the recovery of and cooperation among Western European countries.

c. Building up as rapidly as possible the war potential of the Soviet orbit in anticipation of war, which in Communist thinking is inevitable.

Both the immediate purposes and the ultimate objective of the Soviet leaders are inimical to the security of the United States and will continue to be so indefinitely.

5. The present Soviet ability to threaten U.S. security by measures short of war rests on:

a. The complete and effective centralization of power throughout the USSR and the international Communist movement.

b The persuasive appeal of a pseudoscientific ideology promising panaceas and brought to other peoples by the intensive efforts of a modern totalitarian propaganda machine.

c. The highly effective techniques of subversion, infiltration, and capture of political power, worked out through a half century of study and experiment.

d The power to use the military might of Russia, and of other countries already captured, for purposes of intimidation or, where necessary, military action.

e. The relatively high degree of political and social instability prevailing at this time in other countries, particularly in the European countries affected by the recent war and in the colonial or backward areas on which these European areas are dependent for markets and raw materials.

f. The ability to exploit the margin of tolerance accorded the Communists and their dupes in democratic countries by virtue of the reluctance of such countries to restrict democratic freedoms merely in order to inhibit the activities of a single faction and by the failure of those countries to expose the fallacies and evils of Communism.

6. It is impossible to calculate with any degree of precision the dimensions of the threat to U.S. security presented by these Soviet measures short of war.

The success of these measures depends on a wide variety of currently unpredictable factors, including the degree of resistance encountered elsewhere, the effectiveness of U.S. policy, the development of relationships within the Soviet structure of power, etc. Had the United States not taken vigorous measures during the past two years to stiffen the resistance of Western European and Mediterranean countries to Communist pressures, most of Western Europe would today have been politically captured by the Communist movement. Today, barring some radical alteration of the underlying situation which would give new possibilities to the Communists, the Communists appear to have little chance of effecting at this juncture the political conquest of any countries west of the Lubeck-Trieste line. The unsuccessful outcome of this political offensive has in turn created serious problems for them behind the Iron Curtain, and their policies are today probably motivated in large measure by defensive considerations. However, it cannot be assumed that Soviet capabilities for subversion and political aggression will decrease in the next decade, and they may become even more dangerous than at present.

7. In present circumstances the capabilities of the USSR to threaten U.S. security by the use of armed forces are dangerous and immediate:

a. The USSR, while not capable of sustained and decisive direct military attack against U.S. territory or the Western Hemisphere, is capable of serious submarine warfare and of a limited number of one-way bomber sorties.

b. Present intelligence estimates attribute to Soviet armed forces the capability of overrunning in about six months all of Continental Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo, while simultaneously occupying important continental points in the Far East. Meanwhile, Great Britain could be subjected to severe air and missile bombardment.

c. Russian seizure of these areas would ultimately enhance the Soviet war potential, if sufficient time were allowed and Soviet leaders were able to consolidate Russian control and to integrate Europe into the Soviet system. This would permit an eventual concentration of hostile power which would pose an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

8. However, rapid military expansion over Eurasia would tax Soviet logistic facilities and impose a serious strain on [the] Russian economy. If at the same time the USSR were engaged in war with the United States, Soviet capabilities might well, in face of the strategic offensives of the United States, prove unequal to the task of holding the territories seized by the Soviet forces. If the United States were to exploit the potentialities of psychological warfare and subversive activity within the Soviet orbit, the USSR would be faced with increased disaffection, discontent, and underground opposition within the area under Soviet control.

9. Present estimates indicate that the current Soviet capabilities . . . will Progressively increase and that by no later than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United States with atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, of more extensive submarine operations (including the launching of short-range guided missiles), and of airborne operations to seize advance bases. However, the USSR could not, even then, successfully undertake an invasion of the United States as long as effective U.S. military forces remained in being. Soviet capabilities for overrunning Western Europe and the Near East and for occupying parts of the Far East will probably still exist by 1958.

10. The Soviet capabilities and the increases thereto set forth in this paper would result in a relative increase in Soviet capabilities vis-a-vis the United States and the Western democracies unless offset by factors such as the following:

a. The success of ERP

b. The development of Western Union t and its support by the United States.

c. The increased effectiveness of the military establishments of the United States, Great Britain, and other friendly nations.

d. The development of internal dissension within the USSR and disagreements among the USSR and orbit nations.

11. The USSR has already engaged the United States in a struggle for power. While it cannot be predicted with certainty whether, or when, the present political warfare will involve armed conflict, nevertheless there exists a continuing danger of war at any time.

a. While the possibility of planned Soviet armed actions which would involve this country cannot be ruled out, a careful weighing of the various factors points to the probability that the Soviet government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated to involve the United States and is still seeking to achieve its aims primarily by political means, accompanied by military intimidation.

b. War might grow out of incidents between forces in direct contact.

c. War might arise through miscalculation, through failure of either side to estimate accurately how far the other can be pushed. There is the possibility that the USSR will be tempted to take armed action under a miscalculation of the determination and willingness of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intolerable to U.S. security.

12. In addition to the risk of war, a danger equally to be guarded against is the possibility that Soviet political warfare might seriously weaken the relative position of the United States, enhance Soviet strength, and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of war or force us into war under dangerously unfavorable conditions. Such a result would be facilitated by vacillation, appeasement, or isolationist concepts in our foreign policy, leading to loss of our allies and influence; by internal disunity or subversion; by economic instability in the form of depression or inflation; or by either excessive or inadequate armament and foreign-aid expenditures.

13. To counter threats to our national security and to create conditions conducive to a positive and in the long term mutually beneficial relationship between the Russian people and our own, it is essential that this government formulate general objectives which are capable of sustained pursuit both in time of peace and in the event of war. From the general objectives flow certain specific aims which we seek to accomplish by methods short of war, as well as certain other aims which we seek to accomplish in the event of war.

CONCLUSIONS

Threats to the Security of the United States

14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR and from the nature of the Soviet system.

15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the USSR is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-Communist countries.

16. The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.

b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.

17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

18. The capability of the United States cither in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal developments, important among which are:

a. Serious espionage, subversion, and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed Communist activity.

b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.

c. Internal political and social disunity.

d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign-aid expenditures.

e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.

f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.

g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics.

U.S. Objectives and Aims Vis-a-Vis the USSR

19. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia, in time of peace as well as in time of war, should be:

a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence, and stability of the world family of nations.

b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.

In pursuing these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.

b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

c To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet-directed world Communist party and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them, d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peace time economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.

d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.

e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.

f. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.

22. In the event of war with the USSR, we should endeavor by successful military and other operations to create conditions which would permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without a predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims supplemental to our peacetime aims should include:

a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war.

b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which the leaders of the All-Union Communist party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens, or groups of citizens, in countries not under Communist control.

c. Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory in the aftermath of a war:

(1) Do not have sufficient military power to wage aggressive war.

(2) Impose nothing resembling the present Iron Curtain over contacts with the outside world.

d In addition, if any Bolshevik regime is left in any part of the Soviet Union, ensuring that it does not control enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory.

e. Seeking to create postwar conditions which will:

(1) Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace.

(2) Be conducive to the successful development of an effective world organization based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

(3) Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance within the United States of wartime controls.

23. In pursuing the above war aims, we should avoid making irrevocable or premature decisions or commitments respecting border rearrangements, administration of government within enemy territory, independence for national minorities, or postwar responsibility for the readjustment of the inevitable political, economic, and social dislocations resulting from the war. . . .

4. SPECIAL ASSUMPTIONS

4. The North Atlantic Pact nations (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal), non-Communist China, the other nations of the British Commonwealth (except India and Pakistan), and the Philippines will be allied. . . .

5. Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, Turkey, the Arab League (Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen), Israel, Iran, India, and Pakistan will attempt to remain neutral but will join the Allies if attacked or seriously threatened.

6. Allied with the USSR, either willingly or otherwise, will be Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia,[' If the present defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite orbit should continue to 1957. it is not likely that Yugoslavia would ally with the Soviet Union but would attempt to remain neutral and would be committed to resist Soviet and/or satellite attack.] Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia),
Manchuria, Korea, and Communist China (hereinafter denoted the Soviet powers).

7. Except for Soviet satellites, other countries of the Eastern Hemisphere will attempt to remain neutral, but will submit to adequate armed occupation by either side rather than fight.

8. The Latin American countries will remain neutral or join the Allies. Those that remain noncombatant probably will make their economic resources and possibly their territories available to the Allies.

9. United States programs for European [economic and fiscal] recovery have been completed by 1953 and have been effective to the extent that, by 1957, countries participating therein have achieved political stability and are mutually self-supporting economically.

10. The armed forces of the Western European Allies have been regenerated to the extent that by 1957 they are capable of substantial coordinated defensive military action in Western Europe.

11. Allied forces, of substantially the same military strength and effectiveness as at present, will be available for D-Day deployment in, or will be actually stationed in, Germany, Austria, Trieste, and Japan in 1957, either in the role of occupation forces or by other arrangement.

12. Soviet aggression will be planned in advance and Soviet mobilization TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY INITIAL PLANS will be practically completed prior to D-Day. Intelligence of heightened war preparation on the part of the USSR has been received, and Allied mobilization and minimum preparatory force dispositions have been initiated, but time has not permitted significant progress prior to D-Day.

13. The [petrol, oil, lubricants] requirements of the Allies will be such that at least part of the finished products of the Near and Middle East oil-bearing areas will be required by the Allies from the start of a war in 1957.

14. Atomic weapons will be used by both sides. Other weapons of mass destruction (radiological, biological, and chemical warfare) may be used by either side subject to considerations of retaliation and effectiveness.

15. Between now and 1957 the United States will not suffer from either a major depression or a catastrophic inflation.

16. The political and psychological tension as it existed in 1948 between the USSR and the Western or Allied powers will continue relatively unabated until 1957.

17. Russian military and economic potentials have not been appreciably augmented prior to 1957 by acquisition or exploitation of territory not under their control in 1948. . . .

5. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

19. In collaboration with our allies, to impose the Allied war objectives upon the USSR by destroying the Soviet will and capacity to resist, by conducting a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East.

Initially: To defend the Western Hemisphere; to launch an air offensive; to initiate a discriminate containment of the Soviet powers within the general area: North Pole-Greenland Sea-Norwegian Sea-North Sea-Rhine River-Alps-Piave River-Adriatic Sea-Crete-southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf-Himalayas-Southeast Asia-South China Sea-East China Sea-Japan Sea-Tsugaru Strait-Bering Sea-Bering Strait-North Pole; to secure and control essential strategic areas, bases, and lines of communication; and to wage psychological, economic, and underground warfare, while exerting unremitting pressure against the Soviet citadel, utilizing all means to force the maximum attrition of Soviet war resources.

Subsequently: To launch coordinated offensive operations of all arms against the USSR as required.

6. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

20. In collaboration with our allies:

a. To secure the Western Hemisphere.

b. To conduct an air offensive against the Soviet powers.

c. To hold the United Kingdom.

d. To hold maximum areas in Western Europe.

e. To conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, naval bases,
shipping, and supporting facilities.

f. To secure sea and air lines of communication essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept.

g. To secure overseas bases essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept.

h. To expand the overall power of the armed forces for later offensive operations against the Soviet powers, and

i. To provide essential aid to our allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the overall strategic concept.

7. PHASED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

21. In the implementation of the overall strategic concept the conduct of the required operations may be considered to fall into four general phases. These phases will not be distinct and will probably overlap as between areas in both time and operation. They are defined as follows:

PHASE I. D-Day to stabilization of initial Soviet offensives, to include the initiation of the Allied [atomic] air offensive.

PHASE II. Stabilization of initial Soviet offensives to Allied initiation of major offensive operations of all arms.

PHASE III. Allied initiation of major offensive operations until Soviet capitulation is obtained.

PHASE IV. Establishment of control and enforcement of surrender terms.

In the event the air offensive, together with other operations, results in Soviet capitulation during Phases I or II, the war would pass immediately into Phase IV. ...

22. Phase I. In collaboration with our allies:

a. Secure the Western Hemisphere.

(1) Maintain surveillance of the approaches to the North American continent.

(2) Provide an area air defense of the most important areas of the United States.

(3) Provide the antiaircraft defense of the most vital installations of the United States.

(4) Provide for the protection of Western Hemisphere coastal and intercoastal shipping and of important ports and harbors in the continental United States.

(5) Ensure the security of the refineries on the islands of Curacao, Aruba,
and Trinidad and of associated sources of oil.

(6) Provide the optimum defense against sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

(7) Establish or secure and defend the following peripheral areas and bases necessary to the defense of the continental United States: Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Labrador, Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Caribbean, northeastern Brazil, and Hawaii.

(8) Defend the sea approaches to the North American continent and to its peripheral bases.

(9) Provide the optimum ground-force defense of the most important areas of the continental United States, including a mobile striking force.

b. Conduct an air offensive against the Soviet powers.

(1) Initiate, as soon as possible after D-Day, strategic air attacks with atomic and conventional bombs against Soviet facilities for the assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction; against LOCs [lines of communications], supply bases, and troop concentrations in the USSR, in satellite countries, and in overrun areas, which would blunt Soviet offensives; and against petroleum, electric power, and steel target systems in the USSR, from bases in the United States, Alaska, Okinawa, the United Kingdom, [and] the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and from aircraft carriers when available from primary tasks.

(2) Initiate, as soon as possible after D-Day, air operations against naval targets of the Soviet powers to blunt Soviet sea offensives, with emphasis on the reduction of Soviet submarine capabilities and the offensive mining of enemy waters.

(3) Extend operations as necessary to additional targets both within and outside the USSR essential to the war-making capacity of the Soviet powers.

(4) Maintain policing of target systems reduced in the initial campaigns, c Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, shipping, naval bases, and supporting facilities.
(1) Destroy Soviet naval forces, shipping, naval bases, supporting facilities, and their air defenses.

(2) Mine important enemy ports, and focal sea approaches thereto, in the Baltic-Barents-White Sea area, northeast Asia, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, and the Turkish straits.

(3) Establish a sea blockade of the Soviet powers.

d. Hold the United Kingdom.

(1) Maintain surveillance of the approaches to the United Kingdom.

(2) Provide the air defense of the most critical areas of the United Kingdom.

(3) Provide the antiaircraft [AA] defense of the most critical areas of the United Kingdom.

(4) Provide for the protection of the United Kingdom coastal shipping and of important ports and harbors in the United Kingdom.

(5) Provide the optimum defense against sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

(6) Provide the optimum ground-force defense of the most critical areas of the United Kingdom.

e. Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(1) Provide the ground-force defense of the Rhine River line from Switzerland to the Zuider Zee.

(2) Provide the ground-force defense of Italy along the Alps-Piave River line.

(3) Provide tactical air support of Allied ground forces along the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(4) Accomplish planned demolitions and interdict Soviet LOCs east of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(5) Provide air defense of areas west of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(6) Provide AA defenses for areas west of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(7) Gain and maintain air superiority over the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(8) Provide for the protection of Allied coastal shipping and of important ports and harbors in Western Europe.

f. Hold the area southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf.

(1) Provide the ground, air, and AA defenses of the refineries and associated installations at Bahrein and Ras Tanura and the airfield at Dhahran.

(2) Provide the ground, air, and AA defenses of the Abadan refinery, its associated installations and oil fields, and the key communications and port facilities in that area.

(3) Accomplish planned demolitions and air interdiction of the Soviet LOCs leading through Iran and Turkey.

(4) Gain and maintain air superiority over the Iranian mountain passes and over the southeastern Turkey battle areas.

(5) Provide the ground-force defense of the mountain passes leading into Iraq and the Iranian oil areas.

(6) Provide the ground-force defense of southeastern Turkey.

(7) Provide tactical air support of Allied ground forces.

(8) Provide AA protection for Baghdad, Mosul, the Iskenderun-Aleppo area and the LOCs southward from the latter.

(9) Provide naval local-defense forces in the Bahrein-Dhahran area.

(10) Provide a floating reserve of ground forces.

g. Hold maximum areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia consistent with indigenous capabilities supported by other Allied courses of action.

(1) Conduct air attacks against Soviet forces which threaten Bandar Abbas and interdict the LOC leading thereto.

(2) Provide ground and air defenses against indigenous Communist forces in Malaya.

(3) Interdict Soviet land and sea LOCs leading into China and neutralize enemy bases in China.

h. Hold Japan, less Hokkaido,

(1) Provide ground and air defenses of Honshu and Kyushu.

(2) Organize, train, and equip Japanese forces prior to D-Day.

(3) Defend the sea approaches to Japan.

(4) Provide naval local-defense forces.

(5) Provide AA defenses for the most important areas.

l. Secure sea and air lines of communication essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept.

(1) Establish a convoy system and control and routing of shipping.

(2) Provide convoy air and surface escorts.

(3) Provide air defense of convoys within effective range of enemy air.

j. Secure overseas bases essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept as follows:

(1) Immediately after D-Day, provide forces by air and sea transport to occupy or recapture Iceland and the Azores and establish necessary air and naval bases thereon.

(a) Immediately after D-Day, or before, if practicable, provide ground, air, and antiaircraft forces to secure and defend Iceland, utilizing airlift as necessary.

(b) As soon as possible after D-Day, provide ground and air units to secure and defend the Azores.

(d) Provide naval local-defense forces for Iceland and the Azores.

(2) Establish or expand and defend Allied bases as required in northwest Africa and North Africa.

(a) Provide air defenses and naval local-defense forces for bases at Port Lyautey and Casablanca.

(b) Provide ground defenses, air defenses, antiaircraft defenses, and naval local-defense forces for Gibraltar, Malta, and Bizerte-Gabes Gulf.

(d) Provide ground defenses, antiaircraft defenses, and naval local defense forces for Tripoli.

(3) Ensure the availability of suitable bases required in the Cairo-Suez-Aden area, prior to D-Day.

(a) Provide ground, air, and antiaircraft defenses of the Cairo-Suez area.

(b) Defend the sea approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area.

(d) Provide ground, air, antiaircraft, and naval local-defense forces for Crete.

(e) Provide ground, air, antiaircraft, and naval local-defense forces for Cyprus,

(4) Have forces in being on D-Day in Okinawa for the security of that island

(a) Provide ground, air, and AA defenses of Okinawa.

(b) Defend the sea approaches to Okinawa.

(5) Provide necessary minimum protection for other overseas bases essential to the maintenance of sea and air lines of communication.

(a) Provide ground, air, antiaircraft, and naval local-defense forces for Guam.

(b) Provide antiaircraft and naval local-defense forces for Singapore

(c) Provide naval local-defense forces for bases in Kwajalein, the Philippines, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand, and Captetown

(d) Provide a theater reserve of ground forces for the western Pacific,

k. Expand the overall power of the armed forces for later operations against the Soviet powers.

1. Provide essential aid to our allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the overall strategic concept.

m. Initiate or intensify psychological, economic, and underground warfare.

(1) Collaborate in the integration of psychological, economic, and underground warfare with plans for military operations.

(2) Provide assistance as necessary for the execution of psychological, economic, and underground warfare.

n. Establish control and enforce surrender terms in the USSR and satellite countries (in the event of a possible early capitulation of the USSR during Phase I).

(1) Move control forces to selected centers in the USSR and in satellite countries.

(2) Establish some form of Allied control in the USSR and in satellite countries.

(3) Enforce surrender terms imposed upon the USSR and its satellites.

(4) Reestablish civil government in the USSR and satellite countries.

23. Phase II. In collaboration with our allies:

a. Continue the air offensive to include the intensification of the air battle with
the objective of obtaining air supremacy.

b. Maintain our holding operations along the general line of discriminate containment, exploiting local opportunities for improving our position thereon and exerting unremitting pressure against the Soviet citadel.

c. Maintain control of other essential land and sea areas and increase our measure of control of essential lines of communications.

d. Re-enforce our forces in the Far East as necessary to contain the Communist forces to the mainland of Asia and to defend the southern Malay Peninsula.

e. Continue the provision of essential aid to Allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the overall strategic concept.

f. Intensify psychological, economic, and underground warfare.

g. Establish control and enforce surrender terms in the USSR and satellite countries (in the event of capitulation during Phase II).

h. Generate at the earliest possible date sufficient balanced forces, together with their shipping and logistic requirements, to achieve a decision in Europe.

24. Phase III. In collaboration with our allies:

a. While continuing courses of action a through/ of Phase II, initiate a major land offensive in Europe to cut off and destroy all or the major part of the Soviet forces in Europe.

b. From the improved position resulting from a above, continue offensive operations of all arms, as necessary to force capitulation.

25. Phase IV. In collaboration with our allies:

Establish control and enforce surrender terms in the USSR and satellite countries.

VOLUME 2. HOLDING THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE, PREPARING FOR THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE.

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

I. SUMMARY OF OPPOSING SITUATIONS

1. Political Factors

a. The gravest threat to the security of the Allies within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR and from the nature of the Soviet system. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the USSR is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the Allies and disrupting their traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of the Allies and other non-Communist countries. The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the Allies. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

b. The USSR has already engaged the Allies in a struggle for power. While it cannot be predicted with certainty whether, or when, the present political warfare will involve armed conflict, nevertheless there exists a continuing danger of war at any time.

(1) While the possibility of planned Soviet armed actions which would involve the United States cannot be ruled out, a careful weighing of the various factors points to the probability that the Soviet government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated to involve the Allies and is still seeking to achieve its aims primarily by political means, accompanied by military intimidation.

(2) War might grow out of incidents between forces in direct contact.

(3) War might arise through miscalculation, through failure of either side to estimate accurately how far the other can be pushed. There is the possibility that the USSR will be tempted to take armed action under a miscalculation of the determination and willingness of the Allies to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intolerable to their security.

c. In addition to the risk of war, a danger equally to be guarded against is the possibility that Soviet political warfare might seriously weaken the relative position of the Allies, enhance Soviet strength, and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of war or force us into war under angerously unfavorable conditions. Such a result would be facilitated by vacillation, appeasement, or isolationist concepts, leading to dissension among the Allies and loss of their influence; by internal disunity or subversion; by economic instability in the form of depression or inflation; or by either excessive or inadequate armament and military-aid expenditures.

d. To counter these threats to Allied national security and to create political, economic, and military conditions leading to containment of Soviet expansion and to the eventual retraction of Soviet domination, the United States has initiated or is supporting the following measures:

(1) The European Recovery Program.

(2) The development of Western Union.

(3) The increased effectiveness of the military establishments of probable allies.

(4) The North Atlantic Treaty.

e. Alignment of selected states and areas. In order to establish reasonable limits for an estimate of the 1957 alignment of selected states and areas, it has been necessary to reduce the variables involved. Accordingly, the estimate for 1957 is based on the following premises:

(1) Europe and the Near East ["Near East" includes Greece. Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, British-Arabian protectorates, Transjordan, and Iraq; "Middle East" includes Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Ceylon] will continue as the primary U.S. security interest, and U.S. policy, including the maintenance of West Germany, will remain approximately as now formulated.

(2) The periphery of Asia will continue as an ever-present but secondary U.S. security interest.

(3) Latin America will remain at its present lower priority as a U.S. security interest.

f. The estimate of probable alignment in 1957 of states and areas of the world is as follows:

State or Area	Probable Alignment in 1957

United States
United Kingdom
Denmark
Norway
Iceland
Greenland
France	Will be allied
Benelux Group
- Belgium
- Netherlands
- Luxembourg
Italy
Portugal
Philippines
Canada
Union of South Africa
U.K. Colonial Africa
Belgian Congo
Australia and New Zealand

State or Area	Probable Alignment in 1957

Republic of Ireland
Sweden
Switzerland
Greece
Spain
Turkey
Syria-Lebanon*	Will attempt to remain
Transjordan*	neutral but will join the
Egypt*	Allies if attacked or
Arabian peninsula*	seriously threatened
Israel*
Iran
India
Iraq*
Pakistan

State or Area	Probable Alignment in 1957

Finland
Latvia
Estonia
Lithuania
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Romania	Will be allied with the USSR,
Yugoslavia**	either willingly or otherwise.
Bulgaria
Albania
Communist China
Manchuria
Outer Mongolia
Korea

State or Area	Probable Alignment in 1957

Afghanistan
Non-Communist China
Siam
Burma
Malaya	Will attempt to remain neutral
Indochina	but will submit to adequate
Indonesia	armed occupation
Portugese, Spanish, Italian, and French Colonial Africa	rather than fight
Ethiopia

State or Area	Probable Alignment in 1957

Caribbean Area	Will remain neutral or will
South America	ally with the United States

State or Area	Probable Alignment in 1957

Caribbean Area	Initially occupied as at
South America	present or will join the Allies

*AlI estimates for the Arab states and Israel, with the possible exception of the states on the Arabian peninsula, are fundamentally conditioned by the policies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Soviet powers regarding Palestine.

** If the present defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite orbit should continue to 1957, it is not likely that Yugoslavia would ally with the Soviet Union but would attempt to remain neutral and would be committed to resist Soviet and/or satellite attack.

g. USSR and Satellites

(I) Political Aims and Objectives (a) Soviet Union

i. Never before have the intentions and strategic objectives of an aggressor nation been so clearly defined. For a hundred years, victory in the class struggle of the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie has been identified as the means by which Communism would dominate the world. The only significant new facts to emerge have been strict control of world Communism by Soviet Russia and the possibility that the USSR may now be entering an era wherein the ultimate objective might be gained by military force if all other methods fail.

ii. The ultimate object of the USSR is domination of a Communist world. In its progress toward this goal, the USSR has employed, and may be expected to employ, the principle of economy of force. World War III is probably regarded by the Kremlin as the most expensive and least desirable method of achieving the basic aim, but the USSR has been, and will continue to be, willing to accept this alternative as a last resort. As time passes, the intense Soviet concentration on increasing its military potential will render the war alternative less hazardous from their point of view.

(b) Satellite States. In general, the governments of the satellite states which are completely under Soviet domination and control will have no political aims and objectives distinguishable from those of the USSR.

(2) Attitude and Morale

(a) Soviet Union

i. The morale of the Soviet people would not become a decisive consideration to the Kremlin until such time as a drastic deterioration of the Soviet military position took place. While certain elements of the Soviet population—particularly ethnic groups in the Baltic states, [the] Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—are dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hostile to domination by the Great Russians, the Soviet government through its efficient security-police network would be able to keep these groups under effective control in the early stages of the war. The more protracted the war, the more chance there would be for these subversive influences, already present in the Soviet Union, to manifest themselves and take a more active part in interfering with the Soviet war effort. Effective resistance or uprisings could be expected to occur only when the Western Allies are able to give material support and leadership and assure the dissident elements early liberation from the Soviet yoke.

ii. Soviet patriotism, while less ardent in support of a foreign war than in defense of home territory, would not be greatly shaken as long as military victories and war booty were forthcoming. As hostilities progress, however, and if Soviet military reverses become known within the USSR, the increased hardships and suffering would magnify any existing popular dissatisfaction with the regime. Russian respect for American technical and industrial ingenuity also might prove to be an important factor in affecting the Soviet people's morale and their willingness to make seemingly useless sacrifices for a sustained war effort.

iii. The people of the USSR are very susceptible to psychological warfare. The Soviet Union's most significant weakness in this regard is its policy of keeping its people in complete ignorance of the true conditions both inside and outside the USSR.

iv. Psychological warfare, therefore, can be an extremely important weapon in promoting dissension and defection among the Soviet people, undermining their morale, and creating confusion and disorganization within the country. It could be particularly effective in subversive operations directed toward those ethnic nationalities which would welcome liberation, as well as toward the Soviet Army, especially those elements of it which would be stationed outside the borders of the USSR.

v. The most effective theme of a psychological-warfare effort directed against the Soviet Union would be that the Western powers are not fighting against the peoples of the USSR but only against the Soviet regime and its policies of enslavement and exploitation, (b) Satellite States. A majority of the native populations in the satellite countries are intensely nationalistic and religious and resent both Moscow domination and Communist regimes with which they are burdened as well as the religious restrictions imposed upon them. This attitude, however, while a source of great potential weakness to the Soviet bloc if shrewdly exploited by the West, would not give rise to effective resistance movements immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Initially the dominant attitude among the non-Communist population of the satellite states would be one of increased non-cooperation and passive resistance toward their Communist masters. This would result in some reduction of the agricultural, industrial, and military contribution of the satellites to the Soviet war effort. More effective resistance, however, in the form of organized sabotage and guerrilla activity would be unlikely to develop significantly until they were assured of guidance and support from the West. In view of the probable continuance of these conditions, the peoples of the satellite area in 1957 would still prove readily susceptible to psychological appeals and would be particularly influenced by assurances that aid from the West in support of their aspirations for national independence and religious freedom would be forthcoming.

(3) Political Strengths and Weaknesses. The significant political strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet orbit are estimated to be as follows:

(a) Strengths

i. The native courage, stamina, and patriotism of the Soviet people.

ii. The elaborate and ruthless machinery by which the Kremlin exercises centralized political control throughout the Soviet orbit, employing police forces, propaganda, and economic and political duress,

iii. The ideological appeal of theoretical Communism,

iv. The apparent ability of the Soviet regime to mobilize native Russian patriotism behind a Soviet war effort.

v. The ability of the people and the administration to carry on a war under circumstances of extreme disorganization, demonstrated in the early years of World War II.

(b) Weaknesses

i. Popular disillusionment and embitterment among certain groups throughout the Soviet orbit, resulting from ruthless Soviet and Communist oppression and exploitation.

ii. The fear of the police state pervading all elements of Soviet and satellite society.

iii. The traditional admiration of many of the Soviet and satellite peoples for the living standards of Western democracies in general and of the United States in particular.

iv. Influence of religious groups, especially among the satellites,

v. The native nationalism of the satellite populations and of certain ethnic groups in the USSR.

vi. Probable demoralization which would result from Soviet military and occupation duties in foreign countries.

vii. The extreme concentration of power in the Politburo of the Communist party, which leads the bureaucratic machinery, tends to preclude the assumption of initiative and to discourage individuals at lower levels in the system from making decisions.

(c) It is estimated that the strengths noted above constitute an actual and present advantage to the USSR, while the weaknesses, in most cases, are potential rather than actual. During the early stages of conflict these weaknesses would constitute a substantial burden upon the Soviet Union's machinery for political control and would also impair the Kremlin's economic and administrative capabilities. These weaknesses, however, would not have an early or decisive effect upon the outcome of a Soviet military venture. During the early stages of war native Soviet morale might improve somewhat with reports of spectacular victories and the prospects of
booty from Western Europe. It is unlikely that the psychological weaknesses in the Soviet and satellite structure would produce serious consequences unless the prospect for ultimate victory was seriously diminished by effective Allied air attack, resistance to their advances, disruption of
coastal commerce, and the threat of increasing Allied strength.

(d) Furthermore it is extremely doubtful that the forces of resistance within the Soviet orbit would effectively assert themselves unless they received guidance and material support from the Allies with tangible hope for early liberation by Allied forces.

h. Allied Nations (Except U.S.)

(1) Political Aims and Objectives (a) United Kingdom

i. The United Kingdom desires a maximum of international stability in order to achieve economic recovery as rapidly as possible. However, this aim is qualified by a determination to ensure the security of the United Kingdom, her dependent areas and imperial communications, and the Near and Middle East from Soviet encroachment. The United Kingdom firmly intends, in concert with the United States, to check Soviet expansionism.

ii. The United Kingdom intends to maintain its imperial position so far as possible. In the dependent empire it aims to encourage a reasonable rate of progress toward self-government, replacing political controls with economic, cultural, and security ties, With regard to the Dominions, it aims to preserve and promote Commonwealth solidarity.

iii. The United Kingdom intends to encourage Western Union and increasing unity in Western Europe but at a pace which will not risk the estrangement of the Dominions.

iv, The United Kingdom will continue to support the United Nations. Until the United Nations has the power to guarantee collective security, the United Kingdom will continue to build power-political relationships based on an intimate association with the United States and on the Brussels Pact, Commonwealth cooperation, and the North Atlantic Treaty.

(b) Canada. Canada desires international peace and a high level of international trade as conditions prerequisite to the development of its territory and resources. Canada intends to maintain close relations with the United States as the best guarantee of its security. Canada also intends to continue its membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, seeing in the Commonwealth a major support of world order and its own participation as a vital link in a North Atlantic security system embracing the United States and the United Kingdom. Canada desires political stability and economic recovery in Western Europe because of the area's importance to Canadian security and because of long-standing cultural and commercial ties.

(c) Australia. Australia desires international peace and a high level of world trade. It wishes to preserve the Australian continent as an area of white settlement and secure it against Asiatic imperialism. It desires friendly relations with the United States and close contacts with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

(d) New Zealand. New Zealand desires peace and a high level of world trade. It desires to preserve the security of the southwest Pacific area and would resist any Asiatic encroachment.

(e) South Africa. South Africa desires to maintain its country free of external influence and internally secure for its dominant white minority. It is interested in seeing as much of the African continent as possible become a "white man's country" in which the Union would be the leading
nation.

(f) France t and Benelux. The primary concern of the governments of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg is security in order to effect the political and economic recovery and stability of their respective peoples. These governments also seek to restore the prestige of their nations to a pre-World War II level and to retain their colonial possessions. All wish to participate in the formation of an economically stable but decentralized West Germany.

(g) Allied Occupied Areas. It is assumed that Allied forces either will be available for D-Day deployment in or will be actually stationed in Austria, West Germany, and Japan in 1957. These countries will, in all likelihood, seek to increase their economic and political strength and will
desire to be reestablished as self-governing states free of occupation forces.

(h) Italy. Italy has two primary objectives: maintenance of political stability through alleviation of economic distress and the resumption of her position as a world power. Two primary considerations keep her aligned with the West, and particularly with the United States, in her attempts to attain these objectives. First is her realization that political stability can be maintained and economic recovery achieved only through very extensive outside assistance and that the West is able to give such assistance. Second is her realization both that her former position as a world power can be achieved only through political alliances and that no alliance with the USSR is possible on any basis of equality or even of independence. While Italy has a history of opportunistic action to fit the needs of the moment, her inborn psychological need for national aggrandizement together with the influence of the church can be counted on to maintain a strong resistance to communization. So long as the Allies can keep her economic distress from becoming unbearable, Italy will remain oriented toward the West.

(i) Iceland. An extreme sense of national independence governs Iceland's political conduct. Although very young as an independent nation, her whole history bespeaks independence of thought and spirit. Culturally, ideologically, and economically, Iceland is closely attached to Denmark, the other Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom. Commercial contacts with the USSR have proved highly profitable to Iceland, but the conduct of commercial negotiations was very evidently governed by political and strategic considerations. Iceland's understanding of the purposes and methods of the USSR have prompted her to join in the Atlantic Pact as the surest means of maintaining her independence. She can be expected to cooperate within the Pact to any extent short of compromising her sovereignty.

(j) Portugal. The basic aims of Portuguese foreign policy presently are to ensure the territorial integrity of the motherland and the empire, to maintain the economic stability on which the political stability of the regime depends, and to align Portugal with the Western powers. Realization on the part of the governing classes that Portugal's territorial integrity and economic stability depend on foreign military and political support probably is the basis of the country's signature of the Atlantic Pact. This departure from the traditional Portuguese policy of neutrality apparently was prompted by fears of an advance into Western Europe by the USSR.

(k) Denmark. The ratification by Denmark of the Atlantic Pact marks a significant change in foreign policy but no change in basic political objectives. Those objectives have been, and are, to maintain Danish independence and territorial integrity. For long, foreign policy in pursuit of the basic objectives has been one of strict neutrality and compromise to mutual benefit in relation to the contending great powers. Ratification of the Pact signalizes the realization by the Danes that neutrality, and compromise or accommodation with the USSR, will be difficult. It constitutes a public statement that Denmark is determined to maintain both her political independence and her ideological, cultural, and economic freedom.

(1) Norway. The remarks in the preceding paragraph concerning Denmark apply also to Norway, with, if possible, even more emphasis on the determination to maintain independence and freedom. Since the experience of World War II, Norway has been a leader among the Scandinavian countries in urging and engineering a departure from the traditional policy of complete neutrality and of adopting a policy of formal alliance. The government of Norway is exceptionally stable and it is expected that its policies will remain firm.

2. Economic Factors

a. Soviet and Satellite

(1) Basic Resources

In the overall picture, the USSR has a wealth of raw materials: it has the largest iron-ore reserves in the world, it is second only to the United States in coal reserves, and in 1947 it had proven petroleum reserves of 8 billion barrels. It is self-sufficient in food and most textile raw materials. On the debit side, the Soviet Union and the satellite countries depend entirely or partially on foreign sources of supply for industrial diamonds, natural rubber, cobalt, tin, tungsten, and molybdenum. The satellites are deficient in high-grade ore. USSR steel production by 1957 may reach 32 million tons; the United States in 1947 produced 79.7 million tons. Soviet coal production in 1957 may be 375 million tons, but the United States in 1945 produced 570 million tons. The Soviet petroleum production for 1957 is estimated at 360 million barrels as compared to the United States 1945 figure of 2 billion barrels. While some deficiencies in high-grade gasoline and lubricants may exist in the USSR during the period under consideration, it is unlikely that their war economy will be initially impaired. However, the USSR has a very limited high-octane refinery capacity, which is a significant weakness.

(2) Industrial Development

(a) Following on the present development of the basic heavy Industries, it is expected that the fifth Five-Year Plan ending in 1955 will see a large expansion of the Soviet manufacturing industries with consequent increase in the capacity for armament manufacture. A brake on the speed of her development will remain the capacity of her transport system. In spite of the advances she will have made in all fields of industrial development, her industrial efficiency, technical ability, and productivity will still be considerably lower than that of the Allied nations. This disparity, how ever, may not prevent the USSR from creating conditions of war.

(b) All of the satellite countries have ambitious economic plans, but it is likely that by 1957 only Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania will have developed sufficiently for their economic assistance to the Soviet Union to be a significant factor under war conditions.

(3) Industrial Manpower

(a) It is estimated that by 1957 the total population will have risen to 220 million, including a labor force of 90 million. This labor force will include 49 million agricultural workers and a nonagricultural force of 41 million.

(b) The present drive to improve technical education will have begun to show results, and the shortage of skilled workers is likely to be less acute, with the result that an extensive call-up of industrial workers in 1957 would have less effect on industrial productivity than would be the
case in 1949. The supply of unskilled workers will remain sufficient.

(4) Dependence on Foreign Sources for Key Commodities

It is considered that by 1957 the Soviet Union will not be critically deficient in any of the more important strategic materials. In cases such as natural rubber and industrial diamonds, where her productive capacity may fall short of her requirements, she will have made every effort to build up stockpiles, but her success in doing so will be to some extent dependent on the willingness of countries outside the Soviet orbit to meet her requirements in the interim period. The Soviet Union has had good success in importing strategic materials, with the exception of tin. The satellites will continue to require high-grade iron ore from Sweden, but if this were denied to them, the Soviet Union would be able to make good this deficiency, provided the necessary transportation could be made available.

(5) Transport Capabilities

(a) Railroads. It is considered that the railway mileage will have been considerably increased by 1957 and that the system will be more flexible and adaptable to war needs. Nevertheless it will still be insufficient to meet the needs of the greatly increased traffic and there will continue to be a shortage of locomotives and freight cars. The general standard of efficiency will remain low by Western standards.

(b) Motor Transport. Development of long-distance routes is at present concentrated on five main roads radiating from Moscow and on two lateral routes. Progress is slow but by 1957 these routes are likely to have approached Western European standards, and long-distance haulage will afford some relief to rail transport in the west of the Soviet Union. Development of the local road system is likely to have been considerable.

(c) Civil Air Transport. In spite of the improvement in other means of internal transport, it is considered the present reliance on civil air transport is likely to continue.

(d) Inland Waterways. Rehabilitation will have been completed, together with the reconstruction and enlargement of some canals and the completion of new projects. These factors, together with the mass production of metal and concrete barges and the increasing mechanization of cargo-handling facilities, will allow the inland waterways to take an in creased percentage of total traffic and afford some further relief to the railways.

(e) Coastal Shipping. In 1957 the internal transport system of the Soviet Union is likely to remain a comparative weakness in [the] Soviet economy, though in a lesser degree than in 1949. The degree of reliance on coastal shipping in certain areas is therefore likely to persist, and an over
all increase in coastal tonnage is foreseen in the existing Five-Year Plan.

(f) Strategic Significance of Communications. The main strategic strength of the Soviet Union and satellite countries will lie in their possession of interior lines of communications and on their ability to move economic and military traffic without resort to open sea routes. Although great efforts will be made to improve these communications and to over come some of the gauge-change difficulties, the capacity of the Soviet railway system will continue to be inadequate and to be one of the Soviet Union's major economic problems.

(6) Vulnerability of Soviet Industry. Of great strategic importance is the fact that in 1945 nearly 70 percent of USSR petroleum needs were supplied by the vulnerable Caucasus region. New plants being built will reduce this concentration as well as that of the chemical, electric-power, and antifriction-bearing industries, but plants for manufacture of instruments and oil-producing equipment are still located almost exclusively in Moscow and the Transcaucasus complex, respectively. No reliable evidence exists to indicate the development of USSR underground industry. It may be expected, however, that some vital processes relating to jet engines, guided missiles, [and] atomic and biological weapons will be placed underground in small and scattered plants, but such procedures will increase needs for skilled labor and machinery and put greatly increased burdens on the already overtaxed transportation system.

(7) Summary. The industrial capacity of the Soviet Union will have advanced to a considerable degree beyond the 1949 level, and this will be particularly so in the manufacturing industries and hence in her ability to produce large quantities of armaments. Most of the strategic deficiencies prevalent in 1949 will have been overcome, and where productive capacity still lags behind war requirements, stockpiles will have been accumulated. It is in consequence considered that by 1957 the economy of the Soviet Union will be adequate to support her in a major war for a prolonged period,

b. Allied Nations

(1) General. The overall economic potential of the Allies in 1957 will be greater in almost every respect than that of the USSR and her satellites, with productive capacity of essential war industries of the United States and British Commonwealth alone at least twice as great. On the other hand, the occupation of Western and Northern Europe by Soviet forces could yield to the
USSR a number of great long-range economic advantages. The principal gains would accrue to the USSR, however, only after the Soviet Union and the entire area under its control were relatively free from damaging attack and if commercial intercourse were possible with other areas.

(2) United States. The increasing dependence of the United States on foreign sources of strategic and critical materials will probably be the most significant factor influencing the economic position of the United States in the event of war in 1957. This dependence will require consideration of the security of certain overseas sources of supply and of sea and air LOCs [lines of communication] thereto. Our estimated position relative to dependence on foreign sources for strategic and critical materials in 1957 is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs; because of the special importance of oil and the tremendous quantities involved, it is treated separately.

(a) Oil

i. The oil position of the United States has changed from one of abundance to one of critical supply. This position is caused by two principal factors: first, the greatly increased civilian consumption, and second, the diminishing volume of new discoveries and the consequent lag in production sufficient to make up for the increase in consumption. As a result, the United States, for the first time in history, now imports more oil than it exports. Present demand in the United States now exceeds 6 million barrels a day, with production in the United States slightly in excess of 5.75 million barrels a day. Every indication is that United States consumption will continue to mount, with indigenous production unable to keep apace.

ii. In the event of war against the USSR in 1957, the skyrocketing demands of the armed forces will require a production far exceeding the estimated capabilities of the United States at that time. Although it has been difficult to estimate accurately our total requirements—both civilian and military—for a lengthy war beginning in 1957, the best information available indicates that those requirements may reach a maximum of 8 million barrels a day. A factor in such a tremendous increase will be the jet fuel requirements.

iii. In order to meet the greatly increased wartime requirements, the Allies must have access to all Western Hemisphere and Far Eastern sources of petroleum. It probably will be necessary to have access to some, if not all, Near and Middle East oil throughout a lengthy war.

iv. Within the framework of a national petroleum program, measures are being considered with the objective of meeting Allied war requirements without dependence on Middle East supply. These measures include the development of additional sources of natural crude oil, development of synthetics, construction of refineries, substitution of natural gas for non-mobile oil consumers, and stockpiling to an appropriate degree. The degree of implementation of these measures and the results which may be accomplished have not been determined at this time.

v. As an essential step in mobilization, a stringent rationing program and a maximum petroleum-production effort would necessarily have to be instituted. Nevertheless, without successful implementation of the national petroleum program, supplies would be inadequate from the beginning of war if Middle East sources were denied. In summary, adequate supplies for a prolonged war without some Middle East oil are by no means assured, and access to some, if not all, Middle East oil becomes a matter of primary consideration, (b) Other Strategic and Critical Materials

i. The growing dependence of the United States on foreign sources for strategic and critical materials is the result of two significant factors: the first is the greatly increasing demand for these materials as a result of accelerated technological advances in industry; the second is the depletion of mineral reserves and the declining rate of discoveries of new sources of supply in the United States.

ii. During World War II approximately 60 percent, on a volume basis, of our total requirements for strategic and critical materials came from domestic production and 40 percent from imports. On the other hand, for a war beginning in 1957 it is estimated that for the first three years only about 40 percent of our total requirements can be met from United States production, while 60 percent must come from imports and stockpile withdrawals.

iii. Although the United States is currently engaged in a program for stockpiling up to five years' wartime requirements, originally slated for completion in 1951-1952 (minimum stockpile objectives), this program is now several years behind schedule. In addition the current stockpile is considerably unbalanced in that there are little or no stockpiles of some materials and large quantities of others. Nevertheless, by 1957 it is estimated that for many strategic materials, although not all, there will be stockpile supplies for up to five years' wartime requirements.[•Although not considered in this estimate, the condition of the stockpile could be further improved by 1957 by several factors, the principal of which would be the occurrence of a depression or the imposition of mandatory controls on industry.] Unless the United States is cut off from access to foreign raw-material sources, it is unlikely, however, that great quantities will be withdrawn from the strategic stockpile during wartime. This is because a very heavy dependence on the stockpile would be a security risk in the event of a lengthy war, and any major discontinuance of imports would cause serious economic dislocations in the countries comprising our normal sources of supply, which in turn might induce these countries to turn against the United States.

iv. In view of the above considerations and assuming that normal import channels would be kept open, it is estimated that stockpile withdrawals for the first three years of a war beginning in 1957 would average 20 percent of our total requirements.

v. The estimated volume requirements for three years of war beginning in 1957—showing the relative quantities which would be obtained from domestic production, stockpile withdrawals, and imports—is shown in Table 1 below. Table 2 shows the quantities which would be required from each of the various world areas. . . .

vi. The volume figures and percentages shown in Tables 1 and 2 [below] do not present the entire picture as to the actual value of the different areas as sources of supply. Certain strategic and critical materials, while having a low volume figure, have an importance out of all proportion to their actual volume. Based upon a consideration of the actual importance of the principal strategic and critical materials, Table 3 below shows the relative importance of the world areas as sources of these materials during three years of war beginning in 1957. . . .

vii. Withdrawals from stockpiles naturally reduce the requirements of import volumes from the various world areas indicated on the map. Nevertheless, since this estimate is based on the premise that in the event of war, imports will continue, the relative importance of the world areas as sources of supply remains the same whether stockpiles be taken into account or not. For this reason, no separate column has been made for stockpiling in the square representing total U.S. supply in [the] map diagram.

(3) United Kingdom

(a) The United Kingdom is presently in a period of transition from war to peace. She is struggling under a burden of international financial

TABLE 1
ESTIMATED RELATIVE VOLUME OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION STOCKPILE WITHDRAWALS, AND IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC ' AND CRITICAL MATERIALS DURING THREE YEARS OF WAR, 1957-1959

			Total	1957 - 1959
			Short tons	% of Total Supply***
	Domestic Production		20,400,000	40
	Stockpile Withdrawals		10,000,000	20
	Imports		20,600,000	40
	Totals		51,000,000*	100


	ST**	%TS**	St	%TS	ST	%TS
Domestic production	6,800,000	49	6,800,000	40	6,800,000	34
Stockpile Withdrawals	2,700,000	19	3,000,000	18	4,300,000	22
Imports	4,500,000	32	7,200,000	42	8,900,000	44
Totals	14,000,000	100	17,000,000	100	20,000,000	100

*Except for bauxite and cobalt, minerals included in this estimate represent metal content in ore. Minerals comprise about 84 percent of total supply requirements of strategic and critical materials.

**tST means "short tons"; %TS means "percentage of total supply."

*** Rounded figures.

TABLE 2
ESTIMATE OF U.S. AVERAGE YEARLY VOLUME OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS FROM VARIOUS WORLD AREAS DURING THREE YEARS OF WAR, 1957-1959

World Area	Average Yearly Volume Short Tons	% of Total US Supply	% of Total Imports

South America	3,864,500	22.8	56
Africa	1,484,500	8.8	22
Canada	804,500	4.7	12
Mexico-Caribbean	294,500	1.7	4
Southeast Asia	294,500	1.7	4
Australia-Oceania	124,500	0.7	2
Totals	6,867,000	40.4	100

TABLE 3
ESTIMATED RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. OF WORLD AREAS AS SOURCES OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS
DURING THREE YEARS OF WAR, 1957-1959

World Area	Percentage of Total Contribution to the US

US, domestic production	28
Imports, by world areas	72
South America	16
Africa	16
Canada	5
Mexico-Caribbean	13
Southeast Asia	13
Australia-Oceania	9
Total	100
Western Hemisphere	62
Eastern hemisphere	38

and domestic economic problems, a serious manpower shortage, and political instability in the empire. It is unlikely that the United Kingdom will be able to finance another war effort as great as the last one.

(b) Overall industrial output of the United Kingdom is, however, substantially above prewar levels. Failure to modernize industrial equipment and improve production methods has been a limiting factor to in creased output. The postwar level of coal production is less than prewar, largely due to shortage of manpower rather than obsolescent equipment. Nevertheless by 1957 the level of British industrial production will undoubtedly exceed 1949 levels. Britain's primary objective at the present time is to expand her foreign trade. An increase of 75 percent over the prewar volume is required to compensate for losses in income from over seas investments and shipping. Consequently Britain's exports will have to be maintained at a very high level in order to finance a major part of her food and raw-materials requirements for the next few years. By 1957 the merchant marine will equal or exceed present size and will consist largely of modern ships.

(c) Economic support for the British armed forces depends on the importation of large quantities of raw materials. Assuming that raw materials are acquired, British industry is capable of supporting her armed forces.

However, the availability of materials abroad, the slowness of sea transport, and the time required to fill supply pipelines are factors which adversely affect procurement. The establishment of an effective British wartime economy would require rapid assistance from the United States.
In a short war, consumer items such as food will be a more important factor than strategic industrial materials. In an extended war, the petroleum-refining industry will be able to meet only a small fraction of the needs of the armed forces, and industry in general will be heavily dependent upon imports.

(4) Canada. It is expected that in the next few years Canada will see a growth of all types of manufacturing, along with new discoveries and development of resources, e.g., iron and coal in Quebec, oil and natural gas in Alberta, and radioactive elements in Ontario and the Northwest Territories. Her capacity for surplus-food production will be greatly increased. By 1957 Canada's economic contribution to a war effort would be substantially greater than in World War II.

(5) Australia and New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand may be expected to increase output of manufactured products, especially in the aircraft and shipping industries. They could also make an important contribution of basic products.

(6) The Union of South Africa. The Union's contribution to the Industrial potential of the empire consists primarily of the following minerals: gold, industrial diamonds, coal, manganese, chrome, asbestos, wool, copper, and iron. With the exception of ISCOR (Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation), where a great variety of steel products are made on an increasing scale, South Africa's manufacturing industry is negligible.

(7) France

(a) Postwar recovery efforts in France are directed toward the rehabilitation and expansion of capital equipment to overcome the physical damage and capital deterioration caused by the war and thereby to restore the framework of the prewar economy. For the six basic industries—coal,
power, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, and transport—the 1950 target for industrial production is 160 percent of the 1930 level. Efforts are being made to modernize both agricultural and industrial production methods to raise output despite continuing labor shortages.

(b) By 1957 France may be expected to be virtually self-sufficient in all major food categories except fats and oils, the domestic production of which will probably supply less than half the country's requirements. France's most extensive indigenous raw materials are iron ore, bauxite,
cement, and potash, in all of which the country is on an export basis. On balance, however, France is a heavy net importer of industrial raw materials, coal and oil being major import items. French coal production should increase substantially by 1957. Imports of at least 30 million tons
or about one-third of total requirements will still be required. The dependence of the French iron and steel industry on raw materials from the Ruhr is such that France is expected to receive 30 percent of the total Ruhr exports of coal and coke.

(c) The Saar, now in economic union with France, is a highly industrialized area with important coal mines and steel mills and substantial production in chemicals and glass. The Saar is important to Western Europe, especially to France, as an exporter of coal and finished steel. By 1957 annual exports from the Saar of 10 million metric tons of hard coal and 1.5 million tons of finished steel may be expected.

(d) Whereas France's imports normally consist predominantly of raw materials, exports are chiefly manufactured goods—textiles, vehicles, chemicals, and iron and steel. Industrial production has already exceeded the prewar rate by 17 percent. The acute postwar limitation of food, transportation, and labor are being overcome; continuation of the upward trend of production will hinge on the availability of coal, particularly from the Ruhr.

(8) Belgium

(a) Belgium is largely an industrial processing country. The principal products which Belgium produces in excess of its domestic requirements are iron and steel, textiles, cut diamonds, glass, cement, certain nonferrous metals, railroad cars, and some types of heavy machinery. Most raw
materials required in the manufacture of the above products, however, are largely imported. The only industrial raw material available in large quantities in Belgium is coal, but even this material must be supplemented to some extent by imports. Belgium also is dependent upon outside sources for a considerable portion of its foodstuffs.

(b) In addition to the export of the products mentioned above, German transit trade through Antwerp was an important source of foreign exchange before the war. At present this trade is only a fractional part of its prewar level. It is expected that it will be much larger in 1957, although even then it may be less than prewar.

(c) It does not appear likely that there will be any great shift in the character of Belgian industry and trade during the next few years. A most likely development is an intensification of the industrial characteristics of the country that existed before the war, with the most important development between 1948 and 1957 probably being a considerable increase in production of iron and steel products.

(d) There are important respects in which trade between Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands is complementary. By 1957 it is likely that considerable progress will have been made toward a complete economic union of the three countries, and a combined strength of the Benelux economic union when fully implemented will be a strong economic bargaining unit in international economic relations.

(9) Netherlands

(a) The effects of the war are relatively greater in the Netherlands than in any Allied country in Western Europe. Economic recovery in the Netherlands consequently has been more difficult and is not as far advanced as in other Western European countries. Nevertheless manufacturing production in the Netherlands by the middle of 1948 had returned approximately to prewar levels.

(b) The long-range economic outlook in the Netherlands is not particularly promising. For many years the value of merchandise imports into the Netherlands was 40-50 percent more than merchandise exports. This commodity trade deficit was offset by income from overseas investments from shipping, and from German transit trade. The principal commodities in which the Netherlands showed a net export were foodstuffs. Principal imports are iron and steel from Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The United Kingdom, because of its increasing self-sufficiency, will not provide as good a market for Netherlands foodstuffs in the future as it did in the past. By 1957 Netherlands shipping may yield larger returns than in prewar years. Income from investments in the Netherlands Indies and returns from German transit trade, however, are not likely to equal prewar levels at any time in the foreseeable future. Moderate improvement in total industrial production over present levels should be attained by 1957, with a tendency toward production for an increased self-sufficiency. It is not likely, however, that the expected increases in industrial production by 1957 will more than offset the declines in visible income earned by the Netherlands before the war.

(10) Luxembourg. Luxembourg has developed within the last fifty years an iron and steel industry of international importance. The iron and steel industry, suffering only moderate damage during the war but in need of considerable modernization, has made rapid advances since the war. Luxembourg is now producing pig iron at the annual rate of 2.6 million metric tons, or approximately 10 percent of the total production of Western Europe, and crude steel at the annual rate of 2.2 million metric tons, or approximately 7 percent of the total production of Western Europe. The principal vulnerability of Luxembourg's production is its dependency on imports for high-grade ores and for coking coal. Given adequate imports of coking coal, increases of perhaps 50 percent from these record levels and substantial exports of crude and semi-finished steel to other countries in Western Europe may be expected by 1957.

(11) The Ruhr

(a) Industrial expansion in France and the Benelux countries depends heavily on the coal industry of the Ruhr, and in the future Ruhr coal is likely to play an equally important part in the industrial activity of Western Europe. Assuming fairly stable peacetime conditions, the possibilities of stepping up Ruhr coal shipments to the West appear to be good. At present about 20 percent of the coal produced in the Ruhr is exported, of which about one-half goes to France and Benelux. The volume of future deliveries will be largely controlled by two factors: the amount of coal produced in the Ruhr and the amount of steel produced in Germany. Coal production is expected to rise to a level of at least 150 million tons by 1957, as compared to a current level of about 95 million tons and a prewar level of 135 million tons. The Western Allies have established a goal for Germany's steel production of 10.7 million metric tons, which is somewhat more than half of prewar output. This goal can probably be attained by 1952 but will not be exceeded in later years.

(b) The dependence of France and Benelux on Ruhr steel is much less important than their dependence on Ruhr coal, because of their current and projected expansion of their own steel and steel-products industries, including those of the Saar. In addition, for the next few years
much, if not most, of the Ruhr steel products will of necessity be consumed at home in reconstructing Germany. After 1950, however, increasing quantities of Ruhr steel products will probably be imported by Western European countries.

(c) Ruhr coal and steel production is obviously providing a powerful stimulus to industrial growth in France and Benelux; loss of Ruhr production during the next few years, therefore, would be expected to cripple their industries in comparable proportions.

(12) Italy. Because Italy is heavily overpopulated in comparison to the extent and productivity of the land, she must remain dependent on outside areas for a large share of her food and other agricultural requirements. Industrially Italy has two distinct assets but has a liability which, under certain circumstances, would cripple industrial production. She has in existence a consider able industrial plan supported by a large reservoir of trained manpower, and she has a considerable hydroelectric plant backed by available water resources for a large expansion. She is, however, so deficient in natural resources that her industrial potential is almost entirely dependent on imports of raw materials and fuels. Non-availability of these commodities, through interruption of lines of supply at any time, would destroy Italy's industrial usefulness.

(13) Iceland. Economically Iceland is important as a source offish and fish products but otherwise has slight economic assets. Other than fish it has almost no natural resources, and its extremely limited manufacturing, mining, and agriculture are not sufficient to supply even its own small population.

(14) Portugal. The Portuguese economy is not self-sufficient in that it requires large imports of many necessities. Although Portugal's economy is based on agriculture and fishing, it is not self-supporting in foods. In the raw-material field, Portugal is the world's most important source of cork
[and] has important quantities of tungsten, and there are extensive deposits of low-quality tin. Other minerals—largely undeveloped and some not even fully explored—include coal, iron, pyrites, sulfur, manganese, zinc, lead, and titanium. Production of these latter minerals is not sufficient even for local requirements, and very extensive development would be necessary before any of them could become important exports. Portuguese manufacturing industries are extremely limited and technically very backward.

(15) Denmark. Except for agricultural land and the fish-producing waters around the peninsula, Denmark has few natural resources of consequence Its economy is, therefore, largely agricultural. It is an important source of foods, its principal exports being meats and dairy and poultry products. It is however, to a considerable degree dependent on imports of fertilizers and feed concentrates. Industrially Denmark has significant capabilities in food processing, farm machinery, diesel engines, shipbuilding, machine tools, construction-engineering equipment, railway rolling stock, cement, and clay processing but is dependent on imports of raw materials and fuels. The Danish labor force is not large but is highly skilled.

(16) Norway. The Norwegian economy is largely dependent on foreign trade. Normally only about one-half of the total food requirements are domestically produced, and in some essential items, notably bread and feed grains and protein concentrates, domestic production is only one-fourth of requirements. Most important among the physical resources are minerals, waterpower, forests, and fish. An almost complete lack of fuel is the most serious deficit.

Commercial shipping is Norway's most extensive and most important industry. The Norwegian commercial fleet is presently the third largest in the world and is expanding. Norway has well-developed industries in the fields of electrochemistry, electrometallurgy, fish, pulp and paper, and mining which produce significant surpluses for export. Pyrites and iron ore are the chief products of the mining industry, but copper, titanium, nickel, zinc, lead, molybdenum, magnetite, mica, tin, tungsten, cadmium, and chromite are also mined. Norway's shipbuilding capacity is quite limited, though a significant expansion is planned.

3. Relative Combat Power

a. Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces (1) Strengths and Dispositions

(a) Ground Forces

i. It is estimated that in 1957 the Soviet armed forces will have a strength of about 3.8 million men. In the Soviet army there will probably be some 2.2 million troops. A vast program of reorganization and re-equipment is in progress throughout the Soviet army with the object of bringing a large proportion of its divisions up to Western standards and, in particular, of increasing the strength of the armored element and converting most of the horse-drawn formations to a motorized basis.

ii. By relating the estimate of the manpower available in 1957 to a conjecture as to the makeup of balanced forces, it is believed that the Soviet standing array may then comprise 12 rifle divisions, 60 motorized rifle divisions, 30 mechanized divisions, 24 tank divisions, 9 cavalry divisions, and 20 artillery and antiaircraft divisions, or a total of 155 divisions of all categories (total of 135 line divisions).

iii. It is considered that by 1957 the armies of the Soviet European satellite states combined will probably total some 115 divisions[The USSR probably would call upon the satellites to ready forces of smaller proportions than their capacity due to the following considerations: an unusual buildup in the satellite areas would imperil the security of the impending attack, which the USSR would attempt to keep secret from the West as long as possible, and the Soviets would call for only such forces from the satellite countries as they believe would loyally fight or participate in occupation duties.] Of these, about 40 percent might be used in offensive ground operations. In addition, in the Far East the Outer Mongolian forces would number 80,000 and Chinese Communist forces would number approximately 1.45 million troops.

iv. On D-Day in 1957, disposition of Soviet line divisions might be as follows:

Area / Line Divisions

Western USSR / 70
Occupied Western Europe / 15
Southern USSR (Caucasus) / 15
Central USSR (Urals to Lake Baikal) / 10
South-central USSR (Tashkent) / 5
Far East USSR (east of Lake Baikal) / 20
TOTAL USSR / 135

v. The disposition of the satellite forces on D-Day would be such that each country's forces, while located within its own borders, would be concentrated near non-friendly borders.

vi. Estimated Soviet-European satellite strengths:

Country	D-Day DIVS	D + 30 DIVS	D + 365 DIVS

USSR(a)	155	248	over 500
Poland (b)(c)(e)	22	33	50
Czechoslovakia(b)(e)	15	37	50
Finland(b)	3	15	15
Soviet Zone of Germany (d)(e)	-	-	25
Bulgaria(e)	12	15	25
Hungary(e)	5	5	8
Romania(e)	11	15	30
Yugoslavia(e)	43	50	65
Albania(e)	4	5	6

* Includes artillery and antiaircraft divisions.

(a) Excludes MVD (Ministry for Internal Affairs) troops and static air-defense forces. The D + 365 capabilities are in excess of any anticipated requirements for ground forces and probably will not be exercised.

(b) It is considered that Poland and Finland will not be able to equip an army larger than that of their D-Day strength. Czechoslovakia will not be able to equip an army larger than that of her D + 30 strength. The remainder of the equipment necessary to equip the "D + 365" armies must be furnished by the USSR. Although Finland is included as a Soviet satellite, it is by no means certain that Finnish troops would fight against the Allies.

(c) In the case of the eight satellites, Mobilization-Day and D-Day are assumed to be synonymous. (d) The Soviets would have to equip any German forces recruited from the Soviet zone
of Germany.
(e) Organization, equipment, training, and tactics would be based on Soviet doctrines. Expansion would be predicated on the USSR's ability to supply necessary equipment.

(f) If the present defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite orbit should continue to 1957, it is not likely that Yugoslavia would ally with the Soviet Union but would attempt to remain neutral and would be committed to resist Soviet and/or satellite attack.

vii. The Soviet army is in the process of a fundamental reorganization of its ground units. Three types of divisions—rifle, mechanized, and tank—are expected to evolve as the basic combat units. Their estimated strengths are as follows:

Type / Personnel / Tanks / SP Guns*

Rifle / 11,000 / 52 / 34
Tank / 10,300 / 250 / 21
Mechanized / 12,850 / 160 / 44

* Self-propelled guns

viii. There is no indicated change in the organization of airborne units. The basic airborne unit is believed to be the brigade of 4,200 men (with combat strength of four battalions at 699 each), (b) Naval Forces

i. The Soviet Union is expected to make a considerable effort in the development of her navies in the north, west, the Black Sea, and the Far East. The greatest menace is expected to be the submarine fleet, which will include high-submerged-speed types.

ii. It is known that the Soviet Union is taking great interest in the building of midget submarines and fast coastal craft of all types, and it is estimated that they will have large numbers of these by 1957.

iii. In the absence of firm intelligence the following is the best estimate which can be arrived at for the Soviet naval forces in 1957.

(i) Battleships. The hull of a 45,000-ton battleship remains undamaged in the slips at Leningrad, but there are indications that she is being dismantled. It is reasonably certain that no other ships of this category are under construction at the moment, and it is unlikely that the Russians have yet made up their minds as to what is required for the future.

(ii) Aircraft carriers. There is no credible evidence of aircraft-carrier construction in the Soviet Union. There is no evidence so far that aircraft suitable for operation from carriers are being built or even designed or that training of personnel for this work has been contemplated. However, even though the Soviet navy may decide that an aircraft-carrier force is necessary for the future, in view of their total lack of experience in this field, it seems unlikely that they can develop such a force by 1957. Furthermore, they cannot call upon German experience to help them in this.

(iii) Monitor-type vessels. The first unit of this type is the Vyborg (ex-Finnish), with a life expectancy through 1959. New units may be added starting in 1955.

(iv) Cruisers. About thirty, the majority of which will be heavy, and of these about seven to ten will be about twenty years old.

(v) Destroyers. About 120, approximately 40 percent of which may be of a large type of 4,500 tons. (vi) Escort destroyers. About 140.

(vii) Submarines. About 300-350 ocean-type, of which about 50 percent are expected to be high-submerged-speed type. About 200-300 coastal-defense type may also be in operation.

(viii) Minor combatant types and landing craft. Large numbers of all types, including motor torpedo boats, midgets, radio-controlled explosive motorboats, minesweepers, etc.

iv. The Soviet navy possesses its own air force, which is divided-between the various fleets and flotillas of the navy. The present total strength is estimated to be about 3,100 aircraft, probably disposed as shown in subparagraph (c) below. Although little is known of the postwar developments of the Soviet naval air force, there is no sign of any contemplated carrier construction, and it is probable, therefore that in 1957 the role of the naval air force will be that of a coastal air force. Its activities will probably be confined primarily to the defense of port areas, the support of land operations in coastal belts, amphibious operations, the protection of shipping, and attacks on Allied sea communications as opportunity offers. There is no evidence to suggest that the size of the force will be markedly different in 1957.

v. There are indications that the Soviet naval authorities are taking steps to intensify the training of personnel to suit the expansion of the fleet which is envisaged. The mobilization strength is expected to be 865,000, including marines, coast defense, and naval air personnel, vi. The estimated total of operational naval forces of the Balkan satellite countries in 1957 is four destroyers; two corvettes; three submarines; fifty midget submarines; fifty motor gunboats. Of the other European satellites, Czechoslovakia may be expected to operate a Danube flotilla of fast armed craft, and Poland and Finland a total naval force of two destroyers, four submarines, and considerable numbers of small craft of all types. It is not expected that the Far Eastern satellites will possess naval forces of any consequence, (c) Air Forces

i. . . . Numbers of combat aircraft set forth are estimated to be those in operational units. While it is believed that the Soviet Union possesses vast numbers of reserve combat aircraft at the present time, no firm estimate of reserves in 1957 can be made. A considerable number of stored aircraft will probably be available, however, and it is likely that reasonable losses can be replaced fairly rapidly.

ii. It is estimated that the Soviet Union has seventeen thousand aircraft in operational units at the present time. This force includes at least fifteen tactical air armies, a long-range force, a fighter defense force, and a naval air force.

iii. Distribution by aircraft by type of command is believed to be as follows: military (tactical) air force, 10,000; long-range force, 1,800; fighter defense force, 2,100; naval air force, 3,100.

iv. A responsible forecast of the composition and strength of the Soviet air force in 1957 cannot be made before 1952 at the earliest. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume for planning purposes that the organization and size of the various arms in 1957 will not differ greatly from the organization and size at the present time. Therefore, utilizing similar strength figures, it is estimated that on any D-Day in 1957 the allocation of tactical aircraft of the Soviet air forces, including naval but not including the fighter defense force (PVO) and the long-range force, might be as follows:

	Western Europe	Middle East	Far East	Interior USSR	Totals

Fighters	2,600	1,000	1,400	400	5,400*
Ground Attack	1,600	700	700	300	3,300
Light Bombers	1,200	700	700	400	2,800
Miscellaneous	600	400	400	200	1,600
	6,000**	2,600	3,200	1,300	13,100

* A proportion of the fighter aircraft in the tactical air armies would be responsible for the defense of the lines of communication—i.e., the interception of enemy reconnaissance and bomber missions passing over the area—and might consequently not be available for offensive tactical operations. This proportion might normally be up to 25 percent of the total fighter strength but would depend on the threat to be met and might on occasions be very much higher.

** Any aircraft required for operations in Norway and Sweden would be taken from the total of those allotted to the Western European theater.

v. Protection of political and industrial centers of the Soviet Union is the responsibility of the antiaircraft defense force, which includes antiaircraft units and early-warning systems in addition to an estimated 2,100 interceptor aircraft in the fighter defense force (PVO). The fighter defense force is responsible for the home defense of the Soviet Union and is divided into a number of air armies, each of which is responsible for the defense of a fixed area. Assuming present strength figures would obtain in 1957, it is estimated that its deployment on D-Day would probably be:

For the defense of the Soviet Union behind the Western European front / 600
For the defense of northern Russia / 300
For the defense of the Soviet Union behind the Near and Middle East front / 700
For the defense of the Soviet Union behind the Far East front / 500
Total / 2,100

vi. The long-range air force currently contains an estimated 1,800 operational aircraft. Although no information is available as to the number of B-29-type aircraft in operational units, it is considered that the 150 B-29s estimated to be available for operational usage are assigned to this force. Other types assigned to the long-range air force include 1,400 light bombers and 250 transports. It is subject to centralized control and its objectives might differ widely geographically from day to day. Therefore, any percentage estimate of the proportion which might be devoted to any particular target area probably would be misleading and at best of doubtful value. The strategic bomber and transport aircraft, therefore, represent a force which might be used to attack targets in Western Europe, the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, or the Near and Middle East and the Far East. Aircraft of the force could also be used for attacks against Alaska, Canada, and the United States. With the introduction of Soviet Super fortresses, IL-18 and TU-70 heavy transports, and later heavy jet bombers and possibly a conventional-engine aircraft comparable to the U.S. B-36, the effectiveness of the long-range force should be substantially increased, but more skilled manpower will be required.

vii. Current strength of Soviet naval air force is estimated at 3,100 aircraft of the same types used in the tactical air armies. It is organized into six fleet air forces designated by areas as the North and South Baltic, Black Sea, Arctic, North and South Pacific. The naval air force will probably be used primarily to protect the sea approaches to the Soviet Union and secondarily in support of the ground forces.

viii. In addition to the above Soviet air forces, the Soviet Union has a semi-military air organization: the civil air fleet. By 1957 the medium transport aircraft of the civil air fleet and the long-range force will have been replaced by IL-12s, TU-70s, IL-18s, and other aircraft of increased performance. It is estimated that the total number of transports available for military operations would be at least 2,500 medium and heavy transports, of which at least 10 percent might be heavy transports. The re-equipment should result in a greatly increased airlift potential. It is estimated that at any time up to 1957 the Soviet Union will have available more paratroops than her transport force will be able to carry in any single lift. The above transport force, however, should be able to lift as many as forty thousand to fifty thousand troops at one time.

ix. The satellites may be able to place a limited number of combat aircraft at the disposal of the Soviet Union by 1957. (2) Mobilization Capabilities

(a) Ground Forces. It is estimated that there might be about 33 million males fit for military service in 1957 and that approximately 55 percent of these might be mobilized in the course of a protracted war. In the event of mobilization the evidence indicates that the peacetime army of about 135 line divisions of all categories could be increased by about 60 percent in thirty days, although the number of armored and mechanized divisions would probably not increase in the same proportion. It is estimated that by M plus twelve months the Soviets can build up to more than 500 divisions. [For mobilization capabilities of Soviet satellite ground forces see table before.]

(b) Naval Forces. Since the Soviet navy does not maintain a reserve fleet except for minor craft, the mobilization of the navy would not be a major problem.

(c) Air Forces. A large proportion of the personnel inducted would have had three years of previous service, which would facilitate the rapid formation of new air-force units. There would be only a slight increase in the operational aircraft strength during the first ninety days of mobilization, since the first three months would be required for the formation, organization, and indoctrination training of new units. Based on current strength and known trends, the following estimate of mobilization capabilities by D+ 180 for 1957 may reasonably be used for planning purposes:

	Fighters		Attack		Lt. Bombers		Long-Range Force
TOTALS	Conv.	Jet	Conv.	Jet	Conv.	Jet	Conv.	Jet
20,000	3,000	7,000	3,000	1,000	3,000	1,000	1,600	400

(3) Combat Efficiency

(a) Soviet Armed Forces

i. Army. By 1957 it is estimated that a very small proportion of the Soviet army will be outside the borders of the Soviet Union, and the army will, therefore, be for the most part insulated from subversive influences. The standard of training should be satisfactory and the supply of specialists will probably be rather easier than in 1949. Although the extent of political control in 1957 cannot be assessed, it is likely that the Soviet army will be a more effective fighting force in 1957 than it is in 1949.

ii. Navy. A significant increase in the Soviet maritime population has taken place since 1939. The effect of this will be a steady increase in the efficiency of the Soviet navy between now and 1957. In 1957 the most efficient arm of the navy will be the submarine force, although overall performance and attack techniques probably will be lower than our standards. Development in high-submerged-speed operations would present a serious threat. The small submarines, in which personal bravery is the predominant factor for success, will be a menace. Surface units will be inexperienced in modern warfare at sea. A policy of ocean raiding would not be suited to the Soviet technique, but individual commanders might be successful in this sphere. Advantage is being taken of German technique and experience in the development of surface-ship designs, and the Soviet surface fleet is expected to have much better oceangoing qualities than hitherto. Energetic steps have been taken to collect all available German knowledge, and therefore some improvement in staff work, technical efficiency, and sea sense as compared with the last war can be expected. It is therefore considered that although any Soviet ship would compare unfavorably in fighting efficiency with her counterpart in the British or United States navies, the Soviet navy, as a whole, could operate such numbers of fast modern surface ships and submarines at such widely scattered points as to present a serious menace to our sea communications.

iii. Air Forces. With the assistance of German aviation experts and the backing of the fast-developing Soviet aviation industry, it is reasonable to suppose that by 1957 the difference in efficiency between the Anglo-American and Soviet air forces will be less than it was during World War II.

(b) Satellite Armed Forces

i. Armies. The satellite armies are likely to increase in efficiency as a result of the training which they are being given by Soviet personnel and the Soviet equipment with which they are being supplied to varying extents. The armies of Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania are limited by treaty and can therefore only be increased in size by covert means. In Bulgaria and Romania this has already been done. The Soviet Union will probably not connive at such a step in the case of Finland.

ii. Navies. The forces at present available to the satellite countries do not represent any considerable factor in overall Soviet maritime strength. Poland and Yugoslavia are, however, likely to increase the efficiency of their navies, possibly up to the prewar standard.

iii. Air Forces. The air forces of all the satellite nations are being developed on Soviet lines. However, it is doubtful if their combat effectiveness will have been developed substantially by 1957.

(4) Defenses

(a) Fortifications

i. It is not anticipated that between the present and 1957, Soviet fortification policy will undergo major changes. It is estimated that Soviet land-fortification activity will consist largely of improvements and expansions of existing installations.

ii. The satellite states and Soviet-occupied areas all have some remnants of World War II or earlier fortifications, especially in Poland, Finland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. These defense systems appear to have been expanded and modernized, and a line of light fortifications at the extreme limit of Soviet control may be expected in 1957.

(b) Major Ports and Naval Bases. Present plans for the defense of major ports and naval bases will probably have been carried out. Defense will probably include:

i. Antisubmarine measures (booms, nets, underwater detecting devices, controlled mines).

ii. Coast-watching radar stations, with efficient personnel manning them.

iii. Strong coast artillery with modern equipment, fire-control methods, and laying gear.

iv. Beach defenses at suitable landing places near important objectives.

v. Extensive use of camouflage.

Any additional bases acquired or developed in the interim period will be similarly defended. Inland defenses will be stiffened and possibly extended.

(c) Airfield Defense. There are some indications of a trend toward placing important airfield hangar and maintenance facilities underground in the Soviet Union and in satellite areas. By 1957, this measure for passive ground defense of aircraft may be extensively implemented.

(d) Early Warning

i. In obtaining early warning of air attack against the USSR proper, Soviet defense forces are now and probably would be in 1957 aided by control or partial control in areas contiguous to her borders. The Soviet satellite countries and occupation zones provide roughly a five-hundred-mile-wide buffer between the USSR and the remainder of Europe. In a more narrow form, Finland extends this corridor northward to the Barents Sea. Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, and the Kuril Islands provide a buffer area in the Far East. Soviet vessels, including the Asiatic fishing fleets, further extend the possible warning zones.

ii. By 1957 the Soviet Union could have developed a fairly efficient early-warning system for their important industrial areas and some of the likely approaches thereto.

iii. By 1957, in the principal defense areas, it is possible that the Soviets could have an operating electronic-control system for interceptors and antiaircraft artillery. However, the problem of electronic control of interceptors, guided missiles, and antiaircraft artillery will be considerable; the entire system in any principal area will be subject to electronic countermeasures.

(5) Weapons, New and Improved

(a) Atomic Weapons. In 1956-1957 the Soviet stockpile may be expected to be something approximating 250 bombs at the most. The supply of uranium ore is the limiting factor. Uncertainty in this respect makes it impossible to forecast the stockpile of bombs with greater accuracy.

(b) Aircraft. Soviet aircraft performance will probably be somewhat below that of the United States and the United Kingdom but should show a degree of technical development comparable to that of the Allies. By 1957 the main equipment of the fighter regiments will probably be jet aircraft. Such aircraft may be supersonic but no firm estimate of performance can be given at present. Some ground-attack regiments may have been reequipped with a ground-attack jet aircraft. There is, however, no evidence as yet that the Soviet Union intends to dispense with the slower, very heavily armored reciprocating-engine aircraft for this purpose. Bomber aircraft of the tactical air armies will probably be comparable in type but inferior in performance to Anglo-American aircraft in 1957.

(c) Antiaircraft. Antiaircraft equipment available to the Soviets will include hypervelocity guns with calibers on the order of 120mm to 150mm, excellent directors for computing and transmitting firing data, satisfactory gun-laying radar, some type of proximity fuse, and ammunition improved in lethal radius. Use of this equipment, against aircraft flying near sonic speeds at altitudes up to forty thousand feet, would be limited to the tracking capability of the director and gun-laying radar. In addition, the equipping of gun-laying radar with some type of anti-jamming device may be attempted. With the acquisition of German blueprints and German scientists, Soviet fire-control equipment will improve rapidly, and by 1957 Soviet antiaircraft fire-control equipment should be at least as good as present-day U.K. and U.S. equipment.

(d) Biological Warfare (BW). There is no evidence available of the Soviet Union's present ability to wage biological warfare, but it must be assumed that she possesses now the requisite basic knowledge. It is not possible, therefore, to assess her present or future biological-warfare potential, but it must be assumed that by 1957 the Soviet Union's capability of waging biological warfare will be limited only by the material effort diverted into this channel and by the availability of the requisite means of delivery. The use of biological warfare as a sabotage instrument is a capability and a distinct threat.

(e) Chemical Warfare. By 1957, in addition to considerable stocks of already well-known gases, the Soviet Union will be able to produce in quantity the most potent nerve gases at present known and possibly others even more poisonous and should have developed means of dissemination.

(f) Guided Missiles

i. Surface-to-Air: In 1957 the USSR probably will have adequate quantities of surface-to-air missiles available for the defense of important targets. It is expected that the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile will be based on the German missile Wasserfall. This missile probably will reach a maximum altitude of sixty thousand feet, a horizontal range of approximately thirty miles, carry a warhead of approximately six hundred pounds, and will attain supersonic speed shortly after launching. Since this missile probably will be launched vertically, precluding control until approximately five seconds of flight have elapsed, another weapon will be employed to engage targets below an altitude of around five thousand feet. This missile will be most likely an improved model of the German Schmetterling or Rheintochter missiles or both. These missiles will attain an altitude of thirty thousand feet at a horizontal range of approximately thirty miles and carry a warhead of fifty to one hundred pounds. The control of all surface-to-air missiles probably will be by radar.

ii. Surface-to-Surface. The surface-to-surface missiles which can be available in operational quantities in 1957 include V-I and V-2 types copied from the original German missiles as well as V-2 types with wings. These Soviet missiles may be expected to have improved operational characteristics. Ranges of six hundred nautical miles for V-1 types and four hundred nautical miles for V-2 types are within the Soviet capability.

iii. Submarine-Launched. There are indications that the Soviets are attempting to extend the areas of possible employment of the V-1 -type missile by equipping submarines for missile launchings. Limited employment of submarine-launched missiles against areas beyond ground-launched missile ranges may be expected by 1957.

iv. Air-to-Surface. By 1957 the Soviets should have operational quantities of slightly improved German types of air-to-surface missiles. These include the Hs-293 and the Hs-294, the latter an air-to-underwater missile. The quantities will probably be such that only high-priority targets will merit their use. Ranges of these missiles will be approximately eight nautical miles at subsonic speeds, carrying warheads up to three thousand pounds. Improvement over German types will include homing devices and control during final trajectory, v. Air-to-Air. Development of air-to-air missiles has been given a rather low priority according to current intelligence. Preliminary studies are apparently in progress, but the program is not as extensive as in other types of missiles. Little improvement is anticipated in the German types Hs-117-H, Hs-298, and the X-4 by 1957. Small quantities of similar missiles should be available.

(g) Proximity Fuses. It is considered that by 1957 the Soviet Union will have developed proximity fuses for AA and field artillery, and the scale of issue will depend upon the type selected for production and the effort put into it.

(h) Naval. The [Walther]-type submarine, still in the development stage, may appear in appreciable numbers after 1954. Between 1950 and 1957 the Soviet navy may develop and put into general use antiaircraft rockets, guided missiles launched from aircraft, radio-controlled explosive motorboats, high-speed homing torpedoes designed for pattern running, and influence mines of all types used or projected by the Germans.

b. Allied Armed Forces
[This estimate is for 1951. An air-force projected model of the B-52 equipped with four turbojet engines would by 1956 have a combat radius of 3,750 nautical miles with the same speeds and bomb loadings but would weigh up to 360,000 lb. at takeoff.]

(1) United States

(a) In view of the fact that a major purpose of this study is to develop force requirements for a war in 1957, no statement with respect to available U.S. forces is made at this time.

(b)New and Improved Weapons. Listed below is a summary of the most significant developments in new and improved weapons which it is estimated will be available operationally in 1957, unless otherwise indicated. . . .

(i) Heavy Bombers

B-52: A 33O,0O0-lb. heavy bomber powered by eight turbojet engines; maximum speed 522 knots, combat radius 2,660 nautical miles at 453 knots with 10,000 lb. of bombs.

(ii) Medium Bombers

B-47: A 185,000-lb. medium bomber with six turbojet engines; maximum speed over 500 knots, combat radius 2,400 nautical miles at 460 knots with 10,000 lb. of bombs.

A medium land-based bomber weighing 175,000 lb. capable of a maximum speed of 600 knots. Combat radius 2,000 nautical miles at 520 knots with 10,000 lb. of bombs. (As first experimental flight date is 1955, this aircraft may not be operationally available in quantity before mid-1957.)

(iii) Attack Bombers (Carrier)

XVA(H-l): An unarmed turbojet carrier-based plane having a maximum speed of 520 knots, a maximum takeoff weight of 75,000 lb., and a combat radius of 1,500 nautical miles at 485 knots with a 10,000-lb. bomb load.

XA2J-I: A carrier-based plane powered by two turboprop engines, having a maximum takeoff weight of 71,000 lb. and a maximum speed of 420 knots. Combat radius 1,220 nautical miles at 370 knots with a 10,500-lb. bomb load.

AJ-I: A carrier-based plane powered by two reciprocating and one turbojet engine, having a maximum takeoff weight of 51,000 Ib. and a maximum speed of 417 knots. Combat radius 770 nautical miles at 220 knots with a 10,500-lb. bomb load,

(iv) Light Bomber

B-51: A 56,500-lb. light bomber with three turbojet engines; maximum speed 500 knots at sea level, combat radius 378 nautical miles at 463 knots with 4,(XX) Ib. of bombs,

(v) Interceptors

XFI0F-I: A 26,700-lb. carrier-based interceptor, maximum speed 565 knots at 50,000 ft. Rate of climb 35,000 ft. in 3.5 minutes; combat radius 575 nautical miles. Armament: four 20mm guns.

XF3H-I: An 18,200-lb. carrier-based interceptor, maximum speed 562 knots at 53,000 ft. Rate of climb 50,000 ft. in 5.5 minutes; endurance, 70 minutes. Armament: twenty-four 2.75-inch rockets.

Land-based interceptor, weighing 15,000 Ib., capable of a maximum speed of 690 knots at 50,000 ft. Rate of climb 45,000 ft. in 5 minutes, endurance 3 hours. Armament includes two guided missiles.

XF4D-X: A 17,000-lb. carrier-based interceptor, capable of a maximum speed of 850 knots at 58,000 ft. Rate of climb 50,000 ft. in 4 minutes, endurance I hour. Armament: rockets or guided missiles.

XF91: A land-based interceptor weighing 28.300 Ib. (with assist rockets) capable of a maximum speed of 855 knots at 47,500 ft. Rate of climb 2.5 minutes to 47,500 ft. Endurance 25 minutes. Armament: four 20mm guns,

(vi) Tactical Aircraft

F-90: A 33,500 Ib. single-place fighter with two turbojet engines; maximum speed 552 knots, combat radius 476 nautical miles at 473 knots. Armament: six 20mm guns, eight rockets, two 1,000-lb. bombs.

F-93A: A 26,500-lb. land-based fighter with one turbojet engine and a maximum speed of 540 knots at 35,000 ft. Combat radius 700 nautical miles at 465 knots. Armament: six 20mm guns, sixteen 5-inch rockets, two 1,000-lb. bombs.

Ground support: A land-based 20,000-lb. aircraft with reciprocating or turboprop engines, capable of a maximum speed of 500 knots at 12,000 ft. Combat radius 500 nautical miles. Armament: guns, rockets, and bombs,

(vii) Reconnaissance

Heavy, medium, and light bomber types described above would also be available for performance of the reconnaissance mission and would have slightly superior speed and altitude performance compared with the combat versions.

(viii) Auxiliary Developments Efforts to overcome deficiencies in the above aircraft are resulting in development[Estimated range extensions of bombers using tankers having the same characteristics of bombers are as follows: one tanker, 38 percent; two tankers, 75 percent; three tankers, 95 percent.] of in-flight refueling techniques for range extension of land-based and carrier-based aircraft, afterburning or JATO for decreasing the lengths of runways required for jet aircraft takeoffs, and track-landing gear to eliminate elaborate runways for large bombers and transports. One-man radar and optical computing bomb sights, improved bomb-release mechanisms, and new bomb designs will solve problems associated with high bomber speeds and high-altitude bombing. Fighters will continue to experience difficulty in maneuvering near sonic speeds.

iii. Guided Missiles

(i) Surface-to-Surface

Navaho: A North American-built 44,000-lb. missile of speed Mach 2.8 carrying a 3,000-lb. warhead 868 nautical miles. Vertical launching. Accuracy 50 percent within 500 feet.

Snark: A Northrop-built missile of speed Mach .9, weighing 28,000 lb., and carrying a 5,000-lb. or special warhead a distance of 4,342 nautical miles. Uses rocket car on ramp for takeoff, then gasoline-powered turbojet for flight; accuracy, 50 percent within 500 feet with target seeker, otherwise 50 percent within 1 mile.

Boojum: Similar to Snark but weighing 90,000 lb. and having a speed of Mach 1.7.

Rigel and Regulus: Missiles designed for ship launching which can carry 3,000-4,000-lb. payload to a range of 400-500 nautical miles. Maximum speed Mach 2.0 and Mach .9, respectively. Accuracy, 50 percent within 3,000 ft., launching weights 19,000 and 11,600 lb., respectively.
Grebe II: A ship-launched 2,700-lb. antisubmarine surface-to-underwater missile which can carry a torpedo to a range of 20 miles at a speed of 350 knots. Accuracy, 40 percent hits against submerged submarines.

Hermes A-3: A 12,000-lb. tactical missile with a 1,000-lb. warhead for use at ranges up to 150 miles. Speed Mach 5.0; accuracy, 50 percent within 210 ft. Similar to German V-2 but lighter in weight.

(ii) Air-to-Surface

Rascal: A 12,000-lb. missile with a 3,000-lb. warhead capable of reaching targets 90 nautical miles from control aircraft. Rocket-propelled at speed Mach 1.6; accuracy, 50 percent within 300 ft. on land, 75 percent hits against water targets.

Tarzan: A 13,000-lb. free-fall missile carrying a 12,000-lb. warhead. Guidance by command control in aircraft, based on visual information or radar presentation. Accuracy, 100 percent within 100 ft. from 20,000 ft.

Dove: A 1,300-lb. free-fall missile carrying a 1,000-lb. warhead but using a passive infrafed homing-guidance system. Accuracy, 80 percent hits against destroyer or larger vessels.

Petrel: A 3,300-lb. torpedo-carrying missile with radar homing. Torpedo enters water 1,000 yd. from target and uses acoustic homing. Range, 20 miles at 350 knots. Accuracy, 50 percent hits.

Diver: Similar to Petrel but weighing 1,500 lb. and carrying a smaller warhead. Uses air- and water-reactive jet engine. Accuracy, 80 percent hits.

Puffin: A 1,250-lb. missile with a 500-lb. plunge bomb. Radar homing. Range 35 miles at 450 knots. Accuracy, 30 percent hits against destroyer or larger,

(iii) Surface-to-Air

Nike: A 2,600-lb. missile with a 325-lb. warhead and a range of 18 miles or 60,000 ft. altitude at a speed of Mach 2.5. Accuracy, 50 percent within 80 ft. against conventional bomber aircraft with speeds up to 525 knots.

Terrier: A ship-launched missile for use against fighters, weighing 2,600 lb. and carrying a 150-lb. warhead to a range of 9 miles or 40,000 ft. at a speed of Mach 1.8; accuracy, 50 percent within 45 ft.

Talos: Similar to Terrier but weighing 5,900 lb. and carrying a 300-lb. warhead 20 miles or 60,000 ft.

Zeus: A rocket missile weighing 110 lb. with a 60-lb. warhead, launched from re-bored 8-inch naval guns. Speed Mach 5.0, range 7.5 miles or 40,000 ft. Accuracy, 50 percent within 180 ft.

Gapa: A 5,000-lb. missile with a 300-lb. warhead and a range of 30 miles or 60,000 ft. at a speed of Mach 2.0. Accuracy, 50 percent within 40 ft. against bombers, (iv) Air-to-Air

MX-904: An internally stowed 77-lb. missile with a 5-lb. warhead, capable of omnidirectional coverage from bombers and forward launching from fighters. Speed Mach 1.5-3.0; accuracy, 50 percent within 10 ft. Target illumination to be from launching aircraft.

Meteor: A fighter-launched missile weighing 510 lb., carrying a 30-lb. warhead a distance of 10 nautical miles at a speed of Mach 2.0-2.6. Accuracy, 50 percent within 30 ft. Target illumination from launching aircraft, other aircraft, or ship.

Sparrow: Similar to above but weighing 275 lb. Target must be tracked and missile guided from launching aircraft,

iv. Surface Vessels

Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessels: Two new types of antisubmarine surface vessels are being provided in 1950 or earlier programs. These comprise a killer cruiser (5,500 tons) and four 3,650-ton destroyers specially designed for minimum noise to facilitate sonar operations, v. Submarines

(i) The emphasis on future submarines is on high speeds and increased concealment, principally by completely submerged operation. Future submarines will be redesigned to withstand depths up to one thousand feet with excellent promise of greatly increased submerged range and speed. Using the closed-cycle, internal-combustion principle, a prototype combat submarine should be available by 1956, having a top submerged speed of twenty-five knots (twelve hours' endurance) and a submerged cruising endurance of over two days.

(ii) Submarine Weapons: The following torpedo developments are scheduled:

A 20,000-yard, pattern-running, 60-knot torpedo with an impact/influence fuse to be tested in 1954.

A 5,000-yard, 25-knot, anti-escort torpedo with three-dimensional active or passive homing, or gyro control, using an impact fuse, to be tested in 1952.

A wire-guided torpedo, 30-knot speed, transmitting acoustic information to the launching vessel up to a 10,000-yard range, to be tested in 1952.

vi. Antisubmarine Warfare

(i) Sonar: No development promises to supplant sonar as the primary surface-vessel detection equipment. Reliability, accuracy of bearings, and depth determination of sonar (sound and ranging) will be improved, but range will not be increased significantly. Passive listening by deep submarines (SSK) hovering or at creeping speeds (low-level listening) provides detection and some bearing information to about twenty miles against snorkeling subs. Airborne sonar is limited to use by slow-moving blimps or helicopters.

(ii) Magnetic detectors have been improved, but they are still of severely limited range, approximately 1,000 feet. Increases to 1,200 to 1,500 feet can be expected.

(iii) Weapon "A" is a 12.75-inch ahead-thrown influence-fused rocket bomb with a 250-lb. HBX warhead. It will be fired at a rate of twelve a minute to a range of 800 yards.

(iv) Torpedoes: The Mark 35 torpedo will be tested in 1952. This will be a submarine-launched, 15,000-yard-range, 30-knot, active or passive homing torpedo. Its air-launched parallel will have a 10,000-yard range. A wire-guided torpedo (Mark 41), providing attack information to the firing vessel, will be in prototype form in 1952.

(v) Radar: The AN/APS-20 program will detect snorkel for a sweep width of twenty miles in a calm sea but is of little value in heavier seas. It is planned to test in 1951 an antisubmarine radar (AN/APS-44) providing two optional frequencies, choice of radiation polarization and combining IFF with the search radar.

(vi) Project General 2: A plan for protecting ships to a depth of fifty feet by streaming explosive charges alongside from paravanes, which gives some hope of destroying a considerable fraction of the torpedoes fired at a ship.

vii. Electronics

(i) Radar early warning: Line-of-sight limitations will continue to affect employment of radar, but improved ground or shipborne equipment will detect targets of one-square-meter equivalent area at ranges up to five hundred miles (target must be twenty-five miles high) and indicate ranges, altitudes, and azimuth with great accuracy over a 360-degree area. Airborne early-warning equipment will supplement the fixed type and will extend low-angle coverage out to 150 miles to detect the approach of low-flying aircraft. Outpost alerting radars, unattended in remote forward areas, arranged in a fencelike disposition, will transmit automatic warning signals when a target appears for the purpose of alerting the accurate tracking devices.

(ii) Navigational aids: Long-range systems dependent on ground stations should provide day and night coverage over land and water, undisturbed by Arctic effects, at ranges up to 3,000 miles with accuracies of up to plus or minus seven miles. These systems can be used by aircraft, surface vessels, and even land vehicles. Automatic-inertial, automatic-celestial, and radar-doppler dead-reckoning systems independent of ground stations will provide automatic ground-position indicators for carrier-based and land-based aircraft. Interceptor aircraft will be provided with automatic air-intercept control systems, probably linked to automatic pilots for ground control to the point of target acquisition by the fighter. Landing aids for use by aircraft during low-visibility conditions will be improved and information relayed to pilots by means of voice, radio, or pictorial radar.

(iii) Countermeasures: Equipment will be available for intercepting and jamming enemy radio, radar, and infrared transmissions within certain ranges, but knowledge will be required of specific enemy frequencies for 100 percent effectiveness. Confusion devices such as reflection material can be ejected from aircraft, ground vehicles, and even submerged submarines. False signals on the same frequency as enemy detection radar will be possible and further improvements in radar camouflage coating material are expected.

viii. Chemical and Biological Warfare

(i) Chemical: By 1951 at least one of the non-persistent nerve gases (GB) along with the persistent agent mustard (HD) will be operationally available, with no problems of production, storage, handling, or dissemination. While no immunization or preventive drug against CW [chemical warfare] agents appears likely, considerable limitations on their effectiveness will be achieved through automatic alarms, improved protective clothing, decontaminating chemicals for food and water, and medical counteraction of CW poisoning. Chemicals now being developed may make possible by 1957 airborne means of interfering with jet and internal-combustion motors. Other projects by 1957 will assure more efficient fire bombs, new cluster bombs, and improved chemical warheads.

(ii) Biological: By 1953 several antipersonnel, anti-animal, and anti-crop organisms or chemicals should be available, and there will be acceptable solutions for the problems of storage, temperature and pressure sensitivity, and dissemination. However, employment of such agents is dependent on a period of up to eighteen months required to attain quantity production of these weapons. Effective defensive measures should also be available, although methods of rapid detection may still be under development. . . .

ix. Antiaircraft (other than guided missiles)

(i) Guns: Radar-controlled large-caliber guns (90mm, 120mm, 5-inch) firing proximity-fused projectiles at higher velocities, [at] higher rates of fire, and with automatic ammunition-handling. Will be able to engage aircraft at speeds up to 800 knots and at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.

(ii) Rockets: Liquid-fueled rocket, Loki, capable of carrying a 5Vi-lb. warhead to a height of 60,000 feet at a horizontal range of 24,000 yd. with a 30-second time of flight. Fires salvos of 60-100 rounds from a single multiple launcher. Is expected to provide an economical weapon for combating aircraft at speeds up to 1,000 mph.

(iii) Automatic weapons: Medium-caliber (75mm, 3-inch) guns with high rates of fire (45-90 rounds per minute), automatic loading, on-carriage or on-mount fire control, capable of engaging aircraft with speeds up to 900 mph and at altitudes up to 19,000 ft.

(2) Allies

(a) Ground Forces . . .

ii. In 1957, practically all Allied troops except those of Spain and France can be expected to be within the borders of their respective countries. Minor elements of the Belgian and Netherlands armies will be on colonial duty.

iii. The United Kingdom will have 200,000 troops in the British Isles, of which fourteen antiaircraft and two infantry brigades will be the only major tactical combat units located there. Three divisions will be overseas; one each in Germany, Cyrenaica, and Malaya.

iv. Spanish forces in Spanish Morocco will total 70,000 in four divisions; in addition, there will be 30,000 troops but no tactical units in other Spanish possessions.

v. French troops outside metropolitan France will include 130,000 men in three divisions in North Africa, 40,000 men and one division in French Indochina, and 50,000 men but no major units in other possessions.

DIVISIONS (Unless Otherwise Shown)*

COUNTRY	D-day**	D+30	D+60	D+90	D+180	D+365

United Kingdom(a)	3(7)**	7	16	18	22	30
France(b)	15	20	20	25	25	30
Belgium(b)	2	3	4	4	4	4
Netherlands(b)	2	3	4	4	4	4
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden (c)	0	0	12	18	20	20
Norway(d)	1 brig	1 div	1	2	2	2
Spain(e)	22(23)	24	27	29	30	33
Italy(f)	9	9
Switzerland	0(25)**	25
Austria(g)	0	0
West Germany(h)	Constabulary forces only
Portugal(i)	0(1)**	2
Turkey(j)	25	25
Greece	12	12
Arab League States(k)	4	4	5	7	9	11
Pakistan	4	Not Estimated				16
Australia	1 brig.	1 brig.	1 div.	3	5	7
New Zealand	1 brig.	1 brig.	1 brig.	1 div.	1	2
South Africa	1 brig.	1 div.	2	2	2	2
Canada	1 brig.	1 div.	3	4	5	8
Argentina(l)	13	Not Estimated				30
Brazil(l)	13	Not Estimated				40
Mexica(l)	3	Not Estimated				10
Total of the Latin America(l)	6	Not Estimated				20
China	Unpredictable at this time
Japan(m)	5	5	5	5	5	5

* Estimated numbers, not necessarily U.S. equivalent, of the types employed by the indicated
country without a U.S. military-aid program.

**By the first 7 to 10 days after D-Day the following countries can have mobilized the divisions shown below additional to those shown on D-Day: United Kingdom, 4; Spain, I; Switzerland 25- Portugal, I.

(a) United Kingdom: Based on planned actual strength for 1957 and actual mobilization accomplishment in World War II, modified by estimated state of munitions stocks, industry, and trained reserves in 1957.

(b) Belgium Netherlands, France: Based on assumption that industrial recovery and financial stabilization will have progressed to a point where these countries will nave developed moderate stockpiles of munitions, either by domestic production or by foreign purchase, and will be able to convert considerable capacity to munitions production after mobilization, though somewhat less than in 1939-1940

c) Sweden: Twelve divisions would be formed immediately upon mobilization but would be undergoing unit training until after M + 30. Additional divisions could be formed later by intensifying munitions production and completion of refresher training programs.

(d) Norway: While six skeletonized divisions will exist on paper supposedly for full organization on mobilization, current economies and prospects for their continuance make it doubtful that Norway «n actually mobilize more than two.

(f) Italy: It is assumed that the main provisions of the peace treaty will still be in force but that substantial economic recovery and political stabilization will have been achieved.

(g) Austria: The position of Austria will be such that opposition to the Soviets, other than by underground warfare, will be impossible.

(h) West Germany: Some degree of assistance to the Allied war effort may be provided in terms of constabulary units and manpower only. Except for underground warfare, no other significant contribution can be made unless large-scale pre-D-Day military aid is provided, which is unlikely in view of the overriding priority of aid to Western Union nations and the almost certain negative reaction of the French to any appreciable rearming of West Germany.

(i) Portugal: Based on Western Allied encouragement of Portuguese military preparedness.

(j) Turkey and Greece: Based on a peacetime army considerably below present strength but able to effect a limited expansion.

(k) Arab League stales: The major part of the forces of the Arab League states would be loosely organized, ill-equipped tribesmen. The force in Transjordan would probably be the most effective, provided that the British continue to support this force. The effectiveness of the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian armies would depend upon Allied aid in arming and training these forces. The forces of Lebanon and Yemen, in all probability, would be negative factors. The army of Saudi Arabia would have limited capabilities, unless there is a considerable step-up in the present United States training activity.

(l) Latin American countries: Every Latin American country will require foreign aid to attain its mobilization potential and to maintain its forces equipped and at peak strength and efficiency.

(m) Japan: Defense of the home islands by Japanese military forces would constitute a contribution of considerable importance to the Allied war effort. Although modification of the present policy toward Japan to permit pre-D-Day provision of military equipment and organization of Japanese military forces would probably be opposed by some of the Allies of the U.S., it is considered that such opposition could be overcome if the Japanese military organization is limited to defense forces only.

(b) Naval Forces

i. It is estimated that the maximum strength (both active and reserve) of Allies and possible Allies on D-Day in 1957 will be as follows:

	CV	CVL	CVE	BB	OBB	CA-CL	OCA	DD	SS	DE	M*
UK	8	10		5		23		123	65	175	2
France	1	2	1	2		10		25	25	50
Netherlands		2				4		7	9	6
Belgium	Belgium will have only 6 minesweepers
Spain						1	4	20	8	15
Portugal								5	3	10
Italy					2	3	1	4		35
Greece						1			6	15
Turkey								6	10	20
Argentina		1			2	3		15	5	15
Brazil			1			2		15	5	10
Chile					1	1		10	5	10
Mexico								5		5
Peru						1		5	5	5
Australia		2				4		12		15
Canada		1				2		10		15
New Zealand						2				6
China	Unpredictable at this time

Note: See Glossary for explanation of abbreviations.
* Monitor.

ii. According to British sources, the following ships will be in commission on M-Day in 1957:

	CV	CVL	BB	CA-CL	DD	SS	Frigates(DE)	AM
UK	3	7	3	17	57	40	49	20
Canada		1		1	6		2	2
Australia		2		2	8		11	16
New Zealand				1			6
South Africa							2	1

iii. It is not possible to determine the percentage of ships of countries other than the above which will be in commission on M-Day. (c)Air Forces. The following estimates of 1957 combat strengths are considered to be optimum strengths, commensurate with the various countries' financial, logistic, and training capabilities. With the exception of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, and to a great extent France, all countries must obtain a majority of their aircraft elsewhere. Other countries—namely, Argentina, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands— should be able to manufacture some of their own aircraft by 1957. Unless considerable impetus is given to expanding production in the United States, this country will be unable to furnish the newest types of aircraft to others in 1957. Consequently the air forces of the Allies may consist, in the major part, of types which by 1957 will be obsolescent or obsolete.

i. It is probable that by 1957 the Royal Air Force (RAF) will be equipped with high-speed, high-altitude, jet-propelled bombers and with jet-propelled fighters.

ii. Sweden is constantly increasing the strength of its air force by purchasing aircraft from Britain and is now planning to manufacture its own jet fighters. It is anticipated that Sweden will have, from the standpoint of quality, one of the best air forces in Western Europe.

iii. It is assumed that, although the French aircraft industry will be able to supply a substantial portion of French aircraft requirements by 1957, the French air force will continue to be dependent on Great Britain and the United States for at least part of its needs. Efforts are being devoted largely to replacing present obsolete aircraft.

iv. It is presumed that the increasingly conciliatory attitude of the Spanish government,* as well as the desire of the Western democracies to consolidate the defense of Western Europe, will result in the rehabilitation of the Spanish air force, which is presently at a low level of operational efficiency.

v. By terms of the Peace Treaty, the Italian air force is limited to 350 aircraft, of which no more than 200 may be combat types.

vi. The figures for Argentina include purchases in Britain and Canada; however, the bulk of future purchases will likely come from the United States and from Argentine manufacture.

vii. The tables below indicate the estimated totals of combat aircraft of the British Commonwealth, France, Sweden, and Switzerland which would be in operational units in 1957 (backed up by a reserve of aircraft sufficient to replace reasonable losses from those shown during a limited period). Figures for all other Allied nations represent estimated total inventory.

i. British Commonwealth

	Total	M/B*	L/B*	FTR/FTR Bombers
United Kingdom	1,804	400	144	1,260
(Naval Air Arm)	(300)**			(300)**
Canada	228	8	24	196
(Naval Air Arm)	(60)**			(60)**
Australia	251	59		192
(Naval Air Arm)	(60)**
New Zealand	84		42	42
South Africa	90		45	45
Middle East	120		24	96

ii. Western Europe

	Total Combat	Light Bomber	Attack	Fighter
Sweden	1,300	100	400	800
Norway	100			100
Belgium	155		30	125
France	500			500
(Naval Air Arm)	(150)**			(150)**
Netherlands	300	50		250
(Naval Air Arm)	100			(100)**
Switzerland	400			400
Spain	350	50	50	250
Portugal	100			100
Italy	200			200

iii. Near East

	Total Combat	Light Bomber	Attack	Fighter
Turkey	880	280		600
Greece	200	20		180
Egypt	98	18		80
Saudi Arabia	44	12		32
Syria	40			40
Iraq	72	24		48

*U.S. classifications

** Naval-air-arm aircraft shown in parentheses, are also included in total

iv. Middle and Far East. It is believed that Pakistan can reach and support their planned strength of ninety-six fighter-bombers by 1957.

The critical nature of the situation in China makes it unprofitable to attempt to estimate the 1957 strengths of the Chinese non-Communist air forces. In any event, neither the non-communist nor Communist air forces will have aircraft except from outside sources.

v. Latin America. Assuming implementation of the Western Hemisphere defense program, the Latin American countries would have air-force combat strengths by 1957 as follows:

	Total Combat	M/B	L/B	Attack	Fighter
Argentina	580	80	125	75	300
(Naval Air Arm)			(25*)	(25)*	(50)*
Brazil	655	125	150	80	300
Mexico	305	40	70	70	125
(Naval Air Arm)			(20)*	(20)*	(25)*
Remaining countries	800	100	200	200	400

* Naval aircraft in parenthesis are included in totals.

vi. Mobilization Capabilities. Consideration of mobilization capabilities was included in estimates of Allied air-force strengths as given above. It is unlikely that D-Day strengths will approach the optimum figures shown unless mobilization is initiated several months before D-Day.

c. Logistics

(I) Soviet and Satellite

(a) Land Transport

i. Soviet Union. It is estimated that by 1957 the USSR will have adequate logistical facilities to support operations for the overrunning of wide areas of Eurasia and the launching of bombing and airborne attacks against Canada and the United States, although the capability for support of airborne attacks would be extremely limited. The railway system of the USSR should be in a position to meet most of the essential industrial and military requirements, although in a war of attrition the inadequate reserve capacity would constitute a vulnerable sector of the Soviet military economy. However, for at least the first phase of operations, Soviet domestic rail transport, supplemented by satellite increments and captured rolling stock of invaded countries, would be sufficient to furnish the main logistical support for operations in Europe and the Far East, and to a lesser extent in the Near and Middle East.

ii. Europe. Rail-transport capacity would be complemented substantially by the inland waterway, motor, and horse transport of the USSR. Satellite and enemy (after invasion) inland-waterway, motor, and horse-transport facilities would be used to their full capacities as adjuncts to rail transport. Transshipping points between Soviet broad-gauge railroads and the narrow- and standard-gauge railroads of European countries would create great logistical difficulties in the transshipment of a minimum of sixty thousand short tons of maintenance supplies (less food) required per day per one hundred divisions on the western front. The requirements for air support will represent additional tonnages. The Rhine River bridges, if destroyed or seriously damaged, would also result in serious bottlenecks. If the Soviets attempted to invade the Iberian peninsula, the logistical problems involved would be of considerable magnitude because of the mountainous terrain and the lack of adequate roads and railroads. Of particular significance would be the few LOCs [lines of communication] through the Pyrenees and the ease with which they could be blocked.

iii. Near and Middle East. Soviet operations in the mountainous and desert areas of the Near and Middle East would be tremendously complicated because of the inadequacy of suitable railroads, roads, the shortages of truck transportation and the extreme vulnerability of the numerous bridges and tunnels throughout the area. . . . Operations in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia would be extremely difficult to support logistically. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers offer little relief because of their shallow depth and the lack of shipping facilities. Utilization of the oil resources of the Near and Middle East for Soviet operations in that area would reduce their logistical problem considerably, if the oil facilities could be captured undamaged. . . . If extensive damage has occurred to the oil facilities from air attacks or demolition, it is doubtful that the Soviets could effect repairs for even partial operation in less than six to twelve months, and continued Allied air attacks or guerrilla warfare could probably delay reconstruction indefinitely.

The usefulness of captured Near and Middle East oil to the Soviets, except for operations in the Near and Middle East, would depend on their ability to transport crude oil or refined products to the USSR. As noted above, LOCs through the Near and Middle East are easily disrupted. The principal feasible means of transporting Near and Middle East oil to the Soviet Union is by sea. Considering the limited number of tankers available to the Soviets and that control of the eastern Mediterranean and the maintenance of oil pipelines thereto would be essential, transportation of Near and Middle East oil by sea appears most unlikely,

(b) Sea Transport

i. It is estimated that at present the combined Soviet and satellite merchant fleets (cargo ships, tankers, combination tanker-cargo, and miscellaneous) total approximately 573 ships of over 1,000 gross tonnage (g.t.) with a total of roughly 2,036,827 g.t. This does not include Finland and Yugoslavia, nor does it include an estimated 119 ships employed in the Caspian Sea. About one-fourth of this tonnage belongs to the satellites. The total is about equally divided between the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean areas (the latter including the Black and Baltic Seas). The troop lift in any area is considered adequate for coastal amphibious operations or movements within contiguous sea areas. In the event of war, all satellite shipping would presumably become available to the Soviets for troop and cargo lift in operations in the Baltic, Atlantic, Black Sea, and possibly in the Mediterranean, ii. By 1951 the Soviet merchant Heel, assuming a normal building and maintenance program, would be able to lift sufficient troops for short-range operations and amphibious operations as indicated above. By 1957 it is not likely that the Soviet merchant fleet could be greatly increased, as most of the new production would be required to replace obsolete vessels. Even with other shipping which might be seized soon after the outbreak of war, the Soviet merchant fleet is not likely to be able to provide continuing support for a large, long-distance overseas operation. Large numbers of troops could, however, be moved in short-haul operations.

i. Existing airfield facilities in the USSR and the satellites would be adequate to support first-phase air operations. Required logistic support for extensive air operations probably would not be a serious problem in Europe but might become a critical factor in the Near, Middle, and Far East.

ii. The Soviets probably will not have stockpiled sufficient quantities of aircraft material and supply in the Far East to make them independent of the limited capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Arctic waters. By 1957 the situation will have improved if the rail line now under construction north of, and parallel to, the Trans-Siberian Railway is completed.

(d) Ports. Soviet, satellite, and captured port facilities and capacities would be more than adequate to handle the naval ships and merchant vessels of the USSR. Therefore, naval strength and troop-lift capacity, rather than port capacities, would be the limiting factors in the scale of Soviet naval warfare and amphibious warfare.

(e) Stockpiles. It is reasonable to assume that adequate stockpiles of most essential war materials and supply would be accumulated prior to D-Day. On the basis of evidence now available it is considered that POL [petroleum, oil, lubricants| would be in shortest supply but that stockpiles plus normal production would be sufficient for all first-phase operations in Eurasia and against Alaska, Canada, and the United States.

II.PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

I. General Objectives. It is estimated that in 1957 the ultimate objective of the Soviets will be the defeat of the United States, which would permit them to realize their goal of world domination. Contributing to the attainment of this ultimate objective will be a number of interim objectives which will be integral parts of a plan progressively directed toward the neutralization or destruction of the United States and Allied potential for war. Attainment of these interim objectives and their exploitation would establish the USSR as the dominant world power, and the attainment of their ultimate objective would be materially advanced.

2. Interim Objectives. In order to achieve the ultimate objective, the Soviet leaders would probably consider that the successful outcome of as many as possible of the following campaigns would be strategically desirable and that certain of them would be essential steps.

a. * A Western European campaign to gain the Atlantic seaboard for the purposes of achieving three aims: first, to provide base facilities for conducting in tensive warfare against Anglo-American sea communications; second, to achieve the most advantageous positions from which to mount a subsequent campaign against the British Isles; and third, to exploit the economic potential of Western Europe. Simultaneous attacks would be expected on Italy and Sicily for the purpose of controlling the central Mediterranean, if the control of Italy has not already been achieved by a Communist coup.

b. *[* Considered essential in achieving the ultimate objective.]

An intensive air and sea offensive against the British Isles, with the initial objective of neutralizing Great Britain as a serious military factor and of preventing the use of the British Isles as a base by United States forces, and with the possible later aim of invasion and complete occupation.

c. An invasion of Scandinavia with the object of:

(1) Securing complete control of the Baltic.

(2) Providing naval and air bases for operations against the trade routes and
Allied bases in the North Atlantic.

(3) Providing early-warning and interception facilities against possible British
and U.S. bomber attack against western Russia.

(4) Denying the use of air and naval bases to the Anglo-American powers.

d. Operations to occupy or neutralize North Atlantic islands with the object of denying the use of air and naval bases to the Anglo-American powers and advancing Soviet bases closer to the northeast approaches to the Western Hemisphere.

e. An invasion of Spain and Portugal with the object of providing naval and air bases for operations against Atlantic trade routes, sealing the Strait of Gibraltar, providing access to northwest Africa, and denying the use of air bases to the Anglo-American powers.

f. *A campaign in the Middle East, including Greece and Turkey, with the primary objects of denying the Middle East oil resources and the Suez Canal area to the Anglo-American powers and of adding depth to the air defenses of south Russia.

g. Attacks on Pakistan to deny the use of its bases to the Anglo-American powers.

h. * [Considered essential in achieving the ultimate objective] A campaign to dominate the northern seaboard of the western Pacific coupled with an attack on Alaska and air and sea offensives against U.S. bases, including those in Japan, with the object of neutralizing them as bases for attacks on the Soviet maritime provinces and Manchuria and of containing the greatest number of United States forces in the Pacific.

i. *Air attacks against the United States and Canada.

j. *A sea and air offensive against Anglo-American sea communications.

k. * Subversive activities and sabotage against Anglo-American interests in all parts of the world.

3. The Soviet leaders might wish to avoid launching full-scale offensives in a number of areas simultaneously. However, they would realize that the Anglo-American powers would not permit the different areas to be overrun singly. Realizing that the Allies would attack the Soviet Union from any direction which was possible, the Soviet leaders would probably decide to launch a full- scale offensive in a number of areas. Such a plan would also make the best use of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union in land and tactical air forces and would enable her to retain the initiative.

4. Upon successful completion of these campaigns, and after a period to consolidate the economic and political resources gained, the USSR would be in almost favorable position to attain their goal of world domination.

III. SOVIET CAPABILITIES

1. Eurasia

Against the maximum defensive forces that could be provided by the Western European nations from their own resources without military aid from the United States, and not considering the as yet unevaluated effect of the air offensive, it is estimated that the Soviets could occupy all of Continental Europe (except the Iberian peninsula) in two and a half to three and a half months [♦If the present defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite orbit should continue to 1957, it is not likely that Yugoslavia would ally with the Soviet Union but would attempt to remain neutral, and would be committed to resist Soviet and/or satellite attack. If such should eventuate, the Soviet campaign against Italy and Greece would be slowed down from I 10 3 months.]; invade the Near and Middle East and seize the oil-producing areas of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran within three months; in six months virtually complete the conquest of Turkey; in twelve months seize the Suez Canal area; establish, as necessary, operational bases in areas of China held by Chinese Communist forces; and occupy southern Korea and seize Hokkaido in less than one month. In the following discussions the strengths of forces are approximations only, and directions of attack are schematic. Timing would vary, depending upon such factors as the degree of Soviet D-Day preparedness and the circumstances of combat as well as the size and D-Day dispositions of the defensive forces.

a. Western Europe (less the Iberian Peninsula)

(1) If the European Recovery Program achieves its objectives and a coordinated defensive system in Western Europe is developed to the extent possible without significant military aid, the initial Soviet attack against France and the Low Countries is likely to be held temporarily on the Rhine. Soviet forces could then build up to a strength of at least 100 line divisions within the first month, supported by about 5,000 combat tactical aircraft, units of the long-range air force (total in USSR: 1,800), and elements of the air-transport fleet (total in USSR: 2,500). These forces could probably overcome Allied defenses on the Rhine, overrun France and the Low Countries, and reach the line of the Pyrenees by about D + 2V4-3 months.

(2) It is estimated that the Soviets probably would use a force of about 5 line divisions and 400 combat aircraft, initially (additional forces would be available if required), in attacks from the vicinity of Stettin through Hamburg and Lubeck to the Danish border, then north along the Danish peninsula, seizing all important ports and major cities of Denmark. This force could consolidate
along the Danish border by D + 5, seize Copenhagen and major ports by D+ 10, and consolidate the entire peninsula and Zeeland by D + 15. Thereafter the force could be built up as necessary for a subsequent attack against southern Sweden.

(3) An attack on Scandinavia probably would not be undertaken until Denmark had been overrun and the required buildup of forces completed. The Soviets could begin the Scandinavian campaign about D+ 1/2 months, employing initially approximately 13 line divisions and 600-900 tactical aircraft, all from the total available for the campaign in Western Europe, supported by elements of the northern and Baltic fleets. Developing the attack from four thrusts, two
from the south and two smaller ones from the north, the Soviets could capture Tromso, Narvik, and Lulea and complete the landing in south Sweden by D + 2 months; capture the Narvik-Lulea railway and the Stockholm-Oslo areas by D + 2-1/2 months; and complete the occupation of south Sweden and south Norway, in particular the areas Christiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim, shortly after D + 21/2 months. If necessary, initial Soviet attacking forces could readily be reinforced from air and ground reserves within the USSR to the extent necessary to overcome Swedish and Norwegian resistance. The Soviets could triple the initial number of line divisions and build up to more than 2,000 combat aircraft if required to overcome Scandinavian resistance or to expedite the occupation of this area.

(4) Austria and southern Germany could be completely occupied by D+10
days.

(5) Against Italy the Soviets could employ 10-15 Yugoslav [See footnote to preceding paragraph. Assuming that reliable Yugoslav forces would not be available, Soviet forces could make up the deficit along with other Balkan satellites.] line divisions supported by at least 600 combat aircraft (two-thirds Yugoslav). Later in the campaign the ground forces could be reinforced by perhaps 10 Soviet divisions. This force could probably complete the occupation of Italy by D + 2-1/2 months and of Sicily by about D + 3-1/2 months. The Soviets would have a D-Day air borne capability against Sicily, but it is doubtful if it would be exercised because of logistic difficulties involved in supply and resupply.

(6) In a campaign against Greece the Soviets, employing approximately 5 Soviet and 15 satellite divisions supported by at least 700 combat aircraft (two-thirds Yugoslav) could overrun all of Greece by not later than D + 3-1/2 months. After consolidation of Greece, operations could be mounted to secure the Aegean islands and Crete. The Soviets would have a D-Day airborne capability against Crete, but it is doubtful that they would exercise it because of logistic difficulties involved in its supply and resupply.

b. Iberian Peninsula

A full-scale Soviet attack against the Iberian peninsula could not be undertaken until after a successful completion of the main offensive in France and the Low Countries. An Iberian campaign probably could be carried on simultaneously with an air and sea offensive against the British Isles, but with difficulty. It is believed that logistic considerations would preclude an Iberian campaign simultaneously with an invasion of the British Isles. Assuming that there is no simultaneous invasion of the British Isles and that the Spanish receive no appreciable amount of military assistance from the United States, the Soviets probably could complete the occupation of the Iberian peninsula by D + 7-8 months.

c. Turkey and the Near and Middle East

(1) In an attack against Turkey the Soviet Union would probably employ initially a total of 33 line divisions, supported by 1,400 combat aircraft and the Black Sea fleet. The attack could be developed in three thrusts: one (25 line divisions, 900 aircraft) starting from Bulgaria against Turkey in Europe and crossing the Bosporus and Dardanelles; a second (5 line divisions, 300 a/c) landing on the Black Sea coast at Samsum, Zonguldak, and Trabzon and driving inland; and a third (3 line divisions, 200 a/c) starting from the Soviet Caucasus and advancing along the line Kars-Erzurum. If Turkey did not receive early outside assistance, mobile elements of the first and second forces could reach the Iskenderun area in about D + 5 months. Winter weather and effective demolition of road and rail lines at strategic points would create great logistic problems and would delay Soviet advances. In the event that demolitions of the magnitude of those now being planned for the Iran-Iraq area in a study [On file in JCS Secretariat] on "Special Operations Against Selected Middle East Lines of Communication," made by the working staff of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, were undertaken in Turkey and were 50 percent effective against the Soviet lines of communication, it is considered that not more than 4 to 5 Soviet divisions could reach the Iskenderun area by overland routes prior to D+ 12 months. If such demolitions were made, logistical supply through Turkey to Soviet forces attacking toward the Cairo-Suez area would be drastically limited.

(2) In a campaign for Near and Middle East oil and control of the Cairo-Suez area, the Soviets could launch simultaneous attacks by four forces to overrun Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Palestine, seizing all major airfields, oil fields, and refineries. These forces initially would probably total about 16 line divisions, supported by about 600 combat aircraft. One force of 5 divisions and 200 combat aircraft could, operating via Tabriz-Mosul, consolidate in the Kirkuk-Mosul area by D + 1-1/2 months. A second force of 6 line divisions and 200 combat aircraft, operating Resht-Hamadan-Baghdad, could consolidate in the Baghdad area by D + 1-1/2 months. A third force of 4 line divisions and 150 combat aircraft, operating Tehran-Basra, could consolidate in the Basra-Abadan area by D+ 1 Vi months, while a fourth force of 1 line division and 50 combat aircraft could consolidate in the Bandar Abbas area by D + 2 months. One line division and about 50 aircraft from the Basra-Abadan area could consolidate in the Bahrein-Dhahran area shortly after D + 3 months.

(3) Small advance-guard elements of forces in the Tigris-Euphrates valley could arrive at the Levant coast prior to D + 3 months. Between D + 3 and D + 8 months the Soviets could build up their strength in the Levant to 9 divisions and about 400 aircraft. The delay in buildup would be caused by logistic considerations, principally the time required to reopen and repair the Mosul-Aleppo railroad, and by the necessity for synchronizing further operations with forces arriving from Turkey and with the opening of the LOCs through Turkey. Thereafter, they could reach the Suez Canal, capturing and securing Cairo and Alexandria by D + 12 months. The Soviets would have the additional capability of employing 3-4 airborne brigades against the Basra-Abadan and Bahrein-Dhahran areas on D-Day.

(4) In the event that demolitions now being planned for the Iran-Iraq area in a study on "Special Operations Against Selected Middle East Lines of Communication," made by the working staff of the Joint Strategic Plans Commit tee, were even 50 percent effective, it is estimated that the Soviet tonnage capacity into the Tigris-Euphrates valley would be reduced to about 1,000 tons
daily, a tonnage considered to be insufficient to support more than 5-6 divisions. Further, it is believed that it would require not less than six months for the Soviets to repair the lines of communication sufficiently to get a force of even this size into the area.

(5) With this limitation on supplies and assuming no water transportation in the Mediterranean, the Soviet operations would be restricted to raiding parties based in the Tigris-Euphrates valley, which might be capable of reaching the eastern Mediterranean coast. If water transportation could be made available by the Soviets in the eastern Mediterranean, it would be possible that a force not in excess of I division could be landed along the eastern coast, and this force might be augmented by not more than 2 divisions from the Tigris-Euphrates valley. Supplied from the USSR by water transportation, this force of only 3 divisions could attack the Cairo-Suez area not earlier than D+ 12 months.

(6) A possible line of action of the Soviets is to make an attack into India and Pakistan through Afghanistan. It is considered, however, that the Soviets would have a very limited capability in this area because of logistic difficulties due to the nature of the terrain. Air attacks by the long-range force would probably be the chief threat to these countries.

d. Far East

(1) Assisted by Chinese Communist forces, the Soviet forces in the Far East (estimated as 20 line divisions and 2,800 combat aircraft), together with available elements of the long-range air force, could readily establish bases in China as required by Soviet plans.

(2) Soviet control of the coast of China, Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurils would facilitate air and amphibious attacks against Japan and other Pacific Islands. Although an invasion of the main islands of Japan would be handicapped during the initial stages of the war by shortages of airlift, shipping, and naval support due to higher-priority requirements in other theaters, the Soviet forces could seize Hokkaido with an estimated 2-3 divisions and air support from Sakhalin and the Kurils. Unless Japanese defense forces were organized, trained, and equipped or the Allied occupation forces augmented beyond the four divisions now present, a major air-amphibious assault against Honshu and Kyushu could be undertaken with reasonable chances of success.

2. British Isles

The initial attack against the British Isles, probably commencing on D-Day, would be an aerial bombardment by the Soviet long-range air force, possibly employing weapons of mass destruction. Concurrently an offensive against British ports and against sea communications with the British Isles could be launched by aircraft and submarines. A strong sabotage effort may be expected. These attacks could be carried on concurrently with the campaign against Western and Northern Europe, the successful completion of which would permit increasing the tempo of the air and sea offensive against the British Isles, utilizing captured air and naval bases. Upon successful completion of this offensive, the Soviets would have the capability of invading the British Isles.

3. Canada and the United States

Soviet estimates of their offensive capabilities against the United States and Canada in 1957 will probably lead them to launch attacks against those countries with the objective of seriously reducing their military potential. Such action would be timed with the major Soviet operations in Europe, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East.

a. It is considered that attacks against Canada and the United States would include an air attack, or closely coordinated series of air attacks, with the probable employment of atomic bombs and biological and chemical agents. A surprise attack might be attempted initially from eastern Siberian and northern Soviet and European bases.

b. The clandestine use of biological and chemical agents in the United States by subversive groups is an important capability. There is also a possibility of Soviet employment of cargo vessels as atomic-bomb carriers.

c. Concurrently with an initial offensive operation against Canada and the United States, the Soviets could seize undefended bases in the Atlantic approach areas and in Alaska for intermediate staging purposes.

d. It is considered unlikely that the USSR could mount a large-scale amphibious[It is realized that a considerable amount of naval and commercial shipping would accrue to the USSR in the overrunning of Western Europe]-airborne expedition against critical areas in the United States with any prospect of success. The Soviets are not given the capability of reducing the United States war potential, including forces in being, by preliminary air, submarine, and sabotage attacks to a point where such an invasion would be
successful. However, numerous sabotage and demolition parties could be landed for special operations.

e. Soviet apparatus for espionage, subversion, and sabotage constitutes a serious threat to the United States war potential. The USSR will continue to improve that apparatus.

f. Sabotage is one of the most important and effective weapons in the Communist arsenal and will be employed by the Soviets immediately preceding armed conflict. It is estimated that the Soviets have the capability of causing a serious initial interruption of the United States war production. In this connection it should be noted that the highly integrated but decentralized industries of the United States are acutely vulnerable to sabotage if left unprotected.

4. North Atlantic Islands

By 1957 in surprise attacks, simultaneously with attacks on Canada and the United States, any or all the principal bases in the North Atlantic approach area, if undefended, could be sabotaged or seized by the USSR. Although the forces so used could not expect long survival in the face of strong United States counteraction, the securing of these areas for even a few days might contribute greatly to the initial all-out Soviet effort against the United States by denying use of these facilities to the United States and by forcing dispersal of our limited means for their recapture and/or reconstruction.

5. Alaska, the Aleutians, and the North Pacific

a. Neutralization of United States bases in Alaska and the Aleutians may become increasingly important to the Soviets after they have atomic bombs available. To secure their northeast Siberian bases and prevent interception of their long-range bombers, the Soviets would make serious efforts to neutralize United States air strength in the Alaska-Aleutian area.

b. A Soviet attack against Alaska and the Aleutians probably would be accompanied by air attacks against western Canada and the northwestern United States. Bombing and limited airborne attacks could be initiated from bases in northeast Siberia, while naval forces could carry out small-scale raids against outlying bases known to be inadequately defended.

c. Intensive anti-shipping submarine raids, involving as many as fifty long-range, high-submerged-speed submarines and approximately sixty long-range conventional submarines could be carried out throughout the Pacific north of the equator.

d. Assuming minimum initial United States resistance, the Soviets probably would have the capabilities of securing or destroying the principal objectives in Alaska and the Aleutians, seriously delaying United States use of the area for bases, and utilizing these bases to a limited extent for operations against the continental United States.

6. Caribbean Area

a. The major Soviet objectives in the Caribbean area would be interference with the Panama Canal and the all-important United States coastal sea lines of communication, over which many strategic materials are carried, and interruption of oil supplies from Venezuela.

b. The greatest Soviet capability against the Canal and other objectives, such as the oil installations of Venezuela and refineries located on the Dutch islands of Aruba and Curacao, is sabotage by pro-Soviet or Soviet agents. There is also the possibility of detonating an atomic bomb concealed in the cargo of a ship within the locks. Soviet submarines could seriously interfere with United States shipping in this area.

7. Allied Sea Communications

a. The main attack on sea communications would probably take the form of attacks on shipping and ports and their approaches by torpedo attacks, mining, bombing, and sabotage. Such attacks would be carried out mainly by aircraft and submarines.

b. In 1957 Soviet long-range submarines on normal patrol missions will have a radius of action of six thousand nautical miles, provided the greater part of the transit from base to operating area can be made on the surface. However, Soviet submarines would be able to conduct limited operations beyond a six-thousand-mile radius by supplementary refueling. Submarine operations would be expected against sea lines of communication in the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean, the Alaskan and Caribbean areas, the approaches to the Panama Canal, and the coastal waters of the United States and Canada. Limited operations could also be conducted in the Indian Ocean.

c. Intensive attacks could be expected on ports and on concentrations of shipping within range of fast coastal craft, submarines, and aircraft. Except for raiders, major surface units of the Baltic, northern, and Far Eastern fleets would constitute a definite threat to Allied sea lines of communication only in limited areas.

d. Aircraft of the Soviet naval air forces would be available for attacks on sea communications within range of their bases and could be supplemented by units from the tactical air forces insofar as this does not interfere with the requirements of the land campaigns. Aircraft of the long-range force might be employed concurrently in attacks on ports and their approaches.

e. Naval forces available against sea communications will vary with the progress of hostilities. As long as campaigns are in progress which involve one or both flanks of the Soviet army resting on the sea, a proportion of the Soviet navy, especially the major surface units, would be required in support.

f. The threat against allied sea LOCs would increase considerably if the Soviets acquire naval and air bases on the European-Atlantic seaboard. The greatest concentrations of all forms of attack would probably be in the North Sea, in the western and southwestern approaches to the British Isles, and in the approaches to and in the Mediterranean.

g. The principal bases from which the Soviet fleet could operate at the outset are set forth below. (Except where otherwise stated, all would be capable of being used as operational bases for ships of all categories likely to use them, and all could be kept open in winter by icebreakers):

North Atlantic

Petsamo

Kola Inlet (including Murmansk, Rosta, Polyarnoe, and Vaenga Bay)
White Sea ports (including Molotovsk and Archangel)

Baltic

Kronstadt, Tallinn, Paldiski, Libau, Memel, Danzig, Gdynia, and Swinemunde

Central Mediterranean

In Yugoslavia: Pola, Split, Gulf of Kotor, and many small ports and bays which might be used as advanced bases for limited numbers of small craft

In Albania: Valona Bay (including Durazzo, Valona, and Saseno Island), Porto Palermo

Black Sea

Sevastopol, Novorossisk, Poti, and Batumi In Romania: Constanza

Pacific

Dairen and Port Arthur

Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and anchorages in the vicinity

Sovetskaya Gavan

Nikolaevsk (cannot be kept open by icebreakers between late October and late May)

Otomari in south Sakhalin Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka

Nagaevo (cannot be kept open by icebreakers between November and May)

Dekastn (being developed and may possibly replace Nikolaevsk; icebound from mid-November to early May)

IV.PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

1. Summary of Strategic Considerations

a. The Soviet leaders would wish to complete their campaign against France and the Low Countries as early as possible and will give it a high priority, realizing that on its progress would hinge the execution, timing, and effectiveness of their campaigns against the United Kingdom and Spain and that its completion would be essential for the attainment of their ultimate objective.

b.The Soviet leaders would probably estimate that the invasion of the British Isles would be extremely difficult even after the successful conclusion of their campaign in Western Europe and that it would be of the greatest importance that they make every effort to achieve complete success before the United States and the Dominions could reinforce the British Isles. Their initial objective, therefore, would be neutralization of the British Isles, and they would probably combine heavy aerial-bombardment, mine-laying, and submarine operations against the British Isles concurrently with their drive in Western Europe.

c. The Soviet leaders would probably estimate that the Near and Middle East oil resources are a very valuable part of the Allied war potential. Moreover, they would appreciate that their own oil areas in the Caucasus and Romania, as well as a large part of their other industries, would be vulnerable to attack from air bases in the Near and Middle East. They would therefore probably conclude that in the absence of effective opposition by the Arab countries and of adequate Anglo-American forces in the Near and Middle East, a campaign there would be successful and would give them a great strategic gain at relatively small cost.

d. The execution of a Scandinavian campaign would depend upon the actions, after the outbreak of war, of Sweden and the Allies and might be undertaken to deepen Soviet defense against Allied air attacks and to forestall Allied use of the Scandinavian peninsula. It would also depend upon the degree of success achieved by the Soviet Union in its campaign in Western Europe and against the British Isles and therefore cannot be assessed accurately at this time. This campaign would be subsidiary to and without prejudice to that in Western Europe.

e. Occupation of Spain, Portugal, and Gibraltar would close the Mediterranean in the west; would provide air and naval bases for operations against Allied LOCs; would provide a key to northwest Africa; and would protect the Soviet southwestern flank. This campaign would be most difficult and would be undertaken only if practicable without prejudice to the Soviet offensive against
the United Kingdom.

f. An attack on Pakistan would be of a purely preventive nature; would be for the purpose of denying Allied use of air bases there; and would probably be limited to air attacks on those bases.

g. The Soviet Union would probably utilize its forces in the Far East to attempt to neutralize U.S. advance bases, to dominate China as far south as necessary, and to contain the maximum Allied force in the Far East theater. The Soviet Union would be unlikely, however, to allocate any additional forces to the Far East, although bases in this theater might be used on occasion by the
long-range air force.

h. Soviet estimates of their offensive capabilities against the United States and Canada in 1957 would probably lead them to launch attacks by air with the objective of seriously reducing the military potential of Canada and the United States, particularly during the critical period of their mobilization. Such action would be timed with the major Soviet operations in Europe, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East.

2. Initial Courses of Action

The foregoing consideration of Soviet strategic objectives and capabilities leads to the conclusion that the Soviets would probably adopt simultaneous or staggered courses of action as follows:

a. Campaigns in Western Europe (including Denmark, Italy, and Sicily) to reach the Atlantic seaboard and secure base facilities for operations against Allied sea and air communications and for a possible subsequent invasion of the United Kingdom. Seizure of Italy and Sicily would aid in the closing of the Mediterranean, and Denmark could be used as a base for attack against
Norway and Sweden.

b. Operations to gain control of Norway and Sweden for security, denial, or offensive purposes.

c. Air attacks and submarine operations designed to neutralize the United Kingdom.

d. An offensive against Greece to help close the Mediterranean and to flank Turkey.

e. Sea and air offensives against Allied sea communications.

f. A campaign to seize control of the Near and Middle East, including Turkey and the Cairo-Suez area.

g. The occupation of Korea; a campaign to seize control of Hokkaido; establishment of base areas in China; and air attacks against Allied base areas in the Far East generally.

h. Air, naval, limited airborne, and, possibly, guided-missile attacks to neutralize or occupy base areas in Alaska, the Aleutians, and the North Atlantic islands.

i. Operations to seize or neutralize such other Allied base areas and to destroy or contain such naval forces as might be used for launching air attacks with atomic weapons, j. Air attacks, with the probable employment of atomic bombs and biological and chemical agents, against Canada and the United States, k. Subversive activities and sabotage against the United States, Canada, and other Allied powers.

3. Subsequent Courses of Action

Depending upon the success of their initial courses of action, and while continuing those considered essential, the Soviet powers may be expected to initiate the following additional campaigns:

a. Airborne-amphibious invasion of the United Kingdom, forces available and weakness of opposition permitting.

b. Operations against Switzerland if such operations become imperative for security or denial purposes.

c. A possible campaign in the Iberian peninsula in order to deny it as a base for the Allies and to close the Mediterranean in the west. This operation would follow the general campaign in other areas of Western Europe and probably would be undertaken only if it would not seriously prejudice the success of other operations.

d. Invasion of the Japanese main islands to extend the Soviet defensive zone and for possible use as bases of operations.

V. ALLIED COURSES OF ACTION

1. General Considerations

a. Military courses of action pursued by the Allies upon the outbreak of war with the Soviets must be in consonance with the national objectives of the United States, which have been staled as follows:

(1) "To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence, and stability of the world family of nations."

(2) "To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the United Nations charter."

b. The primary tasks of our military forces will be to take such offensive action as would eliminate the will and capacity of the Soviet Union to wage aggressive war and to destroy the machinery whereby the USSR is able to dominate areas outside of traditional Russian territory. However, Allied operations toward these objectives will initially be conditioned by the situation existing at
the beginning of the war, since the Soviets will have in being greatly superior ground and tactical air forces and will possess the initiative and the initial capabilities for overrunning large areas of Eruasia, for imposing a serious threat to our lines of communication, and for destructive air attacks against the United States. These capabilities would initially place the Allies generally on the defensive for the purpose of protecting their war-making potential, generating sufficient forces to stabilize the Soviet offensive, protecting their lines of communication, and projecting their offensive strength overseas. While the British will have some offensive power in bombers and naval vessels, only the United States will have any major initial offensive capability.

c. Our principal initial capability will lie in our ability to initiate an air offensive with atomic bombs against the USSR. In addition, our naval forces will be able to project their strength against Soviet naval and other forces within range from the sea. On the one hand, by the degree of opposition to Soviet advances in certain areas which can be exerted by the regenerating military forces of the
Allies and, on the other, by the reduction in the Soviet capacity, as the result of our air offensive, to power and sustain those advances, a stabilization of the initially adverse military situation would sooner or later be obtained. The initiative and advantages of the general offensive would at that time pass to the Allies.

d. From the military standpoint, our strategy overseas should be based on a consideration of the following principles, from which, however, temporary deviations may have to be made because of overriding economic and political considerations:

(1) To seek action with Soviet forces only in those areas and under those circumstances where the bulk of their elements of superiority cannot be brought to bear against us and where our elements of superiority can be exploited to advantage.

(2) To conduct only those operations which contribute directly to the overall strategic concept or which are essential to the security of our positions in support thereof.

e. The military strength of the Allies in 1957 will be in proportion to the extent of pre-D-Day preparation. It must be recognized that serious shortages in reserves of Allied aircraft, ships, ground-force equipment, and POL supplies for military operations may result in some of the most desirable courses of action being completely infeasible unless the existing deficiencies are remedied.

f. The . . . courses of action . . . discussed in subsequent paragraphs are open to the Allies.

2. Western Hemisphere: Secure the Western Hemisphere

a. Consideration of Soviet capabilities and recognition of the fact that the Soviets probably will strike with little or no warning leads to the inescapable conclusion that the United States will be in grave danger in the event of war in 1957. The possibility of an initial catastrophe in the continental United States far exceeding that of Pearl Harbor is real. Destructive blows involving atomic and other weapons of mass destruction against selected vital industrial and administrative centers could so cripple us that our powers of retaliation would be either temporarily paralyzed or greatly retarded. Consequently the protection of the war-making potential of the United States must receive first priority in all considerations of strategy. The protection of this war-making potential should be achieved not only by defensive measures but also by means of a strong Allied counter-air-offensive with atomic and conventional bombs against Soviet facilities for assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. Requirements for this offensive are discussed on pages 159—161. Defensive measures would of necessity involve a defense, in varying degrees, of the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Canada, the northeast approaches (Greenland, Newfoundland, and Labrador), Bermuda, Latin America, and the Caribbean area. This defense must be, for the most part, in being on D-Day. It will have to consist of an adequate early-warning network; air and antiaircraft defense; defense of outlying areas, sea approaches, coastwise and inter-coastal shipping; and defense against internal sabotage and the possibility of limited airborne attacks. All of these measures will constitute a severe drain on our resources but will be vitally necessary in order to avoid disaster and to be able to retaliate rapidly and effectively as well as to generate forces and materiel for later operations. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

3. North Atlantic Approaches: Secure the North Atlantic Islands

a. Of the North Atlantic islands (Iceland, the Azores, Jan Mayen, Spitzbergen, Bear Island), Iceland, if available, would be of the greatest value to the Soviets. It could be utilized as a bomber staging base and for reconnaissance and early warning.

b. Of the group of islands mentioned above, Iceland and the Azores are of considerable importance to the Allies because of their potential use as air and naval bases and their strategic location with respect to sea and air LOCs. Iceland, in particular, could become a major naval base for support of Allied submarine operations, ASW operations, and carrier-replenishment groups. Other northern islands, such as Jan Mayen, Spitzbergen, and Bear Island, lie far within the Arctic Circle but would be of value to either side as outpost early-warning stations and weather-reporting posts and, in the case of Spitzbergen, a source of coal. Neutralization by bombing would be feasible. The Azores are geographically located so as to be relatively immune from Soviet seizure but would still require defenses—estimated at one battalion of ground forces, one squadron of all-weather fighters, and adequate radar coverage— against air raids and sabotage.

c. Iceland is a most probable objective of the Soviets and in any event should be secured by the Allies as soon as possible. If this occupation could be effected before the arrival of Soviet forces, one Rejuvenated Combat Team [RCT] and one fighter group including all-weather fighters should be sufficient for initial defense. If the island had been seized by the Soviets prior to the arrival of U.S. forces, an amphibious assault by at least one division would be necessary to retake it.

d. The defense of Spitzbergen and Bear Island does not appear to be necessary or feasible and is therefore rejected. The retention of Jan Mayen is desirable and would appear feasible with small forces except against appreciable Soviet effort. However, the limited value of Jan Mayen to the Allies and its vulnerability to attack, particularly if Norway is overrun by the Soviets, would
probably not justify its retention. The defense of Iceland and the Azores is retained; therefore, this task is reworded to read: "Secure Iceland and the Azores."

4. Western Europe

a. Hold the United Kingdom

(l)The United Kingdom has great strategic significance because of its manpower and industrial potential [and] its suitability as a base for air operations against the USSR, as a base for naval operations, and as a base for mounting major operations to seize other strategic areas in Western or Northern Europe when such operations become necessary and feasible. Loss of the United Kingdom would be a serious blow to Allied industrial capabilities, with a possible consequent increase in Soviet capabilities. Further, the psychological effect on the other Allies and potential Allies would be considerable. These factors make the holding of the United Kingdom mandatory. Soviet capabilities will be such that the United Kingdom will be in grave danger from air, guided-missile, and airborne attacks, especially if Western Continental Europe is overrun. Contributing greatly to the effective defense of the United Kingdom would be the holding of Western Europe as far east as possible. The security of the United Kingdom must of necessity be primarily a British responsibility. The British should be able to provide the ground defense and to control the adjacent sea areas.

(2) It is difficult to determine the number of Allied aircraft required for air protection of the United Kingdom alone since the division of Soviet air effort between attacks on Western Europe and the expected air offensive against the United Kingdom cannot be accurately estimated. The British have estimated that with eight hundred to nine hundred fighters [see the study of the Institute for Strategic Studies in appendices] and supporting antiaircraft units in the United Kingdom the RAF should be able to inflict at least 10 percent losses on the maximum scale of Soviet long-range bomber attack expected during the initial phase. This aircraft requirement should be within British capabilities, although a considerable buildup of antiaircraft may be required.

(3) The initial requirement for combat aircraft for defense of Western Europe including the United Kingdom (but excluding Italy) is estimated to be approximately 4,000 aircraft. Present estimates indicate that U.S. and Western Union air forces available on D-Day in the U.K. and Western Europe (excluding Italy) will total approximately 2,550 combat aircraft.[ US 150, UK. 1,500 (excludes naval air arm), France 450 (includes all but 50 naval air arm a/c), Belgium 150, Nelherlands 300 (includes naval air arm). Total 2,550] Therefore, as many as 1,450 additional aircraft, in combat units, will have to be provided for the defense of the Western Union, including the United Kingdom, either by a program of military aid or by immediate reinforcement with combat aircraft from the United States. In the event of the loss of Western Europe further reinforcement of the fighter defense of the United Kingdom will be required. This course of action is retained.

b. Hold maximum areas in Western Europe

(1) Hold Western Germany

In the areas east of the Rhine there are only two geographical features that may be considered as major obstacles to which a defense could be anchored. These are that portion of the Elbe River lying in the British zone and the Black Forest rising eastward from the upper Rhine in the French zone. Between these two areas there is no natural defense line. Allied defense of any general line including these two features would retain the Ruhr but would be infeasible because of the prohibitive requirements in forces and the inability of the Allies to deploy forces to such advanced positions in time to meet the initial Soviet assault. This course of action is therefore rejected.

(2) Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave Line

(a) This line is the best natural defense line in Western Europe and the most easterly line feasible of defense. Its successful defense would retain the bulk of the manpower and industrial potential of Western Europe, including Italy and Sicily, in Allied hands. Retention of Italy and Sicily would contribute to control of the central Mediterranean and would permit Allied use of air bases in Italy for air operations against targets in the Balkans. Defense of this line would greatly contribute to the defense of the United Kingdom and would secure major base areas on the Continent for later offensive operations against the Soviets. It has the disadvantage of giving up two-thirds of the Netherlands and the entire Ruhr industrial area.

(b) It is estimated that to hold the general line of the Rhine from Switzerland to the North Sea would require approximately 60[U.S. 2, U.K. 5, France 13, Belgium 3, Netherlands 3. Total 26] U.S. equivalent divisions and 4,000 combat aircraft. Present estimates indicate that without a military-aid program U.S. and Western Union forces available by D + 30 days for defense of the Rhine will total approximately 26 divisions of varying degrees of combat efficiency and 2,550 combat aircraft. The difference between the above estimated requirements and availabilities would have to be made up primarily by a program of military aid to Western Union. The problem of such an aid program is considered in a later course of action. There also exists the possibility of assistance by Spanish forces shortly after D-Day in the defense of the Rhine line. This possibility should be developed thoroughly, both politically and psychologically, since it could cut down considerably the requirements imposed on Western Union and indirectly, to some extent, the requirements of a U.S. military-aid program.

(c) The defense of Italy from the junction of the Swiss, Austrian, [and] Italian borders, thence along the Piave River to the Adriatic would probably require an estimated 16 U.S. equivalent divisions and 500 combat aircraft. These forces are beyond the estimated Italian availability of 9 divisions and 200 combat aircraft, which are their maximum capabilities under the restrictions of
the Italian Peace Treaty. Modification of the peace treaty and U.S. military aid would permit rearming the Italians to the extent (that] they could make up the difference themselves. There exists the possibility of keeping Yugoslavia neutral.[ If the present defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite orbit should continue to 1957, it is not likely that Yugoslavia would ally with the Soviet Union but would attempt to remain neutral and would be committed to resist Soviet and/or satellite attack.] If the latter could be done, it would reduce considerably the Soviet threat against Italy and the requirements for its defense. This possibility should be developed politically and psychologically.

(d) A preliminary estimate of the requirements for defense of Western Europe along the general line of the Rhine-Alps-Piave total about 76 U.S. equivalent divisions! and 4,500 combat aircraft. Part of these divisions—to counter the Soviet air-drop threat against vital portions of the Rhine defensive positions and to meet the immediate Yugoslav threat against the Piave—must be in position on D-Day. It is estimated that a minimum of 9 Italian divisions would be required to meet the initial Yugoslav effort and not less than 4 divisions in position to counter the Soviet air-drop capabilities against the Rhine. The remainder of the estimated 76 divisions would have to be available, approximately as shown in the table below, in order to meet the Soviet buildup.

(e) The following table shows the estimated probable Soviet buildup on this line in the first thirty days, the estimated Allied requirements to meet the Soviet threat, and the estimated Allied buildup capability (without a U.S. military-aid program).

LINE DIVISIONS

	D-Day	D+5	D+10	D+15	D+20	D+25	D+30
Soviet Buildup	12	30	45	70	85	100	115
Allied requirements (1949 US equivalents)	13	17	30	45	55	65	76
Allied capability (without US aid; not US equivalents)	20	27	27	31	31	31	35

*To hold the line for approximately six months.

A buildup of additional Allied forces behind this line would have to begin in the first months following D-Day in order to block Soviet capabilities beyond the first six months and to prepare for later offensive operations. The total requirements of forces beyond the first six months are difficult of determination at this time without an assessment of the results of the air offensive.

(f) Although the requirements for defense of this line as estimated above are large, they do not appear beyond the capabilities of the nations concerned providing the necessary program of U.S. military aid is furnished. Therefore, this course of action is retained for further consideration.

(3) Hold the Rhine-French-Italian Border Line

(a) This course of action differs from the preceding course of holding the Rhine-Alps-Piave line in that it gives up all of Italy and Sicily. It would result in the loss of the industrial and manpower potential of Italy and Sicily and the loss of air bases for operations against targets in the Balkans. In addition, any significant measure of control over the central Mediterranean would be lost unless special operations were undertaken either to retain, neutralize, or retake Sicily. Retention of Sicily, under this course of action, would require 2 U.S. equivalent divisions and 300 combat aircraft.

(b) The requirements for holding that portion of the line from Switzerland to the North Sea are the same as in the preceding course of action, i.e., 60 U.S. equivalent divisions and 4,000 combat aircraft. It is estimated that it would take approximately 10 U.S. equivalent divisions and 400 combat aircraft to hold the French-Italian border against maximum Soviet and satellite capabilities.

(c) The requirements for defense of this line also appear to be within the capabilities of the nations concerned, providing the necessary program of U.S.military aid is furnished. Therefore, this course of action is retained for further consideration.

(4) Hold the Cotentin Peninsula

(a) This course of action would be considered only if Allied forces were unable to hold positions along the general line of the Rhine. Its purpose would be to retain a bridgehead on the Continent for a possible later buildup and subsequent operations against the Soviets on the Continent. The most feasible line for defense of the Cotentin Peninsula would be along the general line isigny-Carentan-Lessay. This line, approximately twenty-five miles long, cannot be considered a natural defense line, although some small rivers, canals, and marsh areas would be of some defense value. Depth to the line would be lacking, as it is only about thirty miles to Cherbourg on the north coast. It is estimated that it would require approximately 10 U.S. equivalent divisions to hold this line. For any protracted defense these forces would require air support on a basis of at least air equality. There arc only two inadequate airfields available on the Cotentin Peninsula, which together with the small size of the peninsula would make it infeasible to base air there.

Consequently air support would have to come from the south of England, approximately one hundred miles away. Although such support would be possible, Soviet air superiority by this time could be increasing to such an extent that it would require a major Allied air effort to oppose it. The number of Allied aircraft necessary to oppose the Soviets might be on the order of 4,000, since the division of Soviet air effort between the attacks on the Cotentin Peninsula and the expected air offensive against the United Kingdom cannot be determined.

(b) Although the port capacity of Cherbourg, the only major port on the Cotentin Peninsula, and the capacities of the LOCs are ample to support the defense force required, it is considered that Soviet air power could destroy or damage the port of Cherbourg, sink shipping in the harbor, and attack the LOCs, supply dumps, and forces to such an extent that logistical support of the peninsula would be extremely difficult. In addition, the Cotentin Peninsula is not considered suitable for the debouchment of large forces because of its narrowness and consequent lack of maneuver room. This course of action is considered to be unprofitable and infeasible and is rejected.

(5) Hold the Brittany Peninsula

(a) A withdrawal to and a holding of the Brittany peninsula would be considered with the principal objective of holding a major bridgehead on the Continent for later buildup of Allied forces and subsequent operations against the Soviets. Initially, it could be used as a base for air operations and to some extent as a naval base. There are three major ports on the peninsula: Brest, Lorient, and Saint-Nazaire. Adequate lines of communication exist. There are approximately fourteen airfields of various types on the peninsula, few of which would be adequate for Allied use.

(b) There is no natural defense line on the peninsula. The most suitable line would probably be generally across the base of the peninsula extending for approximately 100 miles along the general line Saint-Nazaire-Rennes-Mont-Saint-Michel. Defense of this line would give maximum depth to the bridge head, approximately 140 miles, thus giving better protection to the port areas.
The port of Saint-Nazaire, however, would probably be rendered unusable because of its proximity to the front lines. It is estimated that approximately 20 U.S. equivalent divisions as a minimum would be required to hold this line. Air support could be based on the peninsula, providing considerable airfield reconstruction were undertaken. Support could be furnished from the south of England approximately 175 miles away. Soviet air superiority, by this time,
however, could be increasing to such an extent that it would require a major Allied air effort to oppose it. The number of Allied aircraft necessary to oppose the Soviets might be on the order of 4,000, since the division of Soviet air effort between the attacks on the Brittany peninsula and the expected air offensive against the United Kingdom cannot be determined.

(c) Notwithstanding the probable ability of the Allied forces to hold the peninsula, it is believed the gradually increasing Soviet air attacks on the two major port areas would eventually make logistical support of the peninsula extremely difficult. This course of action is rejected as being unprofitable and in-feasible.

(6) Hold the Pyrenees Line

(a) The Iberian peninsula is strategically important chiefly because control of it would permit control of the Strait of Gibraltar and the western Mediterranean. In addition, the peninsula could provide air bases for air operations against the Soviets, although the number of first-class all-weather airfields in the peninsula is small and considerable construction would be required. Also
the Iberian peninsula is not particularly well suited for strategic air attacks against the USSR.

(b) The Iberian peninsula has some further strategic significance as a bridge head on the Continent for subsequent major land operations against the Soviets. Port capacity on the Iberian peninsula is ample, although the best ports on the northern coast and the Mediterranean coast lie relatively close to the Pyrenees, which would make them vulnerable to Soviet air attacks. Ports farther south and west would still be adequate; however, the lines of communication leading
from them to the Pyrenees are vulnerable [and] inferior and are inadequate for sustained heavy military traffic without a large-scale program of reconstruction.

(c) Egress of large Allied forces from the Iberian peninsula into France in major operations against Soviet opposition would be extremely difficult from both a tactical and logistical standpoint. Amphibious operations around each end of the Pyrenees in order to flank Soviet positions would probably be necessary.

(d) Large-scale Allied utilization of the. Iberian peninsula would be a drain on U.S. resources because of the economic poverty of Spain. Extensive rehabilitation of Spanish airfields and LOCs would be required.

(e) The best defense line on the Iberian peninsula is formed by the Pyrenees. It extends for approximately 260 miles and has only four main passes through it. The two major routes through the Pyrenees are at its extremities. The successful defense of this line would keep airfields suitable to the Soviets approximately 575 miles from the Strait of Gibraltar, a distance which would make effective interdiction difficult by air action against lines of communication
through them. It is estimated that it would require approximately 34 U.S. equivalent divisions and 800 combat aircraft to defend Iberia from maximum Soviet capabilities against the Pyrenees for an indefinite period. Assistance by carrier air from the Mediterranean or the Bay of Biscay would be possible.

(f) Present estimates indicate that Spanish forces available for defense of Iberia will total 22 divisions and 350 combat aircraft. Portuguese forces could contribute only about 3 divisions and 100 combat aircraft. The balance of the forces required would have to be provided by the Allies.

(g) In summary, the Iberian peninsula is not particularly suitable as a base for air operations against the Soviets, is not a desirable bridgehead from which to extend subsequent major land operations against the USSR, but does have strategic significance through its control over the Strait of Gibraltar and the western Mediterranean and because it is a key to northwest Africa. These latter factors, and the fact that the estimate of forces required for its defense appear to be reasonable, warrants retention of this course of action for further consideration.

(7) Hold the Apennines Line

(a) This course of action should be considered either in conjunction with holding the Rhine-French-Italian border line or by itself, on the strength of its affording a bridgehead in Continental Europe and control of the central Mediterranean. A successful defense along this line would retain the bulk of Italy in Allied hands with its ample system of air bases, especially those in the Foggia region. It has the disadvantage of giving up the great industrial region of northern Italy, especially the armament industry, the major portion of which is located in the Turin-Genoa-Milan triangle. The remainder of Italy, largely agrarian in economy, would thus be heavily dependent on the Allies for economic support, and continued operations of Italian armed forces would depend
on Allied military aid.

(b) Retention of all or any part of Italy would not provide a good bridgehead for subsequent land operations into the Continent. While operations into northern Italy from the line of the Apennines would be feasible, egress from the northeastern borders of Italy into central Europe would be difficult both tactically and logistically for Allied forces on a major scale. Routes of advance
and lines of communication would be limited to the two major passes through the Alps, the Brenner Pass [and] Tarvisio Pass, and a gateway across the rugged plateau east of Trieste at Postumia.

(c) Although there is an ample number of airfields, it is not considered that they would be utilized extensively for strategic bombing against the USSR until Soviet air power had been materially reduced. There is the possibility, how ever, that those airfields could be used as mounting areas for airborne operations into central Europe at such time as such operations become feasible.

(d) The line of the Apennines south of Bologna is a strong natural defense line. Extending for approximately 125 miles from Rimini on the Adriatic to just south of La Spezia it has only eight or nine passes through it. It is estimated that it would require approximately 20 U.S. equivalent divisions and 500 combat aircraft for a defense of this line. Maximum Italian capabilities would be
approximately 9 divisions and 200 combat aircraft, assuming that all Italian forces have been able to retire intact behind this line. The balance of the forces required would have to be furnished by the Allies. Port capacities and LOCs on the peninsula would be adequate for support of the required forces.

(e) In summary, it is considered that Italy south of the Apennines is not of sufficient importance to require its retention by the Allies because of its limited value either as a bridgehead for subsequent operations against the Soviets or as a base for strategic air operations. It has great significance, however, because it can contribute greatly to the control of the central Mediterranean. For this reason it is retained for further consideration.

(8) Hold the Mediterranean Islands

(a) Sicily, Crete, and Cyprus are of strategic importance to the Allies be cause of their commanding position with respect to control of the Mediterranean and the sea lines of communication therein. In addition, the retention of Crete and Cyprus by the Allies would also contribute to the defense of the Cairo-Suez area.

(b) If Italy is overrun by the Soviets, it is estimated that Sicily could be defended by Italian forces withdrawn from Italy augmented by 2 Allied divisions and 300 combat aircraft. Retention of Sicily would also make Malta secure. If Sicily is seized by the Soviets, the Allied position in Malta would be precarious and its usefulness as a base would be limited by the extent that combat aircraft reinforcements could be provided.

(c) If Greece is overrun by the Soviets, the Greeks should withdraw to Crete in the maximum strength practicable. This would require the influencing of Greek strategic planning to bring it into consonance with Allied plans in the eastern Mediterranean region. If the Greeks were to base their main defenses in the north, the Soviets could concentrate sufficient force in that area to destroy the Greek army and thereby facilitate their subsequent overrunning of Greece. On the other hand, the terrain and the few and poor lines of communication to the south are such that if the Greeks were to avoid a major action in the north and were instead to withdraw to the south, while employing maximum delaying action and carefully planned demolition of transportation systems on withdrawal, the Soviet campaign could be prolonged. Such a course of action by
the Greeks, in addition to helping Allied operations in the overall, would avoid the destruction of the Greek army in the north; would offer a hope to the Greeks of holding on the mainland; and would give them reasonable assurance of preserving at least part of Greek territory (namely Crete) under Greek control. It is estimated that about two Greek divisions and one fighter group could hold Crete. Adequate shipping to transport these forces to Crete should be available in Greek waters from the sizable Greek merchant fleet. Protection for the crossing to Crete could be furnished by Allied naval forces which would be in the eastern Mediterranean, supplemented by Allied air forces in the Cairo-Suez and Cyrenaica areas. The above factors make a withdrawal of Greek forces to Crete appear to be feasible. If seized by the Soviets, which is unlikely because of supply difficulties, Crete could be neutralized by Allied forces in the Cairo-Suez and Cyrenaica areas.

(d) If Turkey is overrun by the Soviets, the Allied position in Cyprus would be untenable unless the Cairo-Suez area is retained by the Allies, thereby permitting reinforcement of Cyprus. If Soviet seizure of Cyprus occurred, which is unlikely, it could be neutralized by Allied forces in the eastern Mediterranean area.

(e) The Balearics, Corsica, and Sardinia, while of less importance, must also be considered. If Spain is held by the Allies, it is highly improbable that the Soviets would attempt to seize the Balearics because of the impossibility of supplying them. If Spain is occupied by the Soviets, retention of the islands by the Allies would be neither feasible nor desirable. It is considered, therefore, that no Allied forces should be allocated for the defense of the Balearics and
that Spanish forces only should be responsible for their defense.

(f) Corsica occupies a similar strategic position with respect to Italy as do the Balearic Islands to Spain. No Allied forces, therefore, should be allocated for the defense of Corsica, which should be a responsibility of French forces.

(g) Sardinia, although of more strategic importance than the Balearic Islands or Corsica, would be of little value to the Soviets if the Allies hold Sicily. Soviet capabilities against Sardinia are insignificant unless they occupy Italy, and even then logistical problems would be most difficult if Sicily is held by the Allies. On the other hand, if the Allies cannot hold Sicily, there would be little to gain by attempting to defend Sardinia. Italian forces, therefore, should be responsible for its defense.

(h) This course of action is reworded as follows and retained: "Hold the Mediterranean islands of Sicily, Malta, Cyprus, and Crete."

5. Northern Europe

a. General

(1) The courses of action open to the Allies in the Scandinavian area of Northern Europe—i.e., "Hold Norway and Sweden" and "Hold Denmark"—and the treatment accorded them in paragraphs b and c below are predicated on the special assumption to this plan which states that Sweden "will attempt to remain neutral but will join the Allies if attacked or seriously threatened." As a consequence of this assumption, Allied dependence upon a combined defense of Scandinavian territory by the three Scandinavian countries is precluded. If, however, Sweden were at some time in the future to signify its adherence to a pact for the common defense of Scandinavian territory, courses of action open to the Allies in that area would have to be reassessed.

(2) In anticipation of such a possible realignment on the part of Sweden, a preliminary examination indicates that it would appear feasible to retain at least a part of Scandinavia with Scandinavian forces, provided some military aid is furnished. It is estimated that defense of Zealand and southern Norway and Sweden, at least as far north as a line running generally east from Trondheim, could be effected with approximately 16 U.S. equivalent divisions and 1,400 combat aircraft. With a program of military aid it is considered that the combined Scandinavian forces could meet the above requirements.

(3) Since the assumption referred to in paragraph (1) above remains, however, a limiting factor as regards the participation of Sweden, both in mutual planning for defense and at the outbreak of war, it is considered that analysis of courses of action open to the Allies should at this time be limited to those in paragraphs b and c below.

b. Hold Norway and Sweden

(I) Norway and Sweden would be strategically significant to the Allies from both an offensive and a defensive standpoint. Offensively these countries could provide air bases for bombing the USSR. These bases would be five hundred to seven hundred miles closer to the northern industrial regions of the USSR than would be bases in the British Isles. Allied forces based in Norway and Sweden would be in a position to deny free use of the Baltic Sea by Soviet shipping and submarines and would threaten the northern flank of Soviet forces operating in Western Eruope. In addition, they could subsequently launch a feint or secondary attack through Finland to sever the Murmansk-Kola Peninsula area, establishing bases therein to further threaten Soviet shipping and bases in the White Sea area. The avenue of approach from Norway and Sweden through Finland is not suitable, however, for major Allied operations into the heart of the USSR because of the poor lines of communication, limited port capacities, weather, and terrain.

(2) Defensively Allied retention of Norway and Sweden would deny them to the Soviets as a base area for air and naval operations and would permit the Allies to prevent Soviet shipping from utilizing the Skagerrak entrance to the North Sea.

(3) Soviet control of Norway and Sweden would provide a considerable expansion of their early-warning system against the Allied air threat from the north and west and would permit establishing bases for projecting air and naval operations (especially submarine) against the British Isles and against Allied sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic. In addition, it would ensure continued supplies of Swedish uranium, industrial products, and iron ore.

(4) Soviet attacks by air, airborne, and amphibious forces against Norway and Sweden from bases in Germany, Denmark, the Baltic States, and the Murmansk-Finland areas, beginning about D + 1-1/2 months, would be opposed by Scandinavian forces estimated at 12 divisions and 1,300 aircraft for the Swedes and 1 division and 100 combat aircraft for the Norwegians. To meet the Soviet threat in the north, it is estimated that at least I U.S. equivalent division and 100 combat aircraft would be required in the Narvik area of Norway and 5 U.S. equivalent divisions and 400 combat aircraft in northern Sweden. To meet the Soviet threat from Denmark, it is estimated that 10 U.S. equivalent divisions and 1,000 combat aircraft would be required in south Sweden opposite Denmark, and 2 U.S. equivalent divisions and 100 combat aircraft in southern Norway. An estimated 2 additional divisions and 200 combat aircraft would be required in central Sweden to include the Stockholm area. These requirements total 20 U.S. equivalent divisions and 1,800 combat aircraft and are estimated to be the absolute minimum necessary to hold the Scandinavian peninsula. It is apparent from the above estimates that Swedish and Norwegian forces estimated to be available would be inadequate to repel the Soviets. Furthermore the Allies could not reinforce Norway or Sweden subsequent to D-Day in sufficient strength in time to block the Soviets. Assuming that pre-D-Day reinforcement by the Allies would be politically unacceptable and in view of the scale of the requirement for such reinforcement (estimated to be about 7 U.S. equivalent divisions and 400 combat aircraft, assuming the 13 available divisions were also made U.S. equivalent), the only other alternative would be to establish a program of U.S. military aid sufficient to provide the required Swedish and Norwegian forces.

(5) However, based on the advantages accruing to the Allies of retaining Norway and Sweden and on the possibility that with sufficient U.S. military aid those countries could successfully defend themselves, this course of action is retained for further consideration.

c. Hold Denmark

(l) The principal strategic importance of Denmark lies in its position with relation to the sea exits from the Baltic through the Kattegat to the North Sea (the Sound, Great Belt, and Little Belt). Secondarily Denmark is strategically significant because of its potentiality as a base for air operations.

(2) The topographic features of Denmark render the country virtually in defensible against attack from the south and east, and its proximity to the USSR makes it particularly vulnerable to air attack. Southern Jutland, while only about thirty miles in width at its narrowest point, has no natural defense line. The eastern coast of Jutland and the coasts of the principal islands of
Zealand and Fyn are vulnerable to amphibious and other seaborne landings.

(3) Denmark has extensive road and railroad systems and ample port capacities, all of which are adequate to support considerable Allied forces. Airfields are neither extensive nor adequate, but potentially the area could be developed as an air base, provided considerable airfield reconstruction were undertaken.

(4) Although the Soviets would probably use, initially, about 5 line divisions and 400 combat aircraft against Danish resistance in attacks by land through Jutland, they could employ considerable additional forces if required by the presence of other Allied forces. Therefore it is estimated that at least 10 U.S. equivalent divisions and 600 combat aircraft would be required to hold Jutland and the two principal islands of Zealand and Fyn. These requirements are well
beyond the capabilities of the Danes to meet. By 1957, even with a considerable program of military aid, Danish forces could total only a maximum of approximately 5 divisions and an insignificant number of combat aircraft. Consequently, in order to ensure the holding of Denmark, the Allies would have to reinforce it to the required strength immediately after D-Day. Such reinforcement would clearly be beyond their capabilities. Therefore, in spite of the advantages to be gained by holding Denmark, this course of action is rejected as being infeasible of accomplishment.

6. Near and Middle East

a. Hold Turkey or Portions Thereof

(1) Control of Turkey would be of great importance to the USSR, since it would provide them a base for air and ground operations against the Cairo-Suez area and the Persian Gulf while denying the same to the Allies. Soviet possession of Turkey could also eliminate a major threat to Black Sea shipping and would permit submarine operations into the Mediterranean via the Turkish straits. Conversely, Allied possession of Turkey would give them a base area for projecting operations against vital areas of the USSR and would contribute to the security of the Cairo-Suez and Middle East oil areas.

(2) As a base of operations, however, Turkey has several disadvantages. Its roads, railroads, and air-transport systems are very poor; there are few adequate ports; and the greater portion of Turkish terrain is very rugged. Air attacks against LOCs by either side would make logistic support of major operations most difficult.

(3) Soviet capabilities against Turkey would be such that Turkish resistance might be continued for about five months, depending upon the season of the year. Allied aid prior to and during the campaign in the form of the provision of equipment and air support from carrier and land-based air in the eastern Mediterranean region could prolong this resistance.

(4) Allied requirements for holding all of Turkey are estimated as about 12 British or U.S. divisions in addition to Turkish forces, plus about 10 U.S. fighter groups. Some of these forces would have to be in place and operational on D-Day.

(5) It is concluded that because of the scale and timing of forces required and the excessive logistic effort that would be necessary, the holding of all of Turkey would not be possible.

(6) There appear to be two alternatives, however, that should be considered: the holding of a maximum portion of southeastern Turkey and the holding of the Iskenderun "pocket" area (Silifke-Cilician Gates-Maras-Aleppo). In consequence of the rejection of the holding of all of Turkey and a consideration of the two alternatives discussed below, it follows that Turkish strategic planning should be influenced to the extent necessary to bring it into consonance with Allied plans in this area. Specifically, and in either of the above alternatives, Turkish plans should provide for maximum possible delaying action in European Turkey and in other areas of northern and eastern Turkey consistent with the capability of withdrawing intact the greatest possible forces to the south and southeastward. Any all-out stand in the northern area of Turkey would only lead to the encirclement and destruction of Turkish forces. Considering the superiority of the Soviet forces and the extreme difficulty of withdrawal over the poor LOCs in Turkey, it is reasonable to assume for planning purposes that the Turks could probably withdraw the equivalent of approximately eleven divisions to the south and southeast. It does not appear sound, however, to assume that any more than a negligible portion of their air force could withdraw.

(7) Retention of southeastern Turkey generally along the line Silifke-Cilician Gates-Malatya-Van Golu to the junction of the Turkish-Iraq-Iran borders would be an important political and psychological asset leading to the maximum use of Turkish forces; would secure the important Iskenderun "pocket" area; would secure the only railroad linking the Tigris Valley and the eastern Mediterranean; and would simultaneously secure both the oil-bearing areas and the Cairo-Suez area from Soviet threats developing through Turkey. Because of the rugged, mountainous terrain and the generally poor LOCs, this area of Turkey should be relatively easy to defend. Assuming that approximately 11 Turkish divisions have been able to withdraw to participate in the defense of this area, it is estimated that additionally about 4 divisions, 5 fighter
groups, 1 light-bomber group, and 1 tactical reconnaissance group, either U.S. or British, would be required. The air forces would have to be in place and operational by about D + 4 months and the ground force by about D + 6 months.

(8) An Allied defense of the Iskenderun "pocket" in itself would be insufficient, as the flank and rear of this area would be exposed to Soviet threats developing through both Turkey and Iran, with the result that this area would become a pocket in reality, accessible only by sea and air. Consequently its defense should be coupled with that of a line running south along the Jordan rift toward the Gulf of Aqaba. The defense of this combined area would preserve a foothold in Turkey, thus permitting utilization of Turkish forces, and would secure the Cairo-Suez area from Soviet threats developing from Turkey and Iran.

(9) An Allied defense of the Iskenderun "pocket"-Jordan rift line would require approximately 7 U.S. or British divisions and 6 fighter groups, I light-bomber group, and 1 tactical-reconnaissance group, assuming that approximately 11 Turkish divisions have been able to withdraw to participate in the defense of this area. Two divisions and two fighter groups would have to be deployed along the Jordan rift by D + 3 months, with a buildup to a total of
4 divisions and 3 fighter groups by not later than D + 7 months. The remaining 3 fighter groups, 1 light-bomber group, and 1 tactical-reconnaissance group would have to be in position in the Iskenderun "pocket" by D + 4 months, while the remaining 3 divisions would have to be there by D + 6 months. A nearly and intensive interdiction and demolition effort would be required against Soviet LOCs. Maximum use should be made of planned demolitions by Turkish forces, augmented as necessary by Allied air interdiction.

(10) Since both of the above two alternate courses of action are considered feasible and advantageous to the Allies, they are retained for further consideration and are worded as follows:

(a) "Hold southeastern Turkey."

(b) "Hold the Iskenderun 'pocket'-Jordan rift line."

b. Hold the Cairo-Suez Area

(1) The Cairo-Suez area is a most important strategic area because of its numerous airfields and base facilities, ports, manpower and industrial potential, its communications network, and the Suez Canal. Bases in this area would not only facilitate attacks against the vulnerable southern flank of the USSR but could support operations to aid the Turks, to retain or regain Middle East oil, and to project subsequent advances toward the heart of the USSR.

(2) Since bases in the Cairo-Suez-Aden area will probably be in British hands on D-Day, Allied bombers should be able to launch attacks on Soviet targets from these bases on D-Day if necessary pre-stocked supplies and prepared facilities can be made available.

(3) The British naval bases in the eastern Mediterranean at Alexandria and Port Said could be utilized. Port facilities in the Red Sea at Suez, Port Sudan, Massawa, and Aden could also be expanded for support of forces in the Cairo-Suez-Aden area.

(4) D-Day requirements for defense of this area against Soviet attack are estimated to be 1 division and 1 fighter group increasing to a maximum of 5 divisions, 4 fighter groups, and 1 light-bomber group by D + 7 months. Egyptian forces available would probably not exceed the equivalent of 1 division, 80 fighters, and 18 light bombers. The Egyptian division, however, could probably not be counted on for more than internal security. Early assistance to ground and air forces could be provided by a carrier task force which will probably be in the Mediterranean and which could, in addition to other operations, attack Soviet LOCs in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey and otherwise assist in the defense of the Cairo-Suez area.

(5) This course of action is retained.

c. Hold the Oil-Bearing Areas

(l)The oil resources of the Near and Middle East (Bahrein-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait-Iran, and Mosul-Kirkuk) estimated to have a daily production of about 2.3 million barrels by 1957 (approximately 25 percent of worldwide) are of great importance to the Allies and consequently of great interest to the USSR. Refineries located in these areas will probably have a total capacity slightly less than 1 million barrels a day, with the Abadan refinery, largest in the world, alone handling 500,000 barrels a day.

(2) While the Soviets would not require the petroleum of the Persian Gulf for initial operations, they would probably attempt to seize the area immediately to deny its use to the Allies as a source of oil and as a base for air operations, as well as to add depth to the defenses of their own southern border and oil-producing area.

(3) Allied requirements for holding the above areas against Soviet D-Day airborne capabilities of 3-4 airborne brigades against Basra-Abadan and Bahrein-Dhahran would be about 1 division and 3 fighter groups at Abadan and 1 Rejuvenated Combat Team [RCT] plus 1 fighter group at Dhahran. Indigenous forces in these areas will be loosely organized and ill-equipped and would be of little value unless a substantial Allied aid program is in effect. There are currently and will probably continue to be employed by the Arabian-American Oil Company in the Bahrein-Dhahran area about 4,000 American men who are, for the most part, of military age and physically well conditioned. With military equipment stocked in the area for the purpose, with limited training and organization, and with a nucleus of regular troops, this labor force could be of great assistance in defending the airfield and the oil installations on an emergency basis against Soviet airborne capabilities on D-Day and until reinforced or relieved by regular forces.

(4) An early and intensive interdiction and demolition effort will be required against Soviet LOCs. Maximum use should be made of planned demolitions by indigenous forces, augmented as necessary by Allied air interdiction. In addition to long-range air interdiction provided by Allied naval and land-based air listed under other courses of action, at least one light-bomber group would also be required in the Abadan-Mosul area from D-Day onward. Additional Allied forces of two divisions should be deployed not later than D+ 1 month for defense of the Tigris Valley in order to protect the oil-bearing areas against Soviet forces attempting to advance through the mountain passes of Iran and Iraq.

(5) Political and economic considerations in the stationing of U.S. or British forces of the size required in the Near and Middle East prior to D-Day may present considerable difficulty. Politically such action during peacetime might be regarded by the USSR as an overt act and in any event would require diplomatic negotiations. The above course of action is retained for further consideration due to the grave importance of the availability of Near and Middle East oil resources to the Allied war effort.

d. Retake the Oil-Bearing Areas Immediately

(1) In the event of early Soviet seizure of Near and Middle East oil areas, the oil position of the United States and its allies would be such that immediate retaking of these areas would be necessary in order to ensure adequate supplies of POL [petroleum, oil, lubricants] to the Allied powers. It is unlikely that the refineries, storage facilities, wells, and pipelines could be recaptured before being partially destroyed by USSR troops if not already destroyed prior to the initial withdrawal of the Allies, but the need for crude oil would necessitate operations to retake the area and reactivate production.

(2) If Allied demolition and bombing attacks on LOCs from carriers or Cairo-Suez have successfully reduced Soviet capabilities, an attack by one air borne RCT, a 1-division amphibious assault force, and a fast carrier task force should be sufficient to recapture the Bahrein-Dhahran area, provided it were launched not later than D + 2-1/2 months.[ • It would be desirable lo retake this area as rapidly as possible in order to prevent Soviet consolidation.] A 20-knot amphibious assault force could reach the Bahrein area twenty-five days after departure from the east coast by way of the Cape of Good Hope and in seventeen days if the Mediterranean route could be used. Two fighter groups would have to be established ashore prior to the departure of the carrier task force.

(3) After recapture of Bahrein-Dhahran, a buildup for an assault on the Basra-Abadan area should be undertaken. An estimated 5 divisions (3 infantry, 1 armored, and 1 airborne), and 5 fighter groups and 1 light-bomber group might be required to retake the area. Initial landings would probably be made in the Kuwait area by a 1-division amphibious assault force and would include a 1-airborne-division assault on the Abadan refinery and other key facilities. The
above operations would ensure access to the bulk of the Middle East oil areas. Subsequent offensives should then reduce Soviet forces remaining in the Kirkuk-Mosul area. This course of action is retained for consideration in the event the retention of these areas is infeasible.

e. Retake the Oil-Bearing Areas Subsequently

(1) If the Near and Middle East oil areas are not retained, or retaken in the early phases of the war, the oil position of the Allies would necessitate subsequent operations to retake it. After gaining access to Near and Middle East oil, it would require at least six months, and probably longer, to reactivate production after recapture of the areas.

(2) Soviet buildup in the three major oil-producing areas would depend on Allied action and on their estimate of our intentions. Requirements for Allied operations to retake the Persian Gulf area are therefore difficult to determine. If the Soviets are permitted to consolidate and strengthen their positions, an Allied amphibious assault may be extremely costly. Forces required would at least be on the order of those listed in the preceding task and might be considerably larger. If the Allies still held the Cairo-Suez area and in addition had reduced Soviet capabilities by the air offensive and combined offensives on other fronts, a feasible approach to the oil-bearing areas would be an advance from Cairo-Suez eastward, combined with an amphibious operation similar to that outlined in paragraph d above. Requirements for this course of action cannot be estimated until such time as an evaluation of the then-current strategic position of the Soviets and the Allies can be made.

(3) The above course of action does not appear beyond Allied capabilities and is therefore retained for further consideration in the event either retention or early recapture of these oil-bearing areas has proved infeasible.

f. Hold Maximum Areas of the Middle East

(1) It is assumed that the principal countries of the Middle East (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) would attempt to remain neutral and that in view of their geographic positions and probable economic, political, and military situations, only Pakistan probably would join the Allies if she were attacked or seriously threatened, while the others would probably submit to adequate armed occupation by either side rather than fight.

(2) The northern frontier of India and Pakistan is the lofty and militarily impassable Himalaya mountain range. Afghanistan presents a formidable terrain obstacle to invasion, with practically no feasible north-south lines of communication. Only in Iran are there feasible avenues of invasion, and these are tenuous and incapable of supporting sizable military forces, particularly if subjected to interdiction operations by air. There would appear little to be gained by the USSR by an invasion of India, Pakistan, or Afghanistan which could not be accomplished by political and subversive means, and the military effort required would be disproportionate to the gains. On the other hand, invasion of Iran as a part of the campaign to seize control of the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East is a probability and is treated with elsewhere in this estimate, including the proposed means of its containment.

(3) It is concluded, therefore, that except for possible air action by the Soviets against Allied use of air bases (not initially envisaged) in India or Pakistan, the military threat to the Middle East countries other than Iran is negligible. The Allied counter to the threat through Iran to the oil-bearing areas is covered elsewhere in this estimate.

(4) Accordingly, this course of action is retained but is reworded as follows: "Hold maximum areas of the Middle East consistent with indigenous capabilities, supported by other Allied courses of action."

7. Far East

a. General

Analysis of possible Allied courses of action in the Far East necessitates consideration of the following factors:

(1) All of the areas of the Far East, including the Far Eastern USSR are remote from those areas of the USSR which are vital to the Soviet war-making capability. This factor, together with the meager lines of communication, eliminates the area as a profitable avenue of land approach to the heartland of the USSR.

(2) The degree of industrial development within the area is such that it would contribute little to the support of a Soviet or an Allied war effort within the first three or four years of war.

(3) The area does not contain substantial amounts of available strategic raw materials vital to an Allied war effort, except in areas adjacent to the South China Sea.

(4) Soviet conquest of much of this area, except for Southeast Asia and the East Indies, would provide few military advantages and would not substantially increase their overall military capacity.

(5) Any major operations in this area by Allied forces would constitute an unprofitable diversion of Allied resources.

(6) It would be desirable to limit the advance of Soviet forces in the Far East and to prevent their acquiring the resources of Southeast Asia and the East Indies.

(7) Realization of long-term Allied objectives in the Far East requires that the Allies be in a position at the conclusion of the war to ensure the alignment of the countries of the Far East as members of the friendly family of nations.

b. Hold Japan

(1) Retention of Japan would assist in blocking Soviet expansion in the Far East and would strengthen our position in that area. In addition, it would contribute to the security of Okinawa. It is estimated that at least 2 U.S. divisions and 3 fighter groups will be actually in or will be available for D-Day deployment in Japan on D-Day. Present surplus equipment in Japan, if properly maintained, would be sufficient to fully equip 2 Japanese divisions, 3 on a substitute basis, and 5 on a strict austerity basis. The latter 5 would be capable of internal-security duties only. Two U.S. divisions and about 3% U.S. fighter groups—together with the 10 Japanese divisions, if equipped as indicated above, with the support of a U.S. carrier task group which it is estimated will be in the Pacific on M-Day—should be adequate for the defense of Japan except Hokkaido.

(2) This course of action is retained and is reworded as follows: "Hold Japan less Hokkaido."

c. Hold Okinawa

Okinawa—because of its present facilities, location, and its relative security from Soviet attacks—is the most suitable base for strategic air operations in the Far East. Initial defense requirements are estimated at 1 RCT, and 1VS fighter groups. This course of action is retained.

d. Hold Maximum Areas of Southeast Asia

(l)The retention of maximum areas of Southeast Asia, to include the East Indies and as much as possible of China, would ensure the availability of their economic resources, provide additional security for our bases and lines of communication in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, provide advanced air and naval bases, encourage dissension as well as underground and guerrilla resistance within Communist-controlled areas, and strengthen our position relative to our long-term objectives in the Far East. However, to provide effective opposition to major Soviet advances over a wide area would require the introduction of Allied forces onto the mainland of Asia on a scale out of all proportion to the results that could be obtained. Except for about one infantry division and one-third fighter group for the security of the natural rubber-producing areas in Malaya, it would therefore not be feasible to undertake major offensive or defensive operations on the mainland of Southeast Asia. Our assistance should consist mainly of psychological- and underground-warfare measures, along with a judicious U.S. aid program and air and naval attacks on enemy bases and lines of communication.

(2) This course of action is retained but is reworded to read: "Hold maximum areas of Southeast Asia consistent with non-Communist capabilities supported by other Allied courses of action."

8. General Courses of Action

a. Conduct an Air Offensive Against the Soviet Powers

(1) The most powerful immediately available weapon the Allies will possess in 1957 which can be applied against the USSR will be the A-bomb. A strategic air offensive against the USSR utilizing the A-bomb supplemented with conventional bombs should be instituted immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. This offensive—directed against facilities for production of weapons of mass destruction, key government and control facilities, major industrial areas, and POL facilities—would accomplish great disruption of the Soviet war potential. Particular emphasis should be placed on blunting Soviet offensive capabilities. Accordingly attacks against atomic-bomb production and storage facilities and important air bases from which atomic-bomb attacks are most likely to be launched should be given high priority. Attacks should also begin immediately against Soviet and satellite LOCs, supply bases, and troop concentrations. Attacks with bombs and mines should be undertaken against submarine-operating bases, channels [and] construction and repair yards to assist Allied naval forces engaged in the destruction of these facilities as discussed under the task "Conduct Offensive Operations to Destroy Enemy Naval Forces, etc.," page 163. Attacks against important targets in the petroleum-refining, electric-power, and iron and steel industries must also be initiated at the earliest practicable date. This offensive, of necessity, would have to begin from bases initially available. These will consist of bases in the United Kingdom, the Cairo-Suez-Aden area, Okinawa, Alaska, and the United States, utilizing the closer as long as tenable, and aircraft carriers, if available from other tasks. If the United Kingdom becomes untenable, bases in Iceland might be required. As soon as possible and in order to permit an intensified and sustained attack, additional bases closer to the USSR should be established. Utilization of bases in the above areas would complete a ring of bases around the USSR and would permit continuing attacks into the heart of the Soviet citadel.

(2) Guided missiles in significant numbers for strategic bombardment will probably not be available by 1957 but when available could become valuable adjuncts to the air offensive, providing their capabilities warrant their relative economic cost.

(3) To achieve maximum effectiveness, the atomic attacks should be launched with optimum force at the earliest possible date after D-Day and should be completed in the minimum practicable time consistent with the availability of bombs, the effectiveness of delivery, and the scope of the target program. It is estimated that U.S. and British forces required would be approximately 5 groups of heavy bombers, 21 groups of medium bombers, and
6 groups of long-range reconnaissance and weather aircraft. These would be as sisted by carrier task groups when available from other tasks. . . .

(4) It is estimated that an initial deployment of the above air forces should be as follows:

	D-Day	D+1
US Heavy Bomb. Group	4(120)	4
Alaska
- Medium Bomb. group	1(30)	1
- Str. Recon. and Weather Group	2/3(24)	2/3
UK
- Heavy bomb. group	1(30)	1
- Medium Bomb. Group	15(550)*	15*
Str. Recon group	3(108)**	3
Okinawa
- Medium Bomb. Group	2(60)	2
- Str. Recon. and Weather group	2/3(24)	2/3
Cairo-Suez-Aden
-Medium Bomb. Group	3(90)	3
- Str. Recon. and Weather group	2/3(24)	2/3
Labrador-Iceland-Azores-Bermuda-Guam Str. Weather group	1(36)	1
Summary
Heavy Bomb. Group	5	5
Medium Bomb. Group	21*	21*
Str. Recon. and Weather Group	6**	6**

* 7 equivalent groups (210 a/c initially) to be provided by the British.

**11 equivalent group (36 a/c initially) to be provided by the British.

(5) An initial air offensive as outlined above would materially reduce the war potential of the USSR, disrupt political and military control centers, interfere with communications, slow down Soviet advances, seriously hamper Soviet ability to replace initial stockpiles, and thereby shorten the war. It might cause the Soviet government to capitulate; but if not, the offensive should be continued from bases progressively advanced with the object of completely destroying the Soviet war potential and capacity to resist.

(6) This course of action is retained.

b. Secure Sea and Air Lines of Communication

(1) Sea Lines of Communication (a) General

i. Sea lines of communication to Newfoundland, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Africa, South America, the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, Western Europe, and within the Pacific Ocean areas will probably be essential for deployment and support of forces overseas, support of the U.S. war economy, and aid to allies.

ii. Preliminary analysis of surface escort requirements, giving due consideration to the capabilities of modern submarines employing long-range torpedoes and the number of Soviet submarines, indicates that escort requirements may be considerably higher than those necessary in World War II. Antisubmarine escorts may be required in all ocean waters. The density of escorts required will depend on the strategy of the Soviet submarine campaign and on the effectiveness of the Allied antisubmarine campaign.

iii. Convoys within range of Allied air bases should be provided with air cover. Escort carriers for air defense of convoys would be necessary when convoys are within range of Soviet air attack and air cover cannot be provided by Allied land-based aircraft.

iv. Hunter-killer groups would be required in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and in the Mediterranean Sea. It is estimated that on D-Day one group would be required in the Atlantic, one in the Pacific, and one in the Mediterranean. Minesweepers, patrol craft, harbor-defense nets, and detection devices would be required at all bases necessary for support of sea lines of communication.

(2) Mediterranean

i. The significance of the Mediterranean Sea LOC will depend in part on Allied strategy in the Near and Middle East. Use of this LOC to support operations in the Near and Middle East would make possible a more rapid buildup of forces and a large reduction in shipping requirements.

ii. Control of the Strait of Gibraltar would make possible use of the western Mediterranean. The central Mediterranean could be used if Sicily and southern Italy were neutralized or denied to the Soviets. Use of the eastern Mediterranean would require neutralization or denial of Crete and retention of the Cairo-Suez-Palestine area. Air and naval bases along the North African coast would also be necessary. Determination of whether or not the Mediterranean Sea LOC should or could be maintained cannot be made until selection of Allied courses of action is completed.

iii. If the Mediterranean Sea LOC cannot be maintained, the necessity for reopening it and the scale and nature of operations required therefor cannot be estimated until an evaluation of the Soviet and Allied strategic positions at the time is made.

(2) Air Lines of Communication

(a) Air LOCs to areas outside the United States must be built up to accommodate the traffic envisaged in deployment and support of overseas forces, airlift of special missions and strategic and critical materials, and overall aid to Allies.

(b) The following air LOCs should be established and maintained:

i. North Pacific: U.S.-northwest Canada-Alaska-Aleutians and U.S. Alaska.

ii. Central Pacific: U.S.-Hawaii-Johnston-Kwajalein-Marianas-Okinawa, Marianas-Japan, and Marianas-Philippines.

iii. South Pacific: Hawaii-Line Islands-Phoenix Islands-Fiji Islands-New Caledonia-New Zealand and Australia.

iv. North Atlantic: U.S.-Newfoundland-Azores-U.K.-Western Europe, U.S.-Labrador-Iceland-U.K.-Western Europe, U.S.-Bermuda-Azores, and Azores-North Africa-Cairo.

v. South Atlantic: U.S.-Trinidad-British Guiana-Brazil-Ascension-Liberia-Gold Coast-Nigeria-Khartoum-Cairo (or Aden-Oman area) and possibly Karachi.

vi. Far East-India: Philippines-French Indochina-Siam-Burma-Calcutta-New Delhi-Karachi. (Alternate: Philippines-Singapore-Ceylon-Oman.)

(3) This course of action is retained but is reworded as follows: "Secure sea and air lines of communication essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept."

c. Conduct Offensive Operations to Destroy Enemy Naval Forces, Shipping, Naval Bases, and Supporting Facilities

(1) General. The North Atlantic and North Pacific form the shortest sea and air approaches to the Western Hemisphere, flank the LOCs to the United Kingdom and Japan, contain the strategic North Atlantic islands and the Aleutians, and must be under control of the Allies. While Soviet naval forces based in the White Sea—Murmansk-Baltic area and in the western Pacific would probably not be of sufficient strength to challenge openly Allied control of the sea, they would be capable of harassing attacks and of serious interference with sea LOCs in limited areas. Unless destroyed or contained, the existence of these forces would require uneconomical diversion of heavy units to convoy duty. Offensive operations against the source of this threat are considered the most effective and least expensive means of obtaining desired results and at the same time of providing a means of counteraction against Soviet air capabilities from these areas and of disrupting Soviet coastal shipping. Allied control of the Mediterranean would be an important contribution to operations in the Near and Middle East and would probably be contested strongly by Soviet air and submarine action from progressively advanced bases. The operations required to control these vital sea areas would be conducted primarily by carrier task forces and submarines, assisted by land-based aviation. . . .

(a) Barents-Norwegian Sea Area. Missions in this area would include destruction of the Baltic, Barents, and White Sea naval forces, bases, shipping, [and] port facilities and interdiction of the Baltic-White Sea canal. Such areas as the Murmansk approaches, Naryan-Mar, the White Sea entrance, and Kara Strait, among others, should be mined. The Kiel Canal and the entrances to the Baltic should also be mined, but this task should be accomplished initially by Allied forces in Germany and Scandinavia and thereafter primarily by aircraft based in the United Kingdom. Carriers performing the above primary missions would assist in the air offensive. It is estimated that two carrier task groups— one of which might be British—reinforced by U.S. and British submarines and British fleet air squadrons would be required on D-Day or as soon thereafter as possible.

(b) Mediterranean Sea

i. Missions in this area would be destruction of the Black Sea naval forces, shipping, naval bases, and port facilities and mining of the Bosporus. In addition, carrier task forces would interdict Soviet advances in the Near and Middle East and would assist in the air offensive.

ii. The ability of a carrier task force to remain in the Mediterranean, in view of Soviet air capabilities, will depend on its strength, on the extent of the Soviet advances into both Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, and on the amount of Allied land-based air that can be allocated to Near and Middle East and North African bases. It is estimated that three carrier task groups, one of which might be British, probably would be required on D-Day or shortly thereafter, in addition to submarines and fleet air squadrons, probably based in North Africa.

(c) Western Pacific. Missions in this area would include destruction of naval bases, shipping, and port facilities. Such areas as the approaches to Vladivostok, Sovetskaya Gavan, Nikolaevsk, Petropavlovsk, Port Arthur, [and] Dairen, among others, should be mined. Naval forces in this area could also assist in the defense of Japan; D-Day requirements probably would be one carrier task group, reinforced by a cruiser task group, submarines, and fleet air squadrons.

(d) Arabian Sea. Any requirement for carrier forces in this area in connection with possible operations in the Persian Gulf or for participation in the air offensive must be provided from forces indicated above as being required in the Mediterranean.

(2) This course of action is retained.

d. Expand the Overall Power of the Armed Forces for Later Offensive Operations Against the Soviet Powers

(1) To provide for the contingency that the air offensive is not decisive, the Allies must implement the buildup of strong, mobile, balanced military forces for later major offensive operations. The necessary basis for this buildup must be in existence on D-Day, and the necessary expansion must be set in motion with the outbreak of war. It cannot be postponed until results of the initial air offensive have been determined. A phased mobilization of manpower for the military forces in consonance with their planned employment and consistent with the manpower requirements of war industry should be initiated, coincident with maximum industrial mobilization based upon the requirements for a lengthy war.

(2) The training of forces must be commenced and plans must be made for their transportation to staging areas in or near contemplated theaters of employ ment in accordance with strategic plans and phased schedules of employment. Equipment and supplies for prolonged operations must be stockpiled both at home and in the overseas staging areas. Ultimate operations may include the
clearing of the major Soviet armed forces from Western Europe, and it may be necessary to occupy selected areas of the USSR proper in order to terminate hostilities.

(3) This course of action is retained.

e. Initiate Major Offensive Land Operations Against the USSR as Required

(1) Although initial Allied strategy against the USSR should emphasize the application of heavy atomic and conventional bombing attacks against selected critical targets and a continuation of the air offensive until the capitulation of the Soviets, it is imprudent to assume that complete victory can be won by the air offensive alone. Achievement of our war objectives will undoubtedly require occupation of certain strategic areas by major Allied land forces and may require a major land campaign.

(2) The lessons of history, the vastness of the USSR, and the magnitude of the effort required, both manpower and logistical, all point up the tremendous difficulties involved in major land operations in the USSR. If, however, the initial air offensive is not decisive, the air offensive should be continued, unremitting pressure maintained against the Soviet citadel, and appropriate major offensive land operations initiated as required. These operations would be initiated when required and as conditions permit. They should not be developed on a major scale until the Soviet logistic capabilities have been reduced to a point where the Soviets no longer have the capability of supplying and rapidly re-concentrating their forces in the campaign area. The prerequisite conditions to such operations would be that the bulk of Soviet war industries and communications systems have been destroyed and their oil production reduced to such a level that for all practical purposes their air forces have been grounded and their naval and ground forces have been rendered relatively immobile.

Only when the above conditions have obtained is it considered feasible to initiate major offensive land operations. No accurate estimate can be made at this point of the time when such operations could be initiated since they would be dependent upon the timing and degree of success of the air offensive and the capabilities of the Allies to mobilize, equip, transport to the theater of operations, and logistically support the large forces required.

(3) The only suitable major base areas which may be available to the Allies and from which large-scale operations could be launched against the USSR would be the British Isles, Western Europe, and the North African-Near Eastern area.

(4) Avenues of approach into the USSR from the British Isles could be through:

(a) the Arctic Ocean and the Murmansk-Kola peninsula area.

(b) Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

(d) Western Europe.

(5) The avenue of approach through the Murmansk-Kola peninsula area would not be feasible for large-scale offensive operations because of poor lines of communication, limited port capacities, weather, and terrain. Logistic considerations would also preclude the employment of large forces in the avenue of approach through Norway, Sweden, and Finland. These two avenues should be used only in connection with feints or secondary attacks.

(6) The avenue of approach through the Baltic would be directly into the USSR. It would require, however, certain preliminary operations, namely, control of the Danish peninsula and northern Germany, at least neutralization of Soviet forces in southern Norway and southern Sweden, or neutrality of Sweden. Utilization of this avenue would also require large amphibious forces. Consequently it is considered that this avenue would be used only in conjunction with the avenue through Western Europe.

(7) The avenue through Western Europe would require a large amphibious expedition to gain a lodgement on the Continent, unless suitable areas thereof were retained by the Allies. It also would have the disadvantage of long routes of advance with the bulk of Soviet forces in opposition until the USSR is reached. On the other hand, it would have the advantage of the best land lines of communication into the USSR. This avenue, in spite of its major disadvantage, would be the best approach. It would probably be advantageous to utilize the sea route through the Baltic in conjunction with this avenue of approach.

(8) From a base area in Western Europe, excluding Spain, the most favor able avenue of approach would be through the north German plain into Poland, the Baltic states, and northern USSR if necessary. This avenue would support all the Allied forces that could be made available for such an operation. Its major advantage and disadvantage are as stated in the preceding paragraph.

(9) The development of the Iberian peninsula as a base area from which to launch major land operations would constitute a serious drain on Allied economic resources. Its use for such a purpose would involve the acceptance of ancillary amphibious operations into western and southern France in order to assure debauchment through the Pyrenees. These operations would then join up in France to proceed along the avenue as outlined in the previous paragraph. It
is therefore considered that Spain would not provide a desirable base area from which to launch major land operations.

(10) Avenues of approach from the North African-Near Eastern area could be through:

(a) Southern France.

(b) Italy.

(d) The Aegean Sea, Turkish straits, and the Black Sea to the Ukraine.

(e) Caucasus and Turkistan.

(11) An approach through southern France, while suitable for large-scale amphibious operations to gain a lodgement on the Continent, would initially present restricted avenues of advance and would entail the longest land routes of advance into the USSR.

(12) Italy does not provide a suitable bridgehead for launching large-scale operations into the Continent. Routes of advance and lines of communication from northern Italy into central Europe are extremely limited and would not support a major operation either tactically or logistically.

(13) Consideration of terrain and logistical factors indicates that the avenue of approach through the Balkans would present major difficulties.

(14) The avenue through the Aegean Sea, Turkish straits, and the Black Sea to the Ukraine would have the disadvantages of a long sea route and the requirement for a large amphibious landing. Lines of communication leading north through the Ukraine would not be especially good for large-scale opera tions and would require a considerable engineering effort. In addition, certain preliminary operations would be required. Operations to neutralize any Soviet forces in western Turkey [and] to secure Crete, the Athens area, eastern Macedonia, Thrace, and the Turkish straits would be the minimum requirements.

This avenue of approach, however, would be the most suitable for launching
land operations directly against the heart of the USSR.

(15) Avenues of approach through the Caucasus and Turkistan are not considered feasible. The Caucasus presents some of the most formidable terrain in the world. The lines of communication through the rugged terrain of eastern Turkey and Iran would be extremely vulnerable and could not support a major operation into the USSR. In Turkistan there would be an almost total lack of
north-south lines of communication.

(16) A consideration of the major advantages and disadvantages of the base areas and avenues of approach discussed in the preceding paragraphs leads to the following conclusions:

(a) It is most desirable to retain a major base area in Western Europe. If this area could be retained, the principal avenue of approach should be through the north German plain into Poland, the Baltic states, and northern USSR, if necessary.

(b) If a major base area cannot be retained in Western Europe but the British Isles remain tenable, it would be desirable to develop the British Isles as a major base area and to launch attacks there from into Western Europe and thence into the USSR.

(c) If a base area in neither Western Europe nor the British Isles can be maintained, then major land operations should be launched from the North African-Near Eastern area, after undertaking preliminary operations to gain control of the Aegean Sea-Turkish straits region through the Black Sea to the Ukraine. Such a course of action, however, presents so many major difficulties
that it should be followed only as a last resort as the major effort.

(17) The extent of and the forces required for such major land operations as envisaged above cannot be foreseen clearly at this time. The probable magnitude of such operations would undoubtedly constitute a severe drain on Allied resources and might even prove unsupportable. Further studies of major land operations against the USSR will be undertaken later in this study.

(18) This course of action is retained.

f. Establish Control and Enforce Surrender Terms in the USSR and Satellite Countries.

(1) Following Early Capitulation

(a) Early capitulation of the USSR might possibly result from an atomic-bombing campaign of such staggering effectiveness that it has paralyzed the entire nation. In the event this occurs, steps should be taken to receive surrender of Soviet troops, disarm them, and inaugurate some system of control before the country has had time to recover from the shock. In the event of capitulation within the first few months, the Allies would not have the strength in troops nor
the available resources to proceed with a full-scale occupation in the conventional manner. Also, Soviet troops would remain in many portions of Europe.

(b) The following methods of control of the USSR and enforcement of surrender terms after an early capitulation are open to consideration:

i. The concentration of available Allied forces in countries around the periphery of the USSR.

ii. The occupation of selected bridgeheads within the USSR by available Allied forces.

iii. The occupation of key points and areas within the USSR by available Allied forces.

iv. Combinations of the above.

(c) Because of the limited Allied forces available at this time, maximum use of all available means for control and enforcement of surrender terms with the USSR would be required. Maximum use of remaining Soviet channels of authority would be obligatory. A concentration of available Allied forces in countries around the periphery of the USSR (/ above), while taking maximum advantage of the initial location of Allied forces, would place the occupation burden and its attendant problems upon the peripheral countries. It would also present many difficulties in control of the USSR and enforcement of surrender terms. The occupation of selected bridgeheads within the USSR (ii above) would relieve peripheral countries of the occupation burden but, except for the bridgehead areas, would present the same difficulties of control within the vast areas of the USSR. The occupation of key points and areas within the USSR (HI above) would provide the most certain means of control and enforcement of surrender terms, but the limited availability of Allied forces would require a modification of this course of action if necessary control is to be established and maintained.

(d) Key urban areas selected as bases for projection of control should be of strategic importance because they perform one or more of the following functions: political and administrative center, industrial center, communication center, major seaport or naval base, oil-producing or -refining center. The occupation of a sufficient number of such key centers should permit adequate control over the country.

(e) Since an early capitulation would probably find Soviet forces occupying much of Europe, Allied forces must be prepared to establish temporary control in satellite and certain of the liberated countries. This control, as in the USSR, would have to be skeletonized, with major forces centered principally in the various capitals and certain key seaports and urban areas. The principal mission of these forces would be the establishment of control, enforcement of surrender terms, disarmament of Soviet and satellite forces, and return of disarmed Soviet forces to the USSR.

(f) It is considered that indigenous policy and armed forces in partially over run countries should be capable of disarming and exercising control over Soviet forces that have surrendered within these countries. If they are unable to do so, and if requested by these countries, additional Allied forces would have to be made available. It is obvious that these occupation forces cannot all be trained units, and many would have to be hastily assembled and transported to the countries of occupation.

(g) It is estimated that the total requirement for Allied occupation forces would be 23 divisions in the USSR proper and 15 divisions in the satellite areas. Air support for these forces should consist of about 5 reinforced tactical air forces totaling approximately 30-35 groups. These requirements would be well within Allied capabilities from D-Day onward.

(h) A combination of courses /; and Hi above—i.e., occupation of selected bridgehead areas within the USSR by available major forces, while occupying selected key areas within the USSR by skeleton forces—is considered the best use of available Allied forces and is selected for further development in the outline plan.

(2) Following Later Capitulation

(a) If an early capitulation of the USSR as a result of the initial atomic-bomb attacks has not occurred, preparations for the control of the USSR and her satellites must continue and take into consideration the following conditions:

i. Capitulation as the result of an extension of the initial air offensive and prior to the initiation of a major land operation.

ii. Capitulation or disintegration following the initiation of land operations against the USSR.

(b) In either condition i or ii above, the problem of establishing control in the USSR or her satellites for the purpose of ensuring compliance with our national war objectives will be less difficult than the problem facing the Allies after an early capitulation. As the war progresses, the Allies will generate increasing numbers of forces which can be made available for control purposes in the event of capitulation. If capitulation occurs at the end of a lengthy air offensive or after a land offensive has been initiated, adequate control forces would be available from those forces engaged in or preparing for those offensives.

(1) Psychological, economic, and underground warfare is an essential adjunct to military operations in the accomplishment of national and military aims. The vast improvements in the fields of communications have been an important factor in this development. This type of warfare, if properly employed, can play an important role in overcoming an enemy's will to fight, in harassing his operations, and in sustaining the morale of friendly groups in occupied territories.

(2) Psychological and economic measures directed at our allies and neutral nations can be of comparable importance to those measures directed at our enemies. From the military standpoint such measures—carefully integrated with military policies, plans, and operations—can facilitate the military prosecution of the war.

(3) In general, objectives of this type of warfare should be as follows:

(a) To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight.

(b) To sustain the morale of friendly groups in enemy territory.

(4) This course of action is retained.

h. Provide Aid to Allies

(1) Military aid can be divided into two categories: that provided prior to D-Day and that provided subsequent to D-Day. A matter of significant importance to Allied military planning is the extent to which military aid can be furnished to the Atlantic Pact nations, and especially the Western Union nations, prior to D-Day. Prewar military aid should be furnished on the largest possible scale consistent with the maintenance of sound economics and a satisfactory state of U.S. and British military preparedness. Aid should also be provided to other countries, including Sweden, the Arab League, Turkey, Greece, Latin America, and China. Aid furnished should be based on a long-range program in accordance with the overall strategic concept and plan of operations.

(2) Military aid subsequent to D-Day will constitute a substantial demand on industry at a time when industry will be strained to the utmost to meet mobilization requirements. The requirement for aid subsequent to D-Day will depend in large measure on the amount provided prior to D-Day.

(3) This course of action is retained but is reworded to read: "Provide essential aid to our allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the overall strategic concept."

VI. SELECTION OF AILIED COURSES OF ACTION

1. Basic Undertakings

a. Examination and analysis of those courses of action retained for further consideration reveal that certain of them require no further analysis or comparison and are so necessary to a successful prosecution of the war as to be basic undertakings and thus become a first charge against our resources. These are as follows:

(1) Secure the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Conduct an air offensive against the Soviet powers.

(3) Hold the United Kingdom.

(4) Expand the overall power of the armed forces for later offensive operations against the Soviet powers.

(5) Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, shipping,
naval bases, and supporting facilities.

(6) Secure sea and air lines of communication essential to the accomplishment
of the overall strategic concept.

(7) Provide essential aid to our allies in support of efforts contributing directly
to the overall strategic concept.

b. It is also apparent from the analyses of the several alternatives under the course of action "Hold maximum areas in Western Europe" that this course of action should be considered essential to the attainment of our war objectives and therefore should be accepted as a basic undertaking. The selection of the areas to be held is made in paragraph 4 below.

2. Other General Courses of Action

In addition to the foregoing there are certain other broad courses of action which, although their details cannot be determined at this time, will be necessary to any strategic concept for successful prosecution of the war leading to a peace which would be in consonance with our national aims and objectives. In this category are the following courses of action which are therefore selected:

a. Initiate or intensify psychological, economic, and underground warfare.

b. Initiate major offensive land operations against the USSR as required.

c. Establish control and enforce surrender terms in the USSR and satellite countries. . . .

There are two clearly dominant issues which must be faced by the Allies, i.e., the holding of maximum areas in Western Europe and access to the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East.

4. Western Europe

a. Suitability of Courses of Action

(1) A comparison of the remaining courses of action in Western Europe indicates that the successful defense of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line will achieve the greatest results since it would retain in Allied hands the bulk of the manpower and industrial potential of Western Europe and would contribute greatly to the defense of the United Kingdom. The defense of the Rhine-French-Italian border line will achieve the next greatest results, differing from the former in that it gives up all of Italy. The defense of Sicily would assume increasing importance if this course of action were adopted. Of the two remaining courses of action—that is, holding the Pyrenees line and the Apennines line—it is apparent that combining them would be the next most suitable course of action. A comparison of the latter two courses of action indicates the following factors: although neither of the two areas, Iberia and the Italian peninsula, is particularly suitable or feasible as a bridgehead for subsequent major operations into the Continent, Iberia would be of greater value because of its size, its availability as an area to which Allied forces could retreat if withdrawal from Rhine positions were forced, its lesser vulnerability, and because its retention would permit the use of shorter and more easily defended sea lines of communication; the Italian peninsula would be more suitable for air operations against the Soviets because of its strategic location, but its relative advantage here would be somewhat canceled out by its much greater vulnerability; although both Iberia and the Italian peninsula have strategic significance because of their control over the western and central Mediterranean, respectively, the control over the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic approaches thereto would be more important to the Allies than control of the central Mediterranean. From the above factors it is concluded that holding the Pyrenees line would be more suitable than holding the Apennines line.

(2) Retention of the Mediterranean islands of Sicily, Malta, Cyprus, and Crete would contribute to the security of the Cairo-Suez area and North Africa and to the control of the eastern and central Mediterranean. In the event Spain were overrun, however, the usefulness of Sicily in this connection would be measurably decreased and the difficulty of its retention increased. It is apparent, therefore, that the suitability of holding Sicily is largely dependent upon the holding of Spain. The same is not entirely true of the islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus, the holding of which should therefore be treated as a separate possible course of action.

(3) In summary, from the standpoint of suitability only, courses of action in Western Continental Europe would be of relative value to the Allies in the following order:

(a) Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(b) Hold the Rhine-French-Italian border line.

(d) Hold the Pyrenees line and Sicily.

(e) Hold the Pyrenees line.

(f) Hold the Apennines line.

(g) Hold the Mediterranean islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus.

b. Feasibility of Courses of Action

(1) Examination of the above courses of action from the standpoint of their feasibility indicates that implementation of either of the first two courses of action would be dependent upon an adequate program of U.S. military aid. Forces required for defense of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line for the first six months of combat are estimated at 76 United States equivalent divisions and 4,500 combat aircraft. Estimated Allied capabilities in the absence of a United States military-aid program would be approximately 35 divisions of varying degrees of combat efficiency by D + 30 days and 2,750 combat aircraft. Assuming that the 35 available divisions were made United States equivalent, a deficit would still remain which by D + 30 days would be on the order of 41 United States equivalent divisions and 1,750 combat aircraft. With a United States military-aid program on the necessary scale. Allied ground-force capabilities are estimated at 76 divisions, which could hold this line for approximately D + 6 months.

(2) Defense of the Rhine-French-Italian border line is estimated to require 70 United States equivalent divisions and 4,400 combat aircraft, on the same basis indicated above. However, since it would probably be unrealistic to assume that any Italian forces would be available for the defense of the French-Italian border, the deficit for this course of action would be 44 United States equivalent divisions and 1,850 combat aircraft, assuming that the available 26 divisions were also made United States equivalent. From the standpoint of terrain and forces required, the defense of the French-Italian border line would be less difficult than defense of Italy along the Alps-Piave line. On the other hand, the probable unavailability of any Italian forces for defense of the French-Italian border would actually create a greater overall deficit of forces required for defense of the entire Rhine-French-Italian border line than for defense of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line, i.e., 3 divisions and 100 combat aircraft plus 2 divisions and 300 aircraft required if Sicily were to be held.

(3) From the above calculations it is concluded that from the overall standpoint it would be slightly more difficult to generate the additional forces required for defense of the Rhine-French-Italian border line than for the Rhine-Alps-Piave line; consequently, it would be comparatively more feasible to defend the latter.

(4) An analysis of the requirements for the simultaneous defense of both the Pyrenees line and the Apennines indicates that the Spanish would have a deficit of 12 United States equivalent divisions and 450 combat aircraft for the Pyrenees and the Italians a deficit of 11 United States equivalent divisions and 300 combat aircraft for the Apennines; these deficits total 23 divisions and 750 combat aircraft, assuming that the available divisions were also made United States equivalent. It is therefore apparent that these lines could be defended together only by the introduction of Allied forces in the above totals into Spain and Italy unless a prior program of military aid is furnished to those countries in order to reduce Allied requirements. It is obvious that the retention of these two lines would be considerably more feasible than those in the first two
courses of action.

(5) In the event the Apennines cannot be held in conjunction with the retention of Spain, holding the Pyrenees and Sicily would make possible a large measure of control over the western and central Mediterranean and could be accomplished with considerably less force. Holding Sicily would permit the exercise of some control over the central Mediterranean although not to the degree obtained by holding the Apennines. Defense forces of two United States or British divisions and 300 combat aircraft would be required in addition to the Italian forces which could be withdrawn and would have to be deployed there probably not later than D + 3 months. The requirements of forces and their timing appear to be feasible.

(6) The additional Allied forces required for the defense of Iberia would not have to be deployed in position as rapidly as would be required for defense of the Apennines. Soviet forces would be unable to assault the Pyrenees earlier than D + 3 months, whereas Soviet and satellite forces might be able to assault the Apennines line as early as D+ 1 month. Logistic problems involved in defense of the Apennines would render that course of action infeasible in event the western Mediterranean LOC were closed by loss of the Iberian peninsula. Therefore it can be concluded that not only would it be more feasible to defend the Pyrenees line than the Apennines line, but the defense of the latter would be infeasible after loss of the Iberian peninsula.

(7) Requirements for defense of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus, in addition to Greek forces that could be withdrawn to Crete, would be less than 1 United States or British division and 1 fighter group supported by land-based combat aircraft in the Cairo-Suez area and carrier-based aircraft. It is unlikely that Soviet forces could assault the islands until after D + 3 months. Considering these factors, therefore, it is concluded that defense of the above islands would be the most feasible of all Western Europe courses of action considered.

(8) In summary, it appears that from the standpoint of relative feasibility the feasible courses of action in Western Europe should be arranged in the following order:

(a) Hold the Mediterranean islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus.

(b) Hold the Pyrenees line.

(d) Hold the Pyrenees and Apennines lines.

(e) Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(f) Hold the Rhine-French-Italian border line.

c. Acceptability of Courses of Action.

(1) The above courses should next be considered from the standpoint of their acceptability, i.e., the possibility of success or failure, the consequences of failure, and the expected gains as compared to the requirements in forces. The successful defense of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line while achieving maximum results would require the generation of the largest numbers of Allied forces. These forces could only be generated by an adequate program of United States military aid over a period of years. Such a program, if carried out, would permit the requirements of forces for the initial defense of this line—estimated at 76 divisions and 4,500 combat aircraft—to be realized. Failure to hold this line would not be disastrous to the Allies, since if at any time it became apparent that this line could not be held, a planned withdrawal could be effected to one or more of the alternate positions discussed herein. Such a withdrawal would have a reasonable chance of extricating the bulk of the Allied forces to alternative positions. Therefore it is considered that, balancing the chances of success and the results to. be achieved from such success against the possibility of failure, this course of action would be most desirable and would be acceptable providing the above-mentioned United States military-aid program could be implemented.

(2) The defense of the Rhine-French-Italian border line accepts approximately the same degree of risk as the defense of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line. This is because the principal threat will likewise be to the northern portion of the line, that lying along the Rhine, and the greatest problem will be that of re-enforcing this line during the first few weeks sufficiently to block the probably increasing Soviet capabilities. However, the Allied capability of executing a planned withdrawal from this line, if forced by the Soviets, would be slightly greater than in the previous course of action, chiefly because any withdrawal from the French-Italian border would be easier than from the Alps-Piave line. It is concluded that the consequences in case of failure in this course of action would not be quite as serious as in the preceding case. On the other hand, defense of the Rhine-French-Italian border line would not achieve nearly the gains of the preceding course of action although the cost would be approximately the same. Therefore, weighing the comparative possibility of success and failure, the consequences of failure, and the objectives to be gained, this course of action is considered to be less acceptable than the preceding course of action. (The same provisions concerning military aid apply in this course of action.)

(3) The combined course of action of holding both the Pyrenees and the Apennines is the most suitable alternative to holding the Rhine-Alps-Piave line or the Rhine-French-Italian border line. Forces required, in addition to Spanish and Italian forces, are estimated to be 23 divisions and 750 aircraft. Total forces required are estimated as 54 United States equivalent divisions and 1,300 combat aircraft to hold indefinitely, as compared to 76 United States equivalent divisions and 4,500 aircraft required to hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line for six months.

(4) The results to be gained are considerably less than could be attained by holding the Rhine River line in that France and Benelux and, accordingly, a major bridgehead on the Continent are abandoned and the threat to the United Kingdom greatly increased. The major advantages of this course of action are that, if successful, it would stabilize the Soviet advance, assure retention of the Mediterranean Sea LOC, and therefore contribute in large measure to the feasibility and success of operations in the vital Near and Middle East area.

(5) If the Pyrenees-Apennines line is the initial defense line, part of the Allied forces required in Spain would have to be deployed by D + 3 and the major part of the forces required in Italy by D + 1. The latter would be extremely difficult of accomplishment, unless United States and British forces required could be greatly reduced by a United States military-aid program or deployment of United States or British forces to Italy commenced prior to D-Day.

(6) If the Pyrenees-Apennines line is defended as a result of planned with drawal from the general line of the Rhine River, the chances of success would depend on the length of delay possible along the latter line and the amount of Allied forces that could be withdrawn to the Pyrenees-Apennines line. It is believed that this course of action should be acceptable to the Allies as an alter native course.

(7) As previously stated, holding the Pyrenees line and Sicily would contribute to the control of the western and central Mediterranean and could be achieved with relatively smaller forces. This course of action would be accept able to the Allies as an alternate course of action.

(8) The holding of the Pyrenees line alone would present no great risk to the Allies; its chances of success are excellent and it would make secure the best major area to which large Allied forces could withdraw without disastrous loss of men and equipment. Since the additional forces required for this course of action could probably be furnished from those forces withdrawing from more easterly positions, the gains of this course appear to be commensurate with the expected costs. Therefore it is believed that this course of action could be acceptable to the Allies as an alternative course of action in the event that more easterly lines in Western Europe become untenable.

(9) The course of action to hold the Mediterranean islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus would have a high probability of success. Failure to hold these islands would not be disastrous to the Allied position because the Allies would retain a considerable capability of neutralizing them. Gains to be expected as compared to the small requirements in forces would appear to make this course of action acceptable to the Allies in the event that more advanced positions could not be held.

(10) Summarizing, it is concluded that from the stand point of acceptability alone the acceptable courses of action in Western Europe should be arranged in the following order:

(a) Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.[ [providing the previously mentioned United States military-aid program could be implemented in full].

(b) Hold the Rhine-French-Italian border line. [Providing a substantial United States military-aid program could be implemented.]

(d) Hold the Pyrenees line and Sicily.

(e) Hold the Pyrenees.

(f) Hold the Mediterranean islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus.

(11) A further scrutiny of the courses of action in Western Europe reveals a possible alternative which should be given additional consideration; this course would be to hold the Pyrenees and a defensive position farther south in Italy. The only position farther south in Italy which could be considered would be the line approximately thirty-five miles northwest of the line Naples-Foggia. This line, approximately eighty miles in length across the narrowest part of the Italian peninsula, is mountainous, rugged, and ideally suited for defense. A successful defense of this line would permit a degree of control over the central Mediterranean somewhat less than by holding the Apennines. Defense of this line would probably require a minimum of 14 United States equivalent divisions and 400 combat aircraft. The probable inability of the Italians, withdrawing down the peninsula, to get all of their forces intact on this line would require the augmentation by considerable additional forces, probably on the order of 7-8 United States equivalent divisions and 300-400 aircraft. These forces would have to be deployed in position probably not later than D + 2 months. It is doubtful that such a deployment would be feasible.

(12) Considering the forces required in addition to those required for holding the Pyrenees and the gains to be expected, it is considered that this course of action would not be acceptable to the Allies.

d. Selected Course of Action

(1) In summary, a consideration of all the factors of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability indicates that Allied courses of action in Western Europe should be arranged in the order of priority indicated below. It should be noted that each course of action listed after the first would be an alternative to each preceding course in case of failure of the preceding course.

(a) Hold the Rhine-AIps-Piave line.

(b) Hold the Rhine-French-Italian border line.

(d) Hold the Pyrenees line and Sicily.

(e) Hold the Pyrenees line.

(f) Hold the Mediterranean islands of Malta, Crete, and Cyprus.

(2) The implementation of either of the first two courses of action would depend upon the adequate program of United States military aid previously indicated. Based on the assumption that such a program has a reasonable possibility of being carried out, the course of action listed in subparagraph (I) (a) above—i.e., "Hold the Rhine-AIps-Piave line"—is selected as the course of action.

5. Near and Middle East

a. Since it appears at this time the Allies will require access to the oil areas in the Near and Middle East beginning with D-Day, it is readily apparent that the holding or very early retaking of some of the Near and Middle East oil will be essential and may even become a basic undertaking.

b. It is reasonable to consider that between now and 1957 certain measures could be instituted to assure the presence of Allied forces in or close to the oil- bearing areas on D-Day which, together with air interdiction of Soviet LOCs leading to them, would be sufficient to hold those areas against initial Soviet at tacks.

c. It is obvious, therefore, that the most desirable course of action would be to hold the oil-bearing areas since it would obviate the necessity for their recapture and the 3VS divisions, 4 fighter groups, and I light-bomber group required would be considerably less than would be required to retake them either immediately or subsequently. Immediate retaking of the oil areas as far north as the Iranian areas at the head of the Gulf would require a total of approximately 5 divisions, 5 fighter groups, and 1 light-bomber group. Additional operations to retake the Kirkuk-Mosul areas would undoubtedly require increased forces. The greater the delay in retaking the oil areas, the more time would be available to the Soviets for consolidation of their positions, and consequently subsequent retaking would be even more costly to the Allies.

d. Since the forces for holding, as outlined above, would be sufficient only to protect the oil areas from Soviet airborne attacks and overland advances through Iran, it would be necessary to provide additional forces to protect their flank and rear from the Soviet threat through Turkey which may be developing soon after D + 5 months. This could best be accomplished by holding southeastern Turkey. It is apparent that holding the oil areas and southeastern Turkey would greatly reduce the threat to the Cairo-Suez area and the forces required therein for its retention.

e. Comparing the forces required for holding either the Cairo-Suez area (5 divisions, 4 fighter groups, and 1 light-bomber group by D + 7) or the Iskenderun pocket-Jordan rift line (7 divisions, 6 fighter groups, 1 light-bomber group, and 1 tactical reconnaissance group by D + 7) reveals that holding the Cairo-Suez area would be more feasible but the gains would be considerably
less.

f. On the other hand, the combination of holding the oil areas and southeastern Turkey would require a total of IVi divisions, 9 fighter groups, 2 light-bomber groups, and 1 tactical reconnaissance group by D + 6 months. Therefore, considering that this latter course would achieve the threefold objective of holding the oil areas and a portion of Turkey and would secure the Cairo-Suez area with only a moderately greater expenditure of forces, that course would be the most acceptable in the Near and Middle east.

g. The above requirements, however, will compete with those required for defense of maximum areas in Western Europe. Also, in both areas the requirements develop immediately upon the outbreak of war. If the implementation of the national petroleum program has not met the early deficiencies, the retaking of the Middle East oil cannot be deferred. Operations to assure access to the oil must commence on D-Day or immediately thereafter. Since the difference between the forces required for retention of Cairo-Suez and those for retention of the oil areas would be relatively small (2VS divisions, 5 fighter groups, 1 light-bomber group, and 1 tactical reconnaissance group), this difference would be all that would accrue to Western Europe by virtue of deferment of access to the oil areas.

h. A consideration of the above factors leads to the conclusion that forces should be allocated for the retention of the oil-bearing areas and the holding of southeastern Turkey. This conclusion is arrived at with a clear understanding that this course of action would reduce the forces available for other areas.

i. The remaining course of action in the Middle East ("Hold maximum areas of the Middle East," etc.) requires no further consideration beyond the previous discussion, since Allied forces other than indigenous will not be specifically provided therefor.

j. The following courses of action are, therefore, selected in the Near and Middle East:

(1) Hold the area: southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf.

(2) Hold maximum areas of the Middle East consistent with indigenous capabilities, supported by other Allied courses of action.

6. Northern Europe

a Although the advantages of Allied retention of Norway and Sweden would be significant, such retention would not be vital to Allied prosecution of the war. It is evident that it would require a large-scale United States aid program to build up the armed forces of those countries, particularly Norway, to give reasonable assurance of their retention. Such an aid program would be either in addition to that already envisaged or would have to be compensated by a reduction in military aid afforded other countries, notably those of the Western Union. Italy, and the Near and Middle East. The provision of the required aid would be justified only in the event it develops that there is a reasonable assurance that Sweden would join with Norway and Denmark in a concerted defense of Scandinavia in the event the Soviets elect to exercise their capabilities against any of the three Scandinavian countries.

b. The holding of maximum areas in Western Europe, with its greater military potential, would achieve far greater results than retention of Norway and Sweden. The retention of at least a part of the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East is essential. Both should have a higher priority than Norway and Sweden.

c. Although it is considered unacceptable to divert sufficient means to ensure defense of Norway and Sweden, unless the latter would join with Norway and Denmark in a concerted defense of Scandinavia, the advantages of delaying Soviet advances in this area warrant token military aid to encourage their resistance against Soviet political and military advances.

d. Based upon the above considerations, the course of action "Hold Norway and Sweden" is rejected.

7. North Atlantic Approaches

a. The value of Iceland to the Allies, both offensively and defensively, is sufficient to warrant its occupation as soon as possible. The forces required—i.e., Vs division and 1 fighter group—are sufficiently small in proportion to the results to be gained that such employment of available forces is justified. If Iceland, however, were to be seized by the Soviets first, which is a possibility, its immediate recapture by an amphibious operation involving 1 division would be necessary to ensure its use as an air and naval base in support of the basic undertakings.

b. A consideration of the value of the Azores to the Allies and the small forces required for their defense—1 battalion and 1 fighter squadron—justify early action to secure it. The following course of action is therefore selected: "Secure Iceland and the Azores."

a. Although Allied objectives in the Far East require some military action to block Soviet expansion, reduce their offensive capabilities, and to ensure the postwar position of the Allies in that area, this action must be kept to an absolute minimum in light of the requirements for major Allied efforts in the European and Near Eastern theaters. The estimate of United States forces required for the defense of Japan and Okinawa would total 2VS divisions and 5 fighter groups if adequate Japanese forces were to be provided. These forces are small in relation to the gains that can be expected.

b. The retention of maximum areas in Southeast Asia would be a responsibility of the non-Communist indigenous forces (except in Malaya), with air and naval support by Allied forces in the Far East from bases outside these areas.

c. The following courses of action in the Far East are therefore selected:

(1) Hold Japan, less Hokkaido.

(2) Hold Okinawa.

(3) Hold maximum areas of Southeast Asia consistent with non-Communist capabilities supported by other Allied courses of action.

9. Consolidation of Certain Selected Courses of Action

a. A further examination of the two selected courses of action pertaining to the holding of maximum areas of the Middle East and of Southeast Asia indicates that, because of their contiguity as to area and the similarity of treatment accorded them, those two courses of action may be advantageously combined into one. Therefore the following course of action is substituted: "Hold maximum areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia consistent with indigenous capabilities supported by other Allied courses of action."

b. In addition, it appears that the two courses of action pertaining to the security of Iceland and the Azores and of Okinawa—together with those courses which will be developed subsequently involving the securing of other overseas base areas required behind or adjacent to the main defensive areas as offensive or supporting bases, or as necessary to the security of sea and air lines of communications—can be conveniently grouped into a single course of action. Accordingly, the following combined course of action is substituted and added to the list of basic undertakings already selected: "Secure overseas bases essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept."

10. Summary of Selected Courses of Action

Each of the selected courses of action should contribute to or be required by the national objectives, both for peace and war. Certain of the selected courses of action, namely, the "Basic Undertakings" ... and "Other General Courses of Action" . . are of such a nature as to be essential to the maintenance of an adequate military posture to assure the successful prosecution of the war. These, together with the balance of the selected courses of action, are considered to be in furtherance of and in consonance with the ultimate fulfillment of the Allied objectives and would therefore serve to generate the initial tasks of which the Allied "concept of operations" should consist. Not listed in priority, these selected courses of action are:

a. Secure the Western Hemisphere.

b. Conduct an air offensive against the Soviet powers.

c. Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, shipping, naval bases, and supporting facilities.

d. Hold the United Kingdom.

e. Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

f. Hold the area: southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf.

g. Hold maximum areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia consistent with
indigenous capabilities supported by other Allied courses of action.

h. Hold Japan, less Hokkaido.

i. Secure sea and air lines of communication essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept.

j. Secure overseas bases essential to the accomplishment of the overall strategic concept.

k. Expand the overall power of the armed forces for later offensive operations against the Soviet powers.

1. Provide essential aid to our allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the overall strategic concept.

m. Initiate or intensify psychological, economic, and underground warfare.

n. Initiate major offensive land operations against the USSR as required.

o. Establish control and enforce surrender terms in the USSR and satellite countries.

VOLUME 3. THE STRATEGIC COUNTER OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION OF THE USSR.

(PHASE I) DEVELOPMENT OF TASKS AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS

1. General

The purpose of this [section] is to develop further the courses of action selected in the strategic estimate. . . . For planning purposes only, Phase I is considered as covering the period from D-Day to D + 6 months. Although the end of Phase I may occur either earlier or later, the adoption of a different period for planning purposes would not affect the requirements for D-Day forces which are developed herein.

2. Relative Importance of Courses of Action

There is no element of priority indicated in the order of listing of courses of action. It is considered that in a plan of this scope and magnitude no I-2-3 order of priority can be stated, since many courses of action are of equal importance in different spheres of action and/or at different times chronologically. A general measure of the importance of each course of action will be found in the analysis in each case, by the manner it is weighed against enemy capabilities, and in some cases through the expression of its effect on or relationship to other courses of action. While these courses are, in general, so interrelated that the accomplishment of any one is dependent on or greatly influenced by the accomplishment of others, it is considered that the holding of maximum areas in Western Europe and the holding of the United Kingdom are essential to the attainment of our national war objectives.

3. Secure the Western Hemisphere a. Analysis

The bulk of the war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere lies within the borders of the United States. The vital, critical, and most important installations of the United States ... are highly concentrated and hence extremely vulnerable to successful attack by air or sabotage. Their location develops the most important areas of the United States and indicates the areas for which defenses must be considered. These areas contain the majority of our government and control facilities, industrial and population centers, major ports, communications systems, and most of our atomic-energy installations. Destruction or neutralization of certain vital installations could seriously handicap the ability of the United States to mobilize promptly for maximum war effort and delay or weaken the initial offensive and defensive measures required. While a degree of passive defense may be achieved by future dispersion and underground construction, no great change in the relative concentration of industry in these areas is expected by 1957.

Initial enemy capabilities against the Western Hemisphere in 1957 included organized sabotage, air attacks against the most important areas with atomic and conventional weapons, limited guided-missile attacks from surface or subsurface vessels, limited "commando"-type attacks against installations adjacent to the coasts, submarine and mining attacks against shipping, and possible clandestine cargo-ship-borne atomic attacks against important ports and the Panama Canal. Soviet seizure or neutralization of bases in Alaska or in the North Atlantic would greatly increase the threat to vital areas of the Western Hemisphere and limit Allied defensive and offensive capabilities.

Full and complete protection against these enemy capabilities would be prohibitive. A reduction in these capabilities and a consequent reduction in defensive measures required could be effected by a strong Allied counter-air-offensive with atomic and conventional weapons against Soviet facilities for the assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. However, reasonable objectives to provide an appropriate measure of defense would still require:

(1) An adequate early-warning and control network to cover the most important areas and approaches thereto against air attack.

(2) Sufficient all-weather fighters disposed for defense of the most important
areas to impose a distinct threat to an attacking force.

(3) Antiaircraft defense forces disposed primarily for defense of vital installations. Antiaircraft defense forces must be composed mainly of local nonmilitary personnel, assisted by the necessary cadres, and must be trained and used as both antiaircraft and ground-defense forces.

(4) Static defense forces located to provide instant defense of certain vital in stallations against strongly organized sabotage efforts or "suicide" attack by airborne or commando-type landing forces, together with a highly mobile reserve centrally located to provide prompt reinforcement of mini mum static defense forces.

(5) Naval surface and air forces to extend and reinforce the early-warning net and to provide protection for coastwise and inter-coastal shipping and for major ports and naval bases.

(6) A civil-defense organization to provide optimum protection against disaster, panic, and sabotage and to furnish air-warning service. The civil-defense organization, together with other existing organizations (Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, state and local police, Immigration Service), must be organized and prepared to relieve the armed
forces of all primary responsibility in these defense fields.

As the threat of Soviet A-bomb attack increases, heavy pressure on the Department of Defense for maximum protection against air attack of all large populated areas may be expected, regardless of their military importance. Complete protection is not practicable, and attempts to provide it could consume an undue proportion of our available resources without commensurate increase in the degree of protection afforded. In order not to weaken dangerously our offensive capabilities by maintaining a vast defensive organization, a carefully calculated measure of defense should be provided for the most important areas, and except for incidental protection afforded by this defense, a calculated risk must be accepted for other less important areas and installations. Dispersion or duplication of facilities in many cases would be cheaper than provision of complete protection. SUFFICIENT DISPERSION OR DUPLICATION OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS TO ENSURE THAT AN UNACCEPTABLE LOSS IS NOT OCCASIONED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF ANY ONE INSTALLATION MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE SOVIETS HAVE THE ESTIMATED CAPABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACK AGAINST THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS.

Calculation of the fighter and AA defense for the continental United States requires a consideration of the degree of protection to be obtained, together with an estimate of the intensity and duration of the attack. Similarly the degree of protection that may be expected from a given allocation of fighters and AAA [Anti-Aircraft Artillery] to the air-defense mission will depend on the duration and intensity of the attack. Experience during World War II demonstrated that 100-percent protection against determined air attack cannot reasonably be expected and indicated that complete protection could not be achieved without destruction of the enemy capability to launch an air attack. An undue proportion of the national resources could be devoted to purely defensive measures without achieving complete protection. While it has been stated that the Battle of Britain indicated that a determined air defense could make a continuing air offensive too costly for the attacker to maintain, the use of weapons of mass destruction will tremendously increase the effects of air attack when measured in terms of the expected attrition of attacking forces and emphasizes the necessity for stopping such attack at its source.

The foregoing considerations indicate that the allocation of fighters and AAA to defensive tasks should be held to the minimum so as not to commit an undue proportion of the national resources to the impossible task of providing complete protection. It should be possible to reduce initial fighter defenses by the end of Phase I—because of the anticipated reduction in the Soviet air threat in order to permit their redeployment overseas. On the other hand, since AAA battalions in defense of the most vital installations in the United States would be composed mainly of civilian personnel, no redeployment overseas would be feasible and therefore no reduction during Phase I should be contemplated. A carefully calculated risk must be accepted in the computation of air-defense forces, and the appropriate means must be devoted to counter-air-force measures designed to reduce at its source the enemy capability to launch an air attack. These offensive forces are developed under: "Conduct an Air Offensive Against the Soviet Powers.''

In summary the analysis of the problem of air defense of the United States leads to the conclusions that:

(1) The minimum air defense worthy of consideration is that defense in being that will serve as a continuing threat to an attacking force and will cause enemy airplanes to carry protective equipment at the expense of offensive payload. This defense may be expected to reduce the enemy offensive payload capability by about 50 percent [The necessity for defense against enemy attack requires that a large proportion of the combat payload of bombers be devoted to defensive equipment. As a current example a B-36 bomber on a combat mission, carrying ten thousand pounds of bombs, would also carry over thirteen thousand pounds of defensive armament. Thus a defense system in being reduces the bomb-carrying capability of an enemy bomber by approximately 50 percent before actual combat is joined.] but cannot be expected to provide a high degree of protection nor of attrition of enemy forces. It would, however, contribute measurably to civilian morale and serve to avert pressure for provision of
disproportionately large defensive forces.

(2) Beyond the minimum defense defined in (1) above, the added protection that may be expected from additional resources devoted to purely defensive measures must be balanced against that to be gained by offensive counter-air-action. Beyond the degree of minimum defense set forth in (1) above, a point is rapidly reached where resources are more profitably applied in offensive counter-air-force action than in defensive measures.

(3) The optimum air defense of the United States may be obtained by disposing available fighters for area defense, augmented by antiaircraft artillery and/or guided missiles disposed to protect the most vital installations.

A combination of fighter and antiaircraft defenses has therefore been developed . . . which is considered to be as strong as our economy could reasonably be expected to support in the light of overall military requirements. The effectiveness of this air defense will be in direct proportion to the extent and effectiveness of the control and early-warning system provided.

In addition to the above fighter and AA defenses for the continental United States, certain other ground, air, and naval forces would be required. Ground forces in the United States could probably be limited initially to one airborne division prepared to move to any part of the Western Hemisphere and other defense forces equivalent to 2Vi infantry divisions for defense of our most vital installations. Of the 2V4 infantry divisions, VS would be required in the Seattle area, V6 in the San Francisco-Los Angeles-San Diego area, % in the Boston-New York-Washington area, and the remaining 1 division for defense of the Soo locks and certain atomic installations. In the event of emergency, divisions in training could also be utilized. In support of these ground forces, only one tactical reconnaissance group would be required, since other tactical-air-force requirements can be met by the use of U.S. fighter defenses and other air units in training. For protection of coastal shipping and important ports and harbors, escort forces, fleet air squadrons, and naval local-defense forces would be necessary. Requirements for naval forces, unlike those for fighter defenses, would require some increases in the months immediately after D-Day and could probably not be reduced at all during first-phase operations because of increases in the number of convoys to support overseas operations and the continuance of the submarine threat. Outside of the continental United States the peripheral areas and bases necessary to our defense would require one or more of the following: ground forces, air forces, naval local-defense forces, fleet air squadrons, and antiaircraft defenses. These areas and bases include Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Labrador, Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Caribbean area (including Puerto Rico, Cuba, Trinidad, Curasao, Aruba, and Panama), Brazil, and Hawaii.

Alaska is a highly important defense area in the Western Hemisphere. Ground forces required for the defense of Alaska should be limited to those necessary for defense of the airfields in the Fairbanks and Anchorage areas and for defense of the naval base at Kodiak. Fighter and AA protection for these areas should also be included. AA protection for naval and air installations on Adak would be required. Fighters will also be required for intercept missions and for opposing any attempted Soviet lodgements in Alaska or the Aleutians. Naval-fleet air squadrons and naval local-defense forces will also be required. Ground-force and naval-force requirements for peripheral areas and bases other than Alaska are not developed in detail herein but are listed in the tables following this discussion. Ground forces, in general, are principally for defense against Soviet lodgements and sabotage. Naval forces defending bases from submarine attacks would include several patrol craft and minesweepers per base for harbor defense, while one or more heavy or medium patrol squadrons, aided in some cases by blimp squadrons, would be stationed within supporting distance to provide surveillance of areas to seaward.

In Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland the greatest threat would exist on D-Day or shortly thereafter from surprise Soviet airborne and seaborne landings. It is considered that ground forces and accompanying tactical reconnaissance air groups could be reduced progressively beginning at about D + 3 months as the Soviet threats diminish. Except as required for defense of U.S. bases and for the security of Curasao, Aruba, Trinidad, and the Venezuelan oil fields, defense of other Western Hemisphere nations and their possessions should be the primary responsibility of indigenous forces. [See relevant map.] . . .

b. Tasks

(1) Maintain surveillance of the approaches to the North American continent.

(2) Provide an area air defense of the most important areas of the United States.

(3) Provide the antiaircraft defense of the most vital installations of the United States.

(4) Provide for the protection of Western Hemisphere coastal and inter-coastal shipping and of important ports and harbors in the continental United States.

(5) Ensure the security of the refineries on the islands of Curasao, Aruba, and
Trinidad and of associated sources of oil.

(6) Provide the optimum defense against sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

(8) Defend the sea approaches to the North American continent and to its peripheral bases.

(9) Provide the optimum ground-force defense of the most important areas of the continental United States, including a mobile striking force. [See force-requirement chart.] .

4. Conduct an Air Offensive Against the Soviet Powers

a. Analysis

(1) General Considerations: U.S. national policy envisages that "in the event of war with the USSR we" would "create conditions" to attain "U.S. objectives," "ensuring," among others, that "if any Bolshevik regime is left in any part of the Soviet Union," it would "not control enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union to enable it to wage war on comparable terms with any other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional Russian territory." And further, we should seek "to create postwar conditions which will: Prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace." Disruption of centralized Communist control and of the integrated industrial economy which lends it power is an essential step in obtaining those objectives.

Soviet capabilities which pose serious threats to the Allied was effort include attacks with weapons of mass destruction on the United States, Canada, and the united kingdom; conquest of Western Europe, the near and Middle East, and probably the Scandinavian peninsula; and interruption of sea lines of communication by submarine warfare.

It is considered that the most powerful immediately available means of blunting initial Soviet land, sea, and air offensive capabilities, of destroying sufficient of their integrated military-industrial economy to render them unable to wage war successfully, and of weakening centralized Communist control in the USSR and its satellites would be an air offensive with atomic and conventional bombs initiated immediately after D-Day. It is recognized, however, that the scope of attacks of the air offensive must be carefully calculated to obtain only that destruction essential to the fulfillment of the national war objectives.

In addition to the defensive measures developed under "Secure the Western Hemisphere," "Hold the United Kingdom," and other courses of action, protection of Allied war potential against the Soviet air-offensive threat will require an immediate Allied offensive effort to destroy or neutralize the bases and facilities from which the Soviet air offensive with weapons of mass destruction would be launched. This task should be given first priority, providing sufficiently accurate intelligence is available to enable our immediate attack and destruction of these targets. Blunting of Soviet land and sea offensives by air attack against LOCs, supply bases, and troop concentrations directly supporting initial Soviet advances and against naval bases capable of supporting the initial Soviet submarine campaign should also receive a high priority.
The Soviet threat to the Allied air offensive would consist of both offensive and defensive measures. Offensively the Soviets would attack atomic installations in the United States; air bases in the United States, United Kingdom, Cairo-Suez-Aden area, Okinawa, and Alaska which they would consider likely to be used for launching atomic-bomb attacks; and aircraft carriers which they believed capable of performing similar missions. They would probably employ air attacks, sabotage, and airborne troops where practicable. Defensively their capabilities would include a defense-in-depth early-warning network embodying radar and electronics countermeasures, a fighter defense force (PVO) of some 2,100 interceptors which will be mainly jet aircraft, and an antiaircraft defense utilizing both guns and surface-to-air guided missiles. Properly timed and coordinated Allied air attacks conducted from air bases encircling the USSR and from aircraft carriers engaged primarily in attacking naval targets should in a large measure minimize the Soviet air defensive system against our air offensive.

As visualized, the overall air offensive would have as its objectives two separate but related series of operations, not necessarily distinct in point of time— those to abort or blunt Soviet initial offensive capabilities and those to collapse to a calculated degree the military-industrial economy of the USSR.

The campaign to blunt Soviet naval offensive capabilities with Allied naval forces, to include a mining offensive, is discussed, analyzed, and the forces therefore developed under: "Conduct Offensive Operations to Destroy Enemy Naval Forces," etc.

(2) Target Systems: The blunting of Soviet air, land, and sea offensives against the Allied war-making capacity should be the initial mission of our striking forces. Simultaneous air offensives would be required against:

i. Soviet facilities for the assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

ii. LOCs, supply bases, and troop concentrations in the USSR, in satellite countries, and in overrun areas, the destruction of which would blunt Soviet offensives.

iii. Naval targets of the Soviet powers, to blunt Soviet sea offensives by the destruction of enemy naval and merchant shipping, submarine assembly and repair facilities, naval bases, and the air defenses of such supporting facilities and with emphasis on the reduction of Soviet submarine capabilities and the offensive mining of enemy waters.

At the earliest practicable moment, air attacks should be undertaken against important elements of the Soviet and satellite industrial economy. These operations are further analyzed as follows:

(a) Strategic air attacks against Soviet facilities for assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. Present intelligence is inadequate to provide a firm determination as to the requirements for attack on facilities for the assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. However, it is considered that this deficiency will probably be remedied by 1957. The importance of our being fully prepared for this operation cannot be overemphasized. Its immediate and effective accomplishment upon the outset of hostilities would have not only a stunning effect on Soviet offensive capabilities but would progressively reduce the forces required for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the United Kingdom. In point of fact the calculated risks which have been accepted in these two defensive tasks in this plan for 1957 would no longer be acceptable were not this attack made the first charge on the operations of our strategic air forces.

In spite of the inadequacy of present intelligence it is considered that a reasonable requirement for attacks on atomic-assembly facilities, storage points, and heavy-bomber airfields considered likely to be used for launching atomic attacks might be on the order of seventy-five to one hundred atomic bombs on target. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness, this campaign should be completed at the earliest possible date. Since it is envisaged that during this campaign each bomb carrier would have four accompanying aircraft to provide electronics countermeasures and other defensive coverage as well as to increase the probability of successful delivery of the A-bombs, about eleven heavy and medium groups would be required to conduct this offensive.

(b) Strategic air attacks against LOCs, supply bases, and troop concentrations. An important element in blunting Soviet offensives would be the use of atomic weapons and conventional bombs against LOCs, supply bases, and troop concentrations in the USSR, in the satellites, and in overrun countries which directly support Soviet advances. The use of atomic bombs against satellite and overrun areas, however, should be confined as far as possible to those targets the destruction of which would not involve large masses of population. These attacks, beginning immediately after D-Day, should be carried out in coordination with and supplemental to the operations of the tactical air and naval air elements which are developed under other tasks. Studies are currently under way to establish firm requirements for this campaign. However, as a result of preliminary examinations of the problem, it is considered that a reasonable requirement for atomic bombs on target for this purpose might be on the order of an additional one hundred atomic bombs of a type not now available but which are considered capable of development and production in sufficient quantity by 1957. This number includes the atomic bombs which might be required in the attack against Soviet naval capabilities.

The forces required for attacking those targets located in Western Europe—in addition to those established in the courses of action "Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave line" and "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc.—would be on the order of about twelve medium bomb groups based in the United Kingdom.[ Of this total, the equivalent of seven groups (210 a/c) should be provided by the British Commonwealth]

The forces required for attacking those targets located in the Middle East—in addition to those developed under the courses of action "Hold the area: southeastern Turkey," etc., and "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc.—would be on the order of about three medium bomb groups based in the Cairo-Suez-Aden area.

(c) Air attacks against naval targets of the Soviet powers to blunt Soviet sea offensives, including offensive mining, is discussed and the requirements therefore developed under "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc.,

(d) Strategic air attacks on important elements of Soviet and satellite military-industrial economy. In a campaign employing atomic and conventional bombs against Soviet and satellite industry, the latest available air-force intelligence studies have concluded that the greatest overall effects can be achieved by attacking the petroleum industry, the electric power system, and the iron and steel industry. Destruction of 75-85 percent of (the] petroleum industry, including storage facilities, would reduce offensive capabilities of all Soviet forces and seriously affect agriculture, industry, transportation, and shipping; destruction of 60-70 percent of the important electric-power-grid systems would paralyze the Soviet industrial economy, since modern industry requires a continuous supply of electric power, which cannot be stockpiled; elimination of 75-85 percent of [the] iron- and steel-producing facilities would prevent recovery of industrial capacity for two to three years. Important byproducts of attacks on these systems would be destruction of political and administrative centers and internal communication systems; in addition there would probably be an extreme psychological effect, which if exploited might induce early capitulation.
In initiating the air offensive against the above target systems, it is considered that attacks should first be directed against those in the USSR itself in order that we might strike at the heart of Soviet industrial power and exploit to full advantage the psychological effects of this campaign. Upon completion of this offensive, attacks should be shifted to key satellite industries whenever it is determined that they are making a significant contribution to the Soviet war effort.

. . . Additional intelligence of the Soviet economy may indicate revisions in this program as time goes on. It is considered, however, that this program is adequate for the present purpose of providing a basis for the establishment of force requirements for 1957. Accomplishment of these operations . . . would serve to fulfill the objective of disrupting the Soviet and, if necessary, the satellite economies for two to three years. It is envisaged that initial attacks would be in maximum force on USSR targets alone, to be followed by progressively widening attacks on elements in the program as destructive and psychological results were evaluated. Seven heavy- and medium-bomber groups would be required to provide the optimum capability for this task.
Air assistance would be provided by Allied naval forces when available from primary tasks.

(3) Summary. The separate force requirements developed above, if added together, would be on the order of 33 heavy and medium bomb groups. It is considered, however, that in view of the flexibility inherent in the strategic air operations envisaged with regard to selection of targets and time phasing of attacks, and having due regard for the logistics involved, the attack on Soviet industry could be initiated and conducted by the same groups which conduct the attacks on Soviet offensive capabilities. The optimum U.S. force requirements for the performance of these tasks could therefore be reduced to nineteen heavy and medium bomb groups on D-Day. The RAF requirement would be seven medium bomb groups. It would be highly desirable if these groups could be provided with a reserve of aircraft for replacing combat losses during the first six months. However, preliminary cost estimates have shown that a pre-D-Day program of this magnitude would increase the military budget to an unacceptable degree. An alternative would be to reduce the number of combat groups in order to provide a reserve of planes for replacement of combat losses. This, however, would also reduce the magnitude of the initial air attacks against the USSR. It is therefore concluded that greater returns could be expected, commensurate with the cost factor, if the strategic air offensive were initiated with the maximum possible number of combat groups, accepting attrition with only partial replacement, as opposed to initiating the strategic air offensive with a smaller number of combat groups backed up by an adequate reserve for replacing combat losses. It is estimated that the operational strength of the nineteen U.S. groups conducting the above campaigns would probably not fall below 50 percent of total initial strength during the first phase. A similar loss rate would probably be applicable to British Commonwealth air units required above.

Supporting reconnaissance groups for the bomber forces listed above would be on the order of about four strategic reconnaissance groups—one of which should be British—and two strategic weather groups. Attrition for reconnaissance aircraft would be about 50 percent of initial strength during the first-phase operations, but these losses should be replaced in all areas except the United Kingdom. Strategic weather aircraft would not be exposed to enemy attacks and would suffer only operational losses.

b. Tasks

(1) Initiate, as soon as possible after D-Day, strategic air attacks with atomic and conventional bombs against Soviet facilities for the assembly and delivery of weapons of mass destruction against LOCs, supply bases, and troop concentrations in the USSR, in satellite countries, and in overrun areas, which would blunt Soviet offensives, and against petroleum, electric power, and steel target systems in the USSR, from bases in the United States, Alaska, Okinawa, the United Kingdom, and the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and from aircraft carriers when available from primary tasks.

(2) Initiate, as soon as possible after D-Day, air operations against naval targets of the Soviet powers to blunt Soviet sea offensives with emphasis on the reduction of Soviet submarine capabilities and the offensive mining of enemy waters.

(3) Extend operations as necessary to additional targets both within and out side the USSR essential to the war-making capacity of the Soviet powers.

(4) Maintain policing of target systems reduced in the initial campaigns.

c. Requirements. [See map]

5. Conduct Offensive Operations to Destroy Enemy Naval Forces, Shipping, Naval Bases, and Supporting Facilities

a. Analysis

The principal threat from Soviet naval forces would lie in their submarine capabilities, which are analyzed under "Secure sea and air lines of communication," etc. While Soviet naval surface forces would probably not be of sufficient strength to challenge openly [the] Allied control of the sea, they would be capable of harassing attacks and of serious interference with sea LOCs in limited areas, which could require uneconomical diversion of Allied heavy units to convoy duty. Enemy shore-based aircraft would constitute an effective threat against Allied shipping, ports, and their approaches within range. Soviet merchant shipping would be an appreciable adjunct to their transportation system, as well as affording troop lift and auxiliary means of supply in the execution of their campaigns.

Offensive operations against the source of these threats are considered the most effective and least expensive means of neutralizing them. These operations would have as their primary objectives the destruction of enemy naval and merchant shipping, submarine assembly and repair facilities, naval bases, and the air defenses of such supporting facilities. For location of these targets, see map. Included also would be offensive mining of sea approaches to enemy ports and bases, hunter-killer operations, antisubmarine submarine operations, and the destruction of enemy naval surface forces which get to sea. . . .

Operations against those targets constituting the source of Soviet naval strength would be conducted principally by fast carrier task forces, hunter-killer groups, and submarines, assisted by land-based air. In view of the extensive area to be controlled in the western Pacific and as an economical means of providing naval surface support to the theaters concerned where and when needed or to reinforce the carrier task group, a small cruiser task group is required in addition to the fast carrier task group.

The air elements of the forces generated by this course of action would participate in the air offensive, in coordination with the Allied air forces, when available from primary tasks. Air assistance in mining and other appropriate tasks would be provided by Allied air forces shown under "Conduct an air offensive," etc.

Disposition of forces for conducting offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, etc., is shown on the map.

Forces for this course of action—together with forces shown under "Secure sea and air LOCs," etc. . . .—are also shown on the maps. . . .

b. Tasks

(1) Destroy Soviet naval forces, shipping, naval bases, supporting facilities and their air defenses. .
(2) Mine important enemy ports, and focal sea approaches thereto, in the Baltic-Barents-White Sea area, northeast Asia, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, and the Turkish straits.

(3) Establish a sea blockade of the Soviet powers.

c. Requirements.

(1) Army. None.

6. Hold the United Kingdom,

a. Analysis

Defense of the United Kingdom would retain for the Allies a wealth of manpower and industrial potential; a major base for air, naval, and ground operations against Western and Northern Europe (including the western USSR); and an incalculable political and psychological asset with respect to other allies and potential allies. Loss of the United Kingdom would not only deny these advantages to the Allies but in addition would greatly augment the military and possibly the industrial potential available to the Soviets.

It is estimated that the principal threat to the United Kingdom, beginning on D-Day, would be an assault by the Soviet long-range air force (D-Day total in USSR-'eighteen hundred), probably with weapons of mass destruction. Some of the five thousand Soviet tactical aircraft in Western Europe could assist in this task and also support the expected submarine offensive against British ports and sea communications. In addition, Soviet saboteurs would probably make a strong effort to assist the overall plan.

The Soviet long-range air force would be faced with two major tasks: attacks against the United States and attacks against the United Kingdom. Since its objectives might differ widely geographically from day to day, any estimate of the proportion of this force which would be devoted to a particular target area might be misleading and, at best, would be of doubtful value. However, for planning purposes it appears reasonable to assume that of the total of eighteen hundred* long-range bombers available to the Soviets, as many as one thousand might initially be assigned the task of attacking the United Kingdom. Fighter escort for these bombers might not be significant initially, but a considerable number of these escorts could be expected about D+1 month, or as soon as the Soviets had established fighter airfields closer to the United Kingdom.

Except for the initial attacks on D-Day the maximum scale of Soviet air attack would probably be considerably less than the totals available, since operational availability of Soviet bombers may become as low as 50 percent. For planning purposes no more than about five hundred bombers per attack would be expected on a continuing basis.

British planners have estimated that in 1957 they could force the Soviets to cease sustained operations against the United Kingdom if RAF fighters could intercept maximum Soviet attacks on a ratio of one RAF fighter to two Soviet bombers. Assuming a fighter operational availability of 75 percent, the RAF has estimated that it would need about 350 fighters if all fighters were in a position to intercept. Since fighters based in the south of England would probably be unable to intercept Soviet bombers attacking targets in the north of England and vice versa, the requirement for fighters would have to be doubled. The initial aircraft requirement for defense against bombers would therefore become about 700 fighters. As soon as the Soviets provide fighter escort, an increased requirement would develop. This might be as much as 200 additional fighters. The total requirement for air defense of the United Kingdom would then increase to about 900* fighters, all of which should be high-performance all-weather interceptors. In addition to these there would be a need for AA defenses and control and warning squadrons. Since it is considered unlikely that Soviet airborne attacks would be made against the United Kingdom as long as the line of the Rhine was held by the Allies, it is believed that home-guard units and other forces in training would be sufficient for ground defense and protection against saboteurs.

It is believed that the United Kingdom would not be initially subjected to serious harassing attacks by short-range Soviet tactical aircraft since most of these aircraft will be required in support of Soviet operations against the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

The conduct of the air offensive will require the availability of selected air bases in the United Kingdom which could be operational on or immediately after D-Day. The requirements for this course of action are covered under: "Conduct an air offensive," etc.

Defense against the submarine offensive against sea communications to the United Kingdom would require a major effort by Allied naval forces. This task is covered under "Secure sea and air lines of communication," etc., and "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc.

b. Tasks

(1) Maintain surveillance of the approaches to the United Kingdom.

(2) Provide the air defense of the most critical areas of the United Kingdom.

(3) Provide the anti-aircraft defense of the most critical areas of the United Kingdom.

(4) Provide for the protection of United Kingdom coastal shipping and of important ports and harbors in the United Kingdom.

(5) Provide the optimum defense against sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

(6) Provide the optimum ground-force defense of the most critical areas of the United Kingdom.

7. Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave Line

a. Analysis

Defense of the line Rhine-Alps-Piave River retains in Allied hands the bulk of the manpower and industrial resources of Western Europe, takes advantage of the terrain most favorable to the defense, and lends depth to the defense of bases in the United Kingdom and in Western Europe. The Soviets will appreciate that Allied retention of this line would greatly facilitate the overall Allied strategy and will endeavor to seize critical points along this line before they can be defended in sufficient force by the Allies. The advantages to the Allies of holding on the Rhine-Alps-Piave River line, as compared to any position west of that line, are so great as to warrant maximum effort to hold on this line from D-Day onward.

The Soviet threat to the Rhine River line would probably materialize on D-Day with airdrops on selected Rhine River bridges. Airborne units allocated for these missions might total the equivalent of two divisions. Within five days the Soviets could probably have fifteen divisions at the Rhine River line with a buildup to a maximum of one hundred divisions in thirty days. Both during this period and thereafter the Soviet buildup would be limited by logistic considerations. It is considered, however, that the execution of planned demolitions and air interdiction of LOCs as envisaged in this plan would limit Soviet capabilities, during the first six months, to logistic support of a maximum of one hundred divisions and accompanying air units on the Rhine line. (See the interdiction task as covered under "Conduct an air offensive," etc.).

The threat to the Alps-Piave River line would come initially from the Yugoslavs, who would probably have available upwards of fifteen divisions. These would probably be supported by about six hundred combat tactical aircraft, two-thirds of which would be Yugoslav. The Soviets could reinforce the above forces with about ten divisions, if necessary, early in the campaign.[ If the present defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet satellite orbit should continue to 1957, it is not likely that Yugoslavia would ally with the Soviet Union but would attempt to remain neutral and would be committed to resist Soviet and/or satellite attack. In any event, the Soviet Union should be able to deal with the situation effectively and complete the Italian campaign with a delay of one to three months. Additional Soviet forces required should not materially detract from capabilities in other areas.]

The Rhine River portion of this line extends for approximately five hundred miles from the Zuider Zee to the Swiss border. Its principal topographical features, from north to south, are as follows:

(1) The Dutch lowlands and Cologne plain, extending about two hundred miles
inland from the Zuider Zee and containing the majority of the LOCs and Rhine bridges.

(2) The Rhine highlands, with elevations up to three thousand feet, extending about 175 miles south from Bonn.

(3) The Vosges Mountains, with maximum elevations of four thousand feet, extending for approximately 125 miles to the south from the area opposite Karlsruhe.

(4) The Belfort Gap.

Ground-force requirements for defense of the Rhine River line are esimated at 60 divisions (including 12 armored divisions).* An estimated 20 divisions would be required for defense of the Dutch lowlands and Cologne plain, 12 divisions for the Rhine highlands, 5 divisions for the Vosges, and 3 divisions for the Belfort Gap. An estimated 20 divisions would be required for general reserve.

Initial requirements for the tactical air support of the Rhine River defenses would be approximately 26 groups of fighters, 6 groups of light bombers, and 6 groups of tactical reconnaissance aircraft. About 7 additional groups of all-weather interceptor aircraft would be required for defense of Allied areas west of the Rhine River defenses. The above requirements total 45 groups or approximately 3,100 aircraft. Attacks against Soviet bases and LOCs in eastern Germany and Poland would require medium bombers, the requirements for which are established under "Conduct an air offensive," etc.

The principal topographical features along the Alps-Piave River line are:

(1) The Alps—about 150 miles of extremely rugged mountainous terrain, with
few routes of approach and relatively easy to defend.

(2) The Dolomites—approximately 95 miles along the Piave River through the
rugged Dolomite Alps to the Venetian lowlands.

(3) The lowlands—approximately 50 miles of line behind the Piave River through the lowlands to the Adriatic.

Defense requirements for the Alps-Piave line are estimated at 3 (mountain) divisions each for the Alps and the Dolomites, with 7 divisions (including 1 armored division) for defense of the lowlands. An additional 3 divisions, one of which should be an armored division, would be required in general reserve.

Initial requirements for tactical air support of the Alps-Piave line would be about 4 fighter groups, 1 light-bomber group, and 1 tactical reconnaissance group. At least 2 all-weather interceptor groups would be required for defense of areas in rear of the Alps-Piave line. The above requirements total 8 groups or approximately 550 aircraft.

In addition to the above ground and air forces, antiaircraft defenses would also be required for areas in rear of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line. . . .

. . . Escort and naval local defense forces would be necessary for the defense of coastal shipping and focal ports in Western Europe.

b. Tasks

(1) Provide the ground-force defense of the Rhine River line from Switzerland to the Zuider Zee.

(2) Provide the ground-force defense of Italy along the Alps-Piave River line.

(3) Provide tactical air support of Allied ground forces along the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(4) Accomplish planned demolitions and interdict Soviet LOCs east of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(5) Provide air defense of areas west of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(6) Provide AA defenses for areas west of the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(7) Gain and maintain air superiority over the Rhine-Alps-Piave line.

(8) Provide for the protection of Allied coastal shipping and of important ports and harbors in Western Europe. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

8. Hold the Area Southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf

a. Analysis

Defense of this area protects the Near and Middle East oil fields and the Cairo-Suez-Aden area from overland assault and lends depth to their defense against air attack. It secures the Suez Canal and important air and naval bases and LOCs in the area and lends strength to the defense of the eastern Mediterranean area. Making all practicable use of available Turkish forces and of the rugged terrain and vulnerable LOCs generally north and east of the area, it provides an integrated defense of the area at minimum cost.

The Soviet threat to this area stems from two probable campaigns: the one to overrun Turkey and the other through Iran to seize the Near and Middle East oil fields. A total of about 33 Soviet divisions and 1,400 aircraft would probably be utilized initially in the Turkish campaign, and 16 Soviet divisions and 600 aircraft would probably be used initially in the Near and Middle East thrusts. In addition the Soviets would have the capability of employing 3—4 airborne brigades against the Basra—Abadan and Bahrein—Dhahran areas on D-Day. The difficult and most vulnerable aspects of these campaigns are the mountainous terrain and the long, tenuous, and easily blocked LOCs required. It is estimated that Soviet forces, operating against indigenous resistance only, could reach the Iskenderun area by D + 5 months and the Iran-Iraq passes before D+1 month. In the Bahrein-Dhahran area there are several facilities which should be given protection on D-Day. These are the airfields, principally the U.S.-built airfield at Dhahran; the refinery on Bahrein Island, which is approximately thirty-five miles southeast of Dhahran; the refinery at Ras Tanura about thirty miles north of Dhahran; and the associated installations.

It is estimated that one RCT should be sufficient to provide the ground defense of these areas. This requirement could be somewhat reduced by organizing and arming the American civilians in the above areas. Since Soviet initial threats would be confined to limited bombing and airborne attacks, air defenses required should not exceed one fighter group and a small amount of antiaircraft. It is unlikely that bombing of the refinery areas could be completely prevented, but damage could be minimized and severe losses probably could be inflicted on the attacking forces. Soviet airborne attacks, unless heavily escorted, would also be extremely vulnerable to fighter attacks, and any attempted air resupply could be seriously interfered with.

In the Basra-Abadan area the principal facilities requiring protection on D-Day will be the Abadan refinery, its associated installations, and the oil fields 80-130 miles to the north and east. In addition the key communication and port facilities should be defended.

It is estimated that one U.S. or British infantry division in addition to indigenous forces would be required to ensure the defense of this area against Soviet D-Day airborne capabilities. Allied combat aircraft requirements on D-Day in the Basra-Abadan area would be three fighter groups to maintain air superiority and to furnish protection against airborne or bombing attacks. Antiaircraft defense would also be required to protect the most important facilities in this area.
The optimum means of providing the defense of the foregoing installations would be through arrangements with Iraq, Iran, Bahrein, and Saudi Arabia whereby the required forces could be in place prior to D-Day. Arrangements should be concluded whereby the nucleus of such forces could be in the Basra-Abadan and Bahrein-Dhahran areas on a continuing basis, ostensibly for other purposes such as the training of indigenous forces. In this respect the British would seem to be in the best position under current treaty provisions with Iraq, and accordingly the initial defense of the Basra-Abadan installations should be a British responsibility. Through an extension of the Dhahran air-base arrangement with Saudi Arabia, provision should be made for the introduction of U.S. ground forces into that area prior to D-Day. The rapid introduction of air units would present less difficulty in an emergency. Failing arrangements for pre-D-

Day introduction of the necessary ground forces for defense, the initial ground defense could be provided from marine forces afloat in the Mediterranean, which in any case should be available for emergency use in the area.

In order to prevent Soviet advances through the mountains of Iran into Iraq and the Iranian oil areas, Allied planned ground demolition and air interdiction of LOCs to those areas would be required, and Allied ground forces would have to defend the mountain passes. There are three principal passes; they are on the Tehran-Hamadan-Abadan road, the Hamadan-Kermanshah-Baghdad road, and the Dzulfa-Mehabad-Mosul road. There is only one railroad that reaches the Iraq border from Iran (Bandar Shah-Tehran-Abadan), and it is extremely vulnerable to demolition and air interdiction. Assuming effective implementation of planned ground demolitions followed by air interdiction immediately after D-Day of the LOCs leading through Iran, it is believed that Allied ground forces would probably not have to be in position to defend these passes until about D+ 1 month.

Two divisions, additional to the one already in the Basra—Abadan area would be required at about this time to block Soviet advances in these areas. The fighter groups already in the Basra-Abadan area should provide tactical air support for Allied ground forces and assist in attacks against Soviet LOCs through Iran. About one additional light bomb group, however, should be provided for air interdiction and ground support. Further assistance to Allied ground forces would be furnished by carrier and land-based aircraft engaged in air interdiction as covered in other courses of action. AA defenses would also be required at Baghdad and Mosul.

Defense of southeastern Turkey could be conducted along the general line SiMfke—Cilician Gates-Malatya-Van Golu to the junction of the Turkish-Iraq-Iran borders. The left anchor of this line would be in the generally high and rugged Taurus Mountains. The right flank would be anchored in the even more mountainous regions north and east of Mosul. The regions between are only slightly less high and rugged. The few routes leading into this area from the north are generally poor land) extremely vulnerable and could be easily blocked. The principal one of these routes would be through the Taurus Mountains (Cilician Gates) into the Iskenderun area, with a secondary route leading from the north into Malatya. Except for these two routes no others of any significance exist.

It is estimated that with proper advance planning approximately eleven Turkish divisions could be reasonably expected to be able to withdraw to this defense line. In addition to these Turkish divisions approximately four Allied divisions (three infantry and one armored) would be required to bolster the Turkish defenses; of these, two infantry and one armored should be provided by the U.S. and one infantry by the British. These divisions would probably have to be in position by not later than D + 6 months.

Allied air forces assisting in defense of southeastern Turkey would be required to maintain air superiority over the battle areas, interdict Soviet LOCs, and furnish support to ground forces as required. It is estimated that, in addition to the one Egyptian fighter group already in the Cairo-Suez area, one fighter group should be in the Mosul area by D + 4 months and four groups plus one light bomb group and one tactical reconnaissance group should be in the Iskenderun-Aleppo area by D + 4 months. The fighter group in the Mosul area should be British; those groups in the Iskenderun-Aleppo area would probably have to be supplied by the United States. These groups would be assisted by carrier and land-based aircraft engaged in air interdiction of Soviet LOC's. . . . AA protection for installations in the Iskenderun-Aleppo area and the LOCs southward would also be required at D + 4 months. [See relevant map.] . . .

b. Tasks

(1) Provide the ground, air, and AA defenses of the refineries and associated installations at Bahrein and Ras Tanura and the airfield at Dhahran.

(2) Provide the ground, air, and AA defenses of the Abadan refinery, its associated installations and oil fields, and the key communications and port facilities in that area.

(3) Accomplish planned demolitions and air interdiction of the Soviet LOCs leading through Iran and Turkey.

(4) Gain and maintain air superiority over the Iranian mountain passes and over the southeastern Turkey battle areas.

(5) Provide the ground-force defense of the mountain passes leading into Iraq and the Iranian oil areas.

(6) Provide the ground-force defense of southeastern Turkey.

(7) Provide tactical air support of Allied ground forces.

(8) Provide AA protection for Baghdad, Mosul, the Iskenderun-Aleppo area and the LOCs southward from the latter.

(9) Provide naval local-defense forces in the Bahrein-Dhahran area.

(10) Provide a floating reserve of ground forces. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

9. Hold Maximum Areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia Consistent with Indigenous Capabilities Supported by Other Allied Courses of Action

a. Analysis

The principal Allied interests in the countries of the Middle East and Far East would be the retention of the oil-bearing areas of Iran and the economic resources of the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the East Indies; their denial to the USSR; and the protection of our LOCs. Limitation of further Communist or Soviet advances in Southeast Asia would be particularly desirable in order to provide additional security for Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines and to strengthen our position relative to our long-term objectives in the Far East.

Since securing the oil-bearing areas of Iran has been covered under "Hold the area: Southeastern Turkey," etc., no further discussion of this task is necessary. In southeastern Iran, however, a small Soviet threat to Allied use of the Persian Gulf would develop at Bandar Abbas ... at about D + 2 months, since by that time the Soviets would have the capability of consolidating in that area an estimated one line division and fifty combat aircraft. However, the LOC from the Caspian Sea area to Bandar Abbas would present a most difficult logistic problem to the Soviets, since it would be long, tenuous, and easily disrupted. Allied combat aircraft . . . could neutralize Soviet forces in Bandar Abbas by virtue of their ability to attack that area and interdict the LOC leading thereto.

The significant threats to the Indian subcontinent would be, first, the possibility of air attack by the Soviet long-range force and second, the danger of infiltration, underground action, and possibly open attack by indigenous Communist forces in Southeast Asia. The air threat would probably be materially reduced by the Allied air offensive and by other operations in the oil-bearing areas. Likewise any Soviet invasion would be confronted by difficult terrain and poor communications. Inasmuch as it is assumed that the armed forces of India and Pakistan would be able to defend those countries against the threat of the indigenous Communist forces in Southeast Asia, it is considered that no additional Allied forces are required in the Indian subcontinent.

Other areas of Southeast Asia—notably Malaya, Burma, and Indochina— would probably be threatened considerably by indigenous Communist forces, possibly reinforced by Chinese Communists, which would be attempting to seize control of local governments and thus deny Allied access to the resources of those areas. It is considered that this threat must be accepted since the necessity for husbanding Allied resources will preclude the allocation of major forces to defend these areas. In Malaya, however, the importance of the natural rubber-producing areas would justify a requirement for 1 British infantry division and 'A fighter group for their protection.
Although it should be possible to retain Formosa under Allied influence, elsewhere in China the Communist and Soviet freedom of action would be such that their forces could push as far into south China as required by Soviet plans.

Because of the disproportionately large forces required to oppose further Communist or Soviet advances into south China, with respect to the results that could be obtained, the introduction of Allied forces onto the mainland of China would be unprofitable. The most suitable alternative would be to assist the non-Communist Chinese by air and naval supporting action from bases outside the Chinese mainland. This action would consist of attacks on land and sea LOCs leading into China and enemy bases in China, by land-based air in Japan and Okinawa and by carrier and cruiser task forces based in the western Pacific. Psychological, economic, and underground warfare measures should also be intensified.

b. Tasks

(1) Conduct air attacks against Soviet forces which threaten Bandar Abbas and interdict the LOC leading thereto.

(2) Provide ground and air defenses against indigenous Communist forces in Malaya.

(3) Interdict Soviet land and sea LOCs leading into China and neutralize enemy bases in China. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

10. Hold Japan less Hokkaido

a. Analysis

Seizure and control of Japan by the Soviets would add the Japanese industrial capacity and technical ability to the Soviet war potential, provide the Soviets with additional air and naval bases in the Pacific, and present a threat to the security of Okinawa. Soviet attacks on the Japanese Islands, unless resulting in the capture and holding of one or more of the main islands, present no serious threat to the Allied strategic concept, and Allied forces committed to the defense of Japan should be kept to the minimum necessary to prevent Soviet invasion and occupation.
The principal Soviet threat to Japan would be an amphibious assault accompanied by airborne landings prefaced and supported by strong air attacks.

The Soviets probably initially would have an estimated 20 line divisions and 2,800 combat aircraft—together with elements of the long-range air force— available for all operations in the Far East. Utilizing 2-3 divisions from this total and supported by aircraft based in Sakhalin and the Kurils, the Soviets could probably seize Hokkaido. Assault of the other main islands would depend upon the availability of the necessary airlift, shipping, and naval support, which might be required to satisfy higher-priority operations in other theaters. Amphibious attacks could develop from Korea against northern Kyushu and southern Honshu, and airborne landings could be made to seize the Kanto plain.

Because of the relative lack of importance of Hokkaido, the comparative ease with which the Soviets could seize it with forces based in Sakhalin and the Kurils, and the disproportionately large additional forces required for its defense, it is considered infeasible to provide ground and air forces on Hokkaido for its defense.

Organization, equipment, and training of Japanese forces would reduce the requirement for U.S. forces in defense of Japan. Five Japanese infantry divisions, fully armed and equipped, and five Japanese security divisions for guarding vital installations and lines of communication would reduce the requirement for V.S. ground forces to two infantry divisions. Unless the indicated Japanese infantry divisions are provided, at least two additional U.S. infantry divisions would be required for the defense of Japan. Provision of Japanese non-combat air units, naval local-defense forces, and logistic supporting units would reduce U.S. commitments.

To meet the above threats, forces estimated at I U.S. infantry division, 2 Japanese divisions, 1 fighter group, and VS of an all-weather interceptor group would be required in the northern Kyushu-southern Honshu area, and 3 Japanese divisions, 1 fighter group, and 1/3 of an all-weather interceptor group in the extreme northern Honshu area. One U.S. infantry division and one all-weather interceptor group would be required in the Kanto plain to protect that area from airborne attacks and to serve as a general reserve. AA defenses would also be required. Five Japanese divisions equipped on an austerity basis should be sufficient for internal-security duties guarding vital installations and lines of communication. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

11. Secure Sea and Air Lines of Communication Essential to the Accomplishment of the Overall Strategic Concept

a. Analysis

Planned Soviet aggression would include initial deployment of Soviet forces to interrupt critical Allied sea and air lines of communication. Allied plans for initial deployment must include adequate measures to prevent unacceptable losses during this period, particularly losses from submarine action. Until eliminated or greatly reduced, the Soviet submarine capability would present a serious threat to Allied sea communications.

While the enemy submarines would present the principal threat to Allied shipping, the Soviets would be capable of a considerable mining effort against Allied ports and their focal approaches. Enemy land-based air and surface naval forces would present a lesser threat to essential sea LOCs.

The Soviet capability to interrupt air LOCs would consist principally of the possible seizure or neutralization of certain air bases along such lines. A limited capability would exist in some areas for attack on aircraft en route. Although the North Atlantic and northwest Pacific would appear to be the only areas m which these capabilities could be exercised initially, Soviet seizure or neutralization of one or more bases in these areas would require an undesirable diversion of Allied means for their recapture and/or rehabilitation and might delay Allied deployment.
In 1957 it is estimated that the USSR will have between 300 and 350 ocean-type submarines, of which about 50 percent are expected to be capable of high submerged speed, and between 200 and 300 submarines of the coastal-defense type. On the basis of an expected radius of action of about six thousand nautical miles for the ocean-going types, Soviet submarines could operate in the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean, the Alaskan and Caribbean areas, and the coastal waters of the United States and Canada. It is possible (with refueling clandestinely or at sea) that limited operations could be conducted in the Indian Ocean. In general, the expected submarine density in any area (and hence the threat) would vary inversely as the distance from the submarines' bases, other factors being equal. It is possible that initially as many as 40-50 percent of the Soviet submarine fleet could be at sea; thereafter about V4-V4 on patrol might be a reasonable expectancy. Russian surface forces built around an estimated 30 cruisers (heavy and light) would constitute a potential but lesser threat to our LOC. It is not expected that their surface forces, except for raiders, would operate far beyond the umbrella of Soviet shore-based air. Unless they are contained or destroyed, however, the defense of convoys would have to include uneconomical use of heavy units.

The three principal methods of controlling our lines of communication are through:

(1) Attack on enemy threat at source.

(2) Offensive control.

(3) Defensive control.

The attack at source includes destruction of enemy submarine production and repair facilities, operating bases, ships, and supporting facilities including defensive air. Offensive control includes offensive mining of approaches to enemy ports and bases, hunter-killer operations, antisubmarine submarine operations, and interception and destruction of enemy naval surface forces which get to sea. Defensive control includes convoy escort (both surface and air), defensive mining, and arming of merchant ships. All three methods will be required and are mutually supporting. The more effective the offensive methods, the less the need for the purely defensive and the less the forces required therefor. Further, the elusive qualities of the modern submarine and the effectiveness of the long-range, pattern-running torpedo emphasize the importance of the attack on this enemy threat at source.

Essential sea and air lines of communication and the Soviet submarine threat to them are shown on the map . .

It is considered that ground and air defenses of air LOC bases within effective range of Soviet air attack would be provided by Allied forces listed under other courses of action. At bases where no Allied defense forces are provided under other courses of action and which may be exposed to sporadic air or surface raids, sufficient qualified personnel should be provided to maintain defensive equipment and instruct the local base operating personnel in its use.

Fighter defense of convoys would be essential only in areas where enemy air attack would be a normal expectancy. Defense of convoys in areas where only sporadic air attacks could be expected should be limited to antiaircraft defense provided by convoy escorts. Forces provided under other courses of action are considered adequate to provide essential fighter protection for convoys except in the Mediterranean between Crete and Cyrenaica. It is estimated that Vs day fighter group and V4 night fighter group would be required to provide for this area. . . .

b. Tasks

(1) Establish a convoy system and control and routing of shipping.

(2) Provide convoy air and surface escorts.

(3) Provide air defense of convoys within effective range of enemy air. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

12. Secure Overseas Bases Essential to the Accomplishment of the Overall Strategic Concept

a. Immediately After D-Day Provide Forces by Air and Sea Transport to Occupy or Recapture Iceland and the Azores and Establish Necessary Air and Naval Bases Thereon

(I) Analysis

(a) Iceland. The security of Iceland should be assured by the Allies because of its strategic location with respect to offensive air and naval bases and sea and air LOCs. While it may not be required for the strategic air offensive as long as the United Kingdom is held, it would be of great value to Allied forces as a base for staging aircraft, for support of submarine operations, ASW operations, and a fast-carrier support group. It should also be denied to the Soviets as a base for reconnaissance, early warning, and bomber staging.

Seizure or destruction of established or potential bases in Iceland by air, naval, and limited airborne attacks would be the principal Soviet threats requiring counteraction by U.S. forces. In addition sabotage could be employed against important facilities. In a surprise movement on D-Day, airborne and seaborne troops and supplies could be landed, but these units would ultimately be lost because of difficulties of re-supply due to Allied counteraction.

In order to secure Iceland, one RCT and one composite fighter group— together with necessary AA protection—should be established in Iceland via airlift immediately after D-Day or before, if practicable. Naval forces for local defense would be required as soon afterward as possible. However, if Iceland were seized by the Soviets before U.S. forces had arrived, it is estimated that a 1 division amphibious assault would be necessary to retake it. The division thus required should be in being on D-Day. This division would be composed mainly of the RCT mentioned above and the 4/9 division earmarked for operations in North Africa but not required until D + 3 months as set forth under "Establish or expand and defend Allied bases as required in northwest Africa and North Africa," page 231. Further protection against Soviet naval forces would be provided by Allied naval forces listed under "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc., and "Secure sea and air lines of communication," etc.

(b) Azores. The Azores would have strategic importance in the maintenance of essential sea and air LOCs and as a necessary base area for ASW operations. They should also be denied to the Soviets as a base for bomber staging or submarine refueling.

Since the Azores are over two thousand nautical miles from any air or naval bases likely to be in possession of the Soviets on D-Day, the only significant threats to these islands would be sporadic bombing and submarine attacks and possible sabotage. These activities would probably be conducted only on a small scale as the Soviets will have far more lucrative targets closer to the USSR.

Security of the Azores as an important link in sea and air LOCs would require employment of one battalion of ground forces and one all-weather fighter squadron. Naval local-defense forces would also be required, with some buildup during the first three months as shipping through this area increases. Initial forces for defense of the Azores should be provided as soon after D-Day as possible.

Forces for this course of action together with forces shown under "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc.. and "Secure sea and air LOCs," etc., are also shown on the map. . . .

(2) Tasks

(a) Immediately after D-Day—or before, if practicable—provide ground, air, and antiaircraft forces to secure and defend Iceland, utilizing airlift as necessary.

(b) As soon as possible after D-Day provide ground and air units to secure and defend the Azores.

(c) Defend the sea approaches to Iceland and the Azores.
(d) Provide naval local-defense forces for Iceland and the Azores. [See force-requirement charts.] . .
b. Establish or Expand and Defend Allied Bases as Required in Northwest Africa and North Africa

(I) Analysis

The maintenance of sea and air lines of communication in the Mediterranean for the furtherance of Allied operations in the Near and Middle East and the support and logistic supply for naval forces in the Mediterranean would require bases in the Port Lyautey-Casablanca, Oran-Algiers, Bizerte—Gabes Gulf areas, Tripoli, and Cyrenaica. Cognizance is taken that Malta would probably be used by U.S. forces, particularly submarines, and that Gibraltar and Alexandria could be used for some support of U.S. escort and ASW units.

Base requirements in North Africa would be as follows:

Port Lyautey / Air base.
Casablanca / Naval operating base. Escort terminal with facilities for limited ship repairs. Base on the air LOC.

Algiers / Intermediate escort station for convoy assembly. Alternate base on the air LOC.
Bizerte / Escort terminal. Secondary naval air base. Advanced secondary operating base with facilities for emergency ship repairs.

Tripoli / Limited escort terminal. Base on the air LOC.
Cyrenaica / Fighter air base for protection of sea LOC between Crete and Cyrenaica. Alternate base on the air LOC.

The need for these bases would require that facilities at Port Lyautey, Casablanca, and the air LOC facilities at Tripoli be available on D-day. Bases at Bizerte, Gabes Gulf, and Cyrenaica would be required by D+ 1 and those at Oran and Algiers by D + 3. Naval base facilities at Tripoli would also be required by D + 3. An additional threat to these bases could exist from unfriendly native elements.

The principal Soviet threat to the foregoing bases would probably take the form of air and submarine attacks from progressively advanced bases in Greece and Turkey and would increase in intensity after D+3 months.

To counteract the Soviet threats, Allied forces would be required as follows: at Port Lyautey and Casablanca, a small number of fighters should be provided on D-day, together with naval local-defense forces; at Oran and Algiers a small number of fighters, antiaircraft defenses, and naval local-defense forces should be provided by D + 3 months; at Gibraltar and Malta beginning on D-Day, minimum ground forces, fighter and antiaircraft defenses, and naval local-defense forces should be provided; in the Bizerte-Gabes Gulf-Tripoli-Cyrenaica area, between D + 1 month and D + 3 months, forces equivalent to a total of about % division, 1 fighter group, antiaircraft defenses, and naval local-defense forces should be provided. Alexandria is covered under subparagraph c of this course of action dealing with the Cairo-Suez area.

To counteract the threat from unfriendly natives, at least 1 additional Allied division would be required in North Africa from D-Day onward.

(2) Tasks

(a) Provide air defenses and naval local-defense forces for bases at Port Lyautey and Casablanca.

(b) Provide ground defenses, air defenses, antiaircraft defenses, and naval local-defense forces for Gibraltar, Malta, and Bizerte-Gabes Gulf.

(d) Provide ground defense, antiaircraft defenses, and naval local-defense forces for Tripoli. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

c. Ensure the Availability of Suitable Bases Required in the Cairo-Suez-Aden Area Prior to D-Day

(1) Analysis. Defense of the Cairo-Suez-Aden area would retain for the Allies strategic air bases for attacks against the vulnerable southern flank of the USSR and would provide the vital base area required to support operations for ensuring the availability of Near and Middle East oil. This area would also provide a base for projecting subsequent advances toward the heart of the USSR. The Cairo-Suez area contains airfields and base facilities, ports, important manpower and industrial potential including a communications network, and the Suez Canal. The holding of Crete and Cyprus would contribute considerably to the security of the Cairo-Suez and Iskenderun-Aleppo areas and the LOCs leading thereto. The Aden area would be important to the control of the Red Sea-Arabian Sea LOC and in addition contains British air bases and port facilities which should be available on D-Day.

As long as the Allies hold the area southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf, the Soviet threat to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area would be reduced to air attack and air and sea interdiction of LOCs. The Cairo-Suez-Aden area would be within range of Soviet long-range bombers on D-Day, although the Aden area should be relatively safe from such attacks. Soviet submarines could attack sea communications to Alexandria and Port Said. Airborne attacks against the Cairo-Suez area would also be possible, but forces used would undoubtedly be sacrificed because of the difficulty of re-supply.

By D + 3 months some increase in the air threat in the eastern Mediterranean might be expected since air bases in Greece and Turkey would probably be available to the Soviet air forces. However, this increased threat would not be too serious in the Cairo-Suez area since it would be counteracted by the buildup of Allied land-based air and carrier task forces in the eastern Mediterranean area as developed in other courses of action.

Allied D-Day requirements for the air defense of the Cairo-Suez area would be about one fighter group (75 a/c). The strength of this group would have to be increased to wartime strength (114 a/c) by D + 3 months to take care of the increased threat. Naval forces would also have to provide local defense for both Alexandria and Port Said. Ground-force requirements are estimated to be one U.S. equivalent division for defense against airborne attacks. AA defenses would be required at Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, Ismalia, and Suez. The island of Crete should be secured by Greek forces withdrawing from Greece at about D + 3 months. These should consist of 2 divisions, 1 fighter group, and a small amount of AA protection and naval local-defense forces. Cyprus should be defended on D-Day by British forces consisting of 'A infantry division, 1 fighter squadron, and necessary AA protection and naval local-defense forces. Additional protection for the Cairo-Suez area and defense of sea approaches thereto would be provided by the naval forces required in the Mediterranean and discussed under "Conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces," etc.

Requirements for the defense of Aden and other Red Sea ports would not be significant unless the Cairo-Suez area becomes untenable. Necessary minimum forces should be provided for keeping the Red Sea LOC open and providing necessary protection for ports, airfields, and other installations. . . .

(2) Tasks

(a) Provide ground, air, and antiaircraft defenses of the Cairo-Suez area.

(b) Defend the sea approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area.

(d) Provide ground, air, antiaircraft, and naval local-defense forces for
Crete.

(e) Provide ground, air, antiaircraft, and naval local-defense forces for Cyprus. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

d. Have Forces in Being on D-Day in Okinawa for the Security of that Island

(1) Analysis. Because of its existing facilities, location, and relative security from Soviet attacks, Okinawa would be the most suitable base for strategic air operations in the Far East.

The principal Soviet threat to Okinawa would probably be in the form of air attacks developing primarily from Korea and North and East China. The Soviets might have some additional capabilities for airborne and seaborne attacks although logistic difficulties involved in supply and resupply would probably preclude any such attacks except on a minor scale. The defense of Okinawa should therefore be achieved primarily by air and naval forces developed under other tasks.

Since the holding of Japan would provide additional security for Okinawa, it is estimated that ground and air forces for the defense of Okinawa could be limited to 1 RCT, 1 fighter group, and V3 all-weather interceptor group and some AA protection.

The defense of the sea approaches to Okinawa should be provided by carrier and cruiser task groups and fleet air squadrons in the western Pacific. . . . (2)Tasks

(a) Provide ground, air. and AA defenses of Okinawa.
(b) Defend the sea approaches to Okinawa.
(c) Provide naval local-defenses forces. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

e. Provide Necessary Minimum Protection for Other Overseas Bases Essential to the Maintenance of Sea and Air Lines of Communication

(1) Analysis

. . . Guam would be required as a major naval supporting base in the Pacific. Other bases required for the sea LOCs in the Pacific would include Midway, Kwajalein, and the Philippines. Emergency repair and sea LOC bases at Singapore. Colombo, and Trincomalee in Ceylon—together with escort terminal bases in Australia and New Zealand—would be used. Facilities at Capetown should be expanded to provide escort terminal facilities in the event the Mediterranean lines of communication should be closed. In addition to the foregoing, air bases for servicing traffic on the air LOCs in the Pacific should be established and maintained in Hawaii. Johnston Island. Kwajalein. the Marianas, the Philippines, the Line Islands, the Fiji Islands. Canton Island, New Caledonia. Australia, and New Zealand. In Southeast Asia, air LOC bases would be required in French Indochina, Burma, Siam, India, Singapore, and Ceylon. Those in the South Atlantic-central Africa area would be in Trinidad, the Guianas, Brazil, Ascension Island, French West Africa, Liberia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan:

The principal threat to bases in the central and south Pacific would probably be sporadic harassing raids by submarines. The importance of Guam as a base for U.S. naval units in the Pacific would make it an additional objective for Soviet long-range bombing attacks. Singapore, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand are within the radius of Soviet submarines. Bases in the Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia area could be attacked by Soviet long-range aircraft. The initial threat to the Philippines would probably consist of occasional air raids plus Soviet submarine activity in the approaches to Manila. As the Soviets advance south in Asia, increased bombing attacks on Allied bases in the Indian Ocean-Southeast Asia area and on Allied airfields and shipping facilities in the western Pacific could be expected.

The Soviet threat to bases on sea and air LOCs in the South American-South Atlantic-central Africa area would be negligible and would probably consist only of limited submarine and mining activity in some areas.

Requirements for defense of Pacific-Indian Ocean area bases would vary with their importance and their distance from Soviet bases. Air bases on Midway [and] Johnston Island and in the Line Islands, Canton Islands, the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean area would require no local defense forces except for base personnel. Kwajalein would require naval local-defense forces. Guam, being an important naval base, would require 1 BCT [Battalion Combat Team], lA night fighter group, antiaircraft, and naval local—defense forces. Local naval and antiaircraft defenses for Singapore and local naval defenses for bases in Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand should be provided. Local naval defense forces would be required at Subic Bay and Sangley Point. Finally, as a theater reserve for the entire western Pacific area, it is considered that one RCT should be available to the theater commander by about D + 2 months to counter possible Soviet lodgement which might pose a threat to the line Japan-Okinawa-Philippines. Additional protection would be furnished by fleet air squadrons based on Midway, Guam, Kwajalein, [and] Okinawa and in Japan and the Philippines as covered under "Secure sea and air lines of communication," etc.

Requirements for defense of bases in the South Atlantic-central Africa area would not be significant owing to their great distance from Soviet bases. Air LOC bases in Trinidad, the Guianas, Brazil, Ascension Island, French West Africa, Liberia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan would require no protection beyond that furnished by base personnel.
At essential bases where no Allied defense forces are provided under other courses of action and which may be subject to sporadic air or surface raids, sufficient qualified personnel should be provided to maintain defensive equipment and instruct the local base operating personnel in its use.

(2) Tasks

(a) Provide ground, air, antiaircraft, and nava] local-defense forces for Guam.

(b) Provide antiaircraft and naval local-defense forces for Singapore.

(c) Provide naval local-defense forces for bases in Kwajalein, the Philippines, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand, and Capetown.

(d) Provide a theater reserve of ground forces for the western Pacific. [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

13. Expand the Overall Power of the Armed Forces for Later Operations Against the Soviet Powers

a. Analysis.

The Allies must provide at the earliest possible date additional balanced forces of all arms for major offensive operations. A phased mobilization of manpower for the military forces in consonance with their planned employment for Phases I, II, and III and consistent with the manpower requirements of war industry should be initiated as far in advance of D-Day as warranted by intelligence of heightened Soviet war preparation. Simultaneously, a maximum industrial mobilization for the requirements of a long war should also be set in motion.
It is probable that the personnel and materiel requirements of U.S. and Allied forces for implementing Phase I of the concept of operations will impose a heavy burden on our resources, since D-Day strength of the armed forces must provide for initial offensive and defensive dispositions, replacement of combat losses, and for the cadres necessary for activation and training of additional units required for later operations. Depending upon the type units required and upon prewar stocks of materiel available, and generally exclusive of national-guard units and of organized reserves, a period of twelve to eighteen months after the initiation of mobilization will be required before trained and equipped combat units, in addition to those in being on M-Day, will be available for combat deployment. . . .

PHASE II

(1) Continue the air offensive, to include the intensification of the air battle with the objective of obtaining air supremacy.

(2) Maintain our holding operations along the general line of discriminate containment, exploiting local opportunities for improving our position there and exerting unremitting pressure against the Soviet citadel.

(3) Maintain control of other essential land and sea areas and increase our measure of control of essential lines of communication.

(4) Reenforce our forces in the Far East as necessary to contain the Communist forces to the mainland of Asia and to defend the southern Malay Peninsula.

(5) Continue the provision of essential aid to Allies in support of efforts contributing directly to the overall strategic concept.

(6) Intensify psychological, economic, and underground warfare.

(7) Establish control and enforce surrender terms in the USSR and satellite countries in the event of capitulation during Phase II.

(8) Generate at the earliest possible date sufficient balanced forces, together with their shipping and logistic requirements, to achieve a decision in Europe.

PHASE III

(1) While continuing courses of action ... of Phase II, initiate a major land offensive in Europe to cut off and destroy all or the major part of the Soviet forces in Europe.* [See force-requirement chart.] . . .

14. Provide Essential Aid to Our Allies in Support of Efforts Contributing Directly to the Overall Strategic Concept

The successful accomplishment of many of the courses of action . . . will depend fully as much upon timely provision of essential military aid to our allies as upon fulfillment of requirements for our own military forces. . . .

Further development of this course of action cannot be made prior to a revision of the program by the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee and its review by the Munitions Board.

15. Initiate or Intensify Psychological, Economic, and Underground Warfare

a. Analysis

The initiation or intensification of psychological, economic, and underground warfare directed at both friendly and enemy groups or countries would greatly enhance the chances of an early and successful conclusion of the war by assisting in overcoming the enemy's will to fight, sustaining the morale of friendly groups in enemy territory, and improving the morale of friendly countries and the attitude of neutral countries toward the Allies.

This type of warfare has a peacetime application against the Soviets and toward friendly nations as well, but it should be greatly stepped up upon the outbreak of war and should exploit to the maximum the psychological effects of the strategic air offensive. It would require participation of all services to assist other agencies in its execution.

It is considered that no force requirements additional to those developed by other courses of action are generated, although specially trained personnel, special types of equipment, some logistic support, and other facilities on a minor scale will be required within the military establishment.

b. Tasks

(1) Collaborate in the integration of psychological, economic, and underground warfare with plans for military operations.

(2) Provide assistance as necessary for the execution of psychological, economic, and underground warfare. . . .

16. Establish Control and Enforce Surrender Terms in the USSR and Satellite Countries (in the Event of a Possible Early Capitulation of the USSR During Phase I)

a. Analysis

In order to ensure compliance with our national objectives, the Allies would have to occupy selected areas of the USSR and her satellites and establish some form of Allied control in each of those countries.

A method of control under the conditions which would exist in the event of early capitulation, affording maximum control with minimum forces, might be to occupy selected bridgeheads in the USSR and other selected centers which would serve as bases for projection of control in both the USSR and her satellites. It is considered that the greater portion of control forces should be in bridgehead areas with minimum forces in the interior.

Areas selected as centers of control in the USSR should be urban areas which are of strategic importance such as the following: political and administrative centers, communication centers, major seaports or naval bases, oil-producing or refining centers. Areas selected in the satellites as centers of control should be the various capitals and certain key seaports and urban areas. Centers of control in the USSR should be grouped into larger regions of responsibility. Regions of responsibility in the USSR with their respective control centers selected for this plan, are as follows: . . .

Regions of Responsibility	Main Control Centers	Subcenters of Control

Western USSR	Moscow	Moscow
		Leningrad
		Murmansk
		Minsk
		Gorki
		Kuibishev

Caucasus-Ukraine	Kiev	Kiev
		Kharkov
		Odessa
		Sevastopol
		Rostov
		Novorossisk
		Batumi
		Baku

Ural-West Siberia-Turkestan	Omsk	Omsk
		Sverdlovsk
		Chelyabinsk
		Novo Sibirsk
		Tashkent

East Siberia-Transbaikal-Maritime	Khabarovsk	Khabarovsk
		Irkutsk
		Vladivostok

[For] centers of control in the European satellites and Korea, as selected for this plan, [see relevant] map.

Except for Korea, which it is considered will be under the firm control of Soviet forces, no requirements for control forces for the possible Far Eastern satellites are developed. It is considered that Communist China and other areas of Southeast Asia controlled by indigenous Communists, unlike Korea and the European satellites, will not be under the complete domination of the Soviets and in the event of an early capitulation by the USSR will not necessarily also capitulate. Consequently the introduction of Allied control forces into those areas may be neither feasible nor desirable upon the capitulation of the USSR since full-scale operations against opposition may be required. Therefore appropriate action in those areas would have to be decided upon after a determination of the existing situation following the capitulation of the USSR. Cognizance should be taken of the possibility that the fulfillment of the national objectives of the United States may require major offensive operations in the Far East and Southeast Asia after the capitulation of the USSR.

It is considered that the basic element of control should be exercised by ground forces based in and operating from the control subcenters. The most suitable control unit readily available would be the division augmented by additional motor transport to give it increased mobility. On this basis, a total of thirty-eight divisions is estimated to be the minimum requirements for the control centers shown on the map referred to above.

Since the means of control envisaged would in reality be a skeleton occupation, it is considered that a high ratio of air-force units would be desirable in order to bring visible evidence of Allied strength before the Soviet and satellite people. These air-force units should be organized, disposed, and controlled on a broader regional concept than the ground forces in order to assure flexibility and maximum effectiveness with the minimum of forces in assisting and supporting the ground forces. On this basis five reinforced tactical air forces, each consisting of approximately five to six combat groups and one troop-carrier group with an attached assault or glider squadron, should be assigned the following regions of responsibility: western USSR, Caucasus-Ukraine, Urals-west Siberia-Turkestan, east Siberia-Transbaikal-maritime (including Korea) and the European satellite area.

Ground and air forces would be provided from forces released from other tasks and should be moved to selected centers of control by the most feasible and rapid means available in each case. Logistic support would be mainly by sea transport and railroad, augmented, especially in the initial stages, by air transport. It is recognized that tremendous logistic problems would exist in the supply of Allied control forces, particularly those destined for areas deep in the USSR. Allied troop-carrier and air-transport units would be strained to the utmost in providing airlift. A considerable period might elapse before full complements of Allied ground and air forces reached all control centers, but every effort should be made to reduce this time to the minimum, even though capitulation had already been obtained.

A carrier task force should be provided in each of the Baltic and Black seas to provide a reserve striking force and to serve as a psychological factor to impress the Soviet and satellite peoples.
A reserve of divisions, fighter and bomber groups, and troop-carrier units should be earmarked by the Allies when released from other tasks to be available for re-enforcement of the control forces if required. The size and composition would be dependent upon the situation existing at the time.
The forces required for this course of action, with the possible exception of those required for airlift, could be made available from those which have been developed for the other courses of action in Phase I. The balance of forces then in existence should be retained operational in reserve until full control of the USSR and her satellites is established and until the situation in Southeast Asia and the Far East has been clarified.

b. Tasks

(1) Move control forces to selected centers in the USSR and in satellite countries.

(2) Establish some form of Allied control in the USSR and in satellite countries.

(3) Enforce surrender terms imposed upon the USSR and its satellites.

(4) Reestablish civil government in the USSR and satellite countries.

c. Requirements

The estimated Allied forces initially required for control of the USSR and satellite areas are set forth [below]. Subsequently these forces would be reduced as rapidly as possible, consistent with the degree and effectiveness of the accomplishment of their tasks.

(1) Army. USSR: Moscow (2 divisions); Leningrad (1); Minsk (1); Mur
mansk (1); Gorki (1); Kuibishev(l); Kiev(l); Kharkov (1); Odessa (1); Sevas
topol (1); Rostov (1); Novorossisk (1); Batumi (1); Baku (1); Sverdlovsk (1);
Chelyabinsk (1); Tashkent (1); Omsk (1); Novosibirsk (1); Irkutsk (1); Kha
barovsk (1); Vladivostok (1); Total: 23 divisions.

(2) Navy. Port Detachments: Black Sea—1 carrier task group; Baltic Sea—1
carrier task group.

Satellite Areas	Location	Divisions
Germany	Berlin	1
	Hamburg	1
Poland	Danzig	1
	Warsaw	1
Czechoslovakia	Prague	1
Estonia	Tallinn	1
Latvia	Riga	1
Lithuania	Kaunas	1
Hungary	Budapest	1
Romania	Bucharest	1
	Constanta	1
Bulgaria	Sofia	1
Yugoslavia	Belgrade	1
	Zagreb	1 (-1 RCT)
Albania	Tirana	1 (RCT)
Korea	Seoul	1
		15 Div

(3) Air Force

	Fighter Gr.	Tactical rec. Gr.	Troop Carrier Gr.	Glider Squadron	Total Combat Gr.
Western USSR	4	1	1	1	5
Caucasus-Ukraine	4	1	1	1	5
Urals-West Siberia-Turkestan	4	1	1	1	5
East Siberia-Transbaikal-Maritime	4	1	1	1	5
European Satellitre Area	5	1	1	1	6
Totals	21	5	5	5	26

[Declassified in 1977, appendixes are not included - Allworldwars]

Recent Record

Latest MatchLatest Match

VOLUME 1. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, DISASTER, AND DEFENSE
1.Mission
2.Basic Assumption
3.National War Objectives of the United States
3.1.The Problem
3.2.Analysis of the Nature of Threat
3.3.Conclusions
4.Special Assumptions
5.Overall Strategic Concept
6.Basic Undertakings
7.Phased Concept of Operations
VOLUME 2. HOLDING THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE, PREPARING FOR THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE
I.Summary of Opposing Situations
1. Political Factors
2. Economic Factors
3. Relative Combat Power
II.Probable Soviet Strategic Objectives
III. Soviet Capabilities
1. Eurasia
2. British Isles
3. Canada and the United States
4. North Atlantic Islands
5. Alaska, the Aleutians, and the North Pacific
6. Caribbean Area
7. Allied Sea Communications
IV.Probable Soviet Courses of Action
1. Summary of Strategic Considerations
2. Initial Courses of Action
3. Subsequent Courses of Action
V.Allied Courses of Action
1. General Considerations
2. Western Hemisphere: Secure the Western Hemisphere
3. North Atlantic Approaches: Secure the North Atlantic Islands
4. Western Europe
5. Northern Europe
6. Near and Middle East
7. Far East
8. General Courses of Action
VI. Selection Of Allied Courses of Action
1. Basic Undertakings
2. Other General Courses of Action
4. Western Europe
5. Near and Middle East
6. Northern Europe
7. North Atlantic Approaches
9. Consolidation of Certain Selected Courses of Action
10. Summary of Selected Courses of Action
VOLUME 3. THE STRATEGIC COUNTER OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION OF THE USSR
Phase I. Development of Tasks and Force Requirements
1. General
2. Relative Importance of Courses of Action
3. Secure the Western Hemisphere
4. Conduct an Air Offensive Against the Soviet Powers
5. Conduct Offensive Operations to Destroy Enemy Naval Forces, Shipping, Naval Bases, and Supporting Facilities
6. Hold the United Kingdom
7. Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave Line
8. Hold the Area Southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf
9. Hold Maximum Areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia Consistent with Indigenous Capabilities Supported by Other Allied Courses of Action
10. Hold Japan less Hokkaido
11. Secure Sea and Air Lines of Communication Essential to the Accomplishment of the Overall Strategic Concept
12. Secure Overseas Bases Essential to the Accomplishment of the Overall Strategic Concept
13. Expand the Overall Power of the Armed Forces for Later Operations Against the Soviet Powers
Phase II
Phase III
14. Provide Essential Aid to Our Allies in Support of Efforts Contributing Directly to the Overall Strategic Concept
15. Initiate or Intensify Psychological, Economic, and Underground Warfare
16. Establish Control and Enforce Surrender Terms in the USSR and Satellite Countries (in the Event of a Possible Early Capitulation of the USSR During Phase I)

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ALL WORLD WARS

"DROPSHOT" - AMERICAN P:AN FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1957

VOLUME 1. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, DISASTER, AND DEFENSE.

1. MISSION

2. BASIC ASSUMPTION

3. NATIONAL WAR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

THE POBLEM

ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THREATS

CONCLUSIONS

4. SPECIAL ASSUMPTIONS

5. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

7. PHASED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

VOLUME 2. HOLDING THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE, PREPARING FOR THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE.

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

I. SUMMARY OF OPPOSING SITUATIONS

1. Political Factors

2. Economic Factors

3. Relative Combat Power

II.PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

III. SOVIET CAPABILITIES

1. Eurasia

2. British Isles

3. Canada and the United States

4. North Atlantic Islands

5. Alaska, the Aleutians, and the North Pacific

6. Caribbean Area

7. Allied Sea Communications

IV.PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

1. Summary of Strategic Considerations

2. Initial Courses of Action

3. Subsequent Courses of Action

V. ALLIED COURSES OF ACTION

1. General Considerations

2. Western Hemisphere: Secure the Western Hemisphere

3. North Atlantic Approaches: Secure the North Atlantic Islands

4. Western Europe

5. Northern Europe

6. Near and Middle East

7. Far East

8. General Courses of Action

VI. SELECTION OF AILIED COURSES OF ACTION

1. Basic Undertakings

2. Other General Courses of Action

4. Western Europe

5. Near and Middle East

6. Northern Europe

7. North Atlantic Approaches

9. Consolidation of Certain Selected Courses of Action

10. Summary of Selected Courses of Action

VOLUME 3. THE STRATEGIC COUNTER OFFENSIVE AND THE DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION OF THE USSR.

(PHASE I) DEVELOPMENT OF TASKS AND FORCE REQUIREMENTS

1. General

2. Relative Importance of Courses of Action

3. Secure the Western Hemisphere a. Analysis

4. Conduct an Air Offensive Against the Soviet Powers

5. Conduct Offensive Operations to Destroy Enemy Naval Forces, Shipping, Naval Bases, and Supporting Facilities

6. Hold the United Kingdom,

7. Hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave Line

8. Hold the Area Southeastern Turkey-Tigris Valley-Persian Gulf

9. Hold Maximum Areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia Consistent with Indigenous Capabilities Supported by Other Allied Courses of Action

10. Hold Japan less Hokkaido

11. Secure Sea and Air Lines of Communication Essential to the Accomplishment of the Overall Strategic Concept

12. Secure Overseas Bases Essential to the Accomplishment of the Overall Strategic Concept

13. Expand the Overall Power of the Armed Forces for Later Operations Against the Soviet Powers

PHASE II

PHASE III

14. Provide Essential Aid to Our Allies in Support of Efforts Contributing Directly to the Overall Strategic Concept

15. Initiate or Intensify Psychological, Economic, and Underground Warfare

16. Establish Control and Enforce Surrender Terms in the USSR and Satellite Countries (in the Event of a Possible Early Capitulation of the USSR During Phase I)

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